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authorGary Mai <garymai@google.com>2018-09-05 15:17:41 -0700
committerMSe <mse1969@posteo.de>2019-02-02 21:51:31 +0100
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Patch URI vulnerability in contact photo editing
Don't allow reading of "file://" URIs that don't point to "/storage" during the photo saving flow. This is to prevent malicious apps from asking us to read our own private files which we copy into a temporary "content://" URI that we give to a cropping app (with permission to read). Fixing here patches both PhotoSelectionHandler.java and AttachPhotoActivity.java. Tested: Manual with the fake gallery app. Confirmed that selecting an "image" with a URI of our own shared_pref file fails without reading it. ContactPhotoUtilsTest Bug: 113597344 Change-Id: Iabb4f8139cedb7d7b865d69a4b95a4997f64c71d (cherry picked from commit ccfd94b965c1e9c2e0b239c12137c239c602070d) CVE-2018-9587
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