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authorSteffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>2012-09-04 00:03:29 +0000
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2012-10-13 05:28:03 +0900
commit7218addc4b8bec641937e8236099f52974cf5687 (patch)
treec652c211b50e88e846cc079de2d669c5855c04d0
parent21de4eb26ec0b1b9c484da823fbcd1d3a48afec9 (diff)
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xfrm: Workaround incompatibility of ESN and async crypto
[ Upstream commit 3b59df46a449ec9975146d71318c4777ad086744 ] ESN for esp is defined in RFC 4303. This RFC assumes that the sequence number counters are always up to date. However, this is not true if an async crypto algorithm is employed. If the sequence number counters are not up to date on sequence number check, we may incorrectly update the upper 32 bit of the sequence number. This leads to a DOS. We workaround this by comparing the upper sequence number, (used for authentication) with the upper sequence number computed after the async processing. We drop the packet if these numbers are different. To do this, we introduce a recheck function that does this check in the ESN case. Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
-rw-r--r--include/net/xfrm.h3
-rw-r--r--net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c2
-rw-r--r--net/xfrm/xfrm_replay.c15
3 files changed, 19 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/include/net/xfrm.h b/include/net/xfrm.h
index b203e14d26b..921f6270a20 100644
--- a/include/net/xfrm.h
+++ b/include/net/xfrm.h
@@ -269,6 +269,9 @@ struct xfrm_replay {
int (*check)(struct xfrm_state *x,
struct sk_buff *skb,
__be32 net_seq);
+ int (*recheck)(struct xfrm_state *x,
+ struct sk_buff *skb,
+ __be32 net_seq);
void (*notify)(struct xfrm_state *x, int event);
int (*overflow)(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb);
};
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c
index 54a0dc2e2f8..ab2bb42fe09 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c
@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ resume:
/* only the first xfrm gets the encap type */
encap_type = 0;
- if (async && x->repl->check(x, skb, seq)) {
+ if (async && x->repl->recheck(x, skb, seq)) {
XFRM_INC_STATS(net, LINUX_MIB_XFRMINSTATESEQERROR);
goto drop_unlock;
}
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_replay.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_replay.c
index 3235023eaf4..379c1764ffa 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_replay.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_replay.c
@@ -437,6 +437,18 @@ err:
return -EINVAL;
}
+static int xfrm_replay_recheck_esn(struct xfrm_state *x,
+ struct sk_buff *skb, __be32 net_seq)
+{
+ if (unlikely(XFRM_SKB_CB(skb)->seq.input.hi !=
+ htonl(xfrm_replay_seqhi(x, net_seq)))) {
+ x->stats.replay_window++;
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ return xfrm_replay_check_esn(x, skb, net_seq);
+}
+
static void xfrm_replay_advance_esn(struct xfrm_state *x, __be32 net_seq)
{
unsigned int bitnr, nr, i;
@@ -508,6 +520,7 @@ static void xfrm_replay_advance_esn(struct xfrm_state *x, __be32 net_seq)
static struct xfrm_replay xfrm_replay_legacy = {
.advance = xfrm_replay_advance,
.check = xfrm_replay_check,
+ .recheck = xfrm_replay_check,
.notify = xfrm_replay_notify,
.overflow = xfrm_replay_overflow,
};
@@ -515,6 +528,7 @@ static struct xfrm_replay xfrm_replay_legacy = {
static struct xfrm_replay xfrm_replay_bmp = {
.advance = xfrm_replay_advance_bmp,
.check = xfrm_replay_check_bmp,
+ .recheck = xfrm_replay_check_bmp,
.notify = xfrm_replay_notify_bmp,
.overflow = xfrm_replay_overflow_bmp,
};
@@ -522,6 +536,7 @@ static struct xfrm_replay xfrm_replay_bmp = {
static struct xfrm_replay xfrm_replay_esn = {
.advance = xfrm_replay_advance_esn,
.check = xfrm_replay_check_esn,
+ .recheck = xfrm_replay_recheck_esn,
.notify = xfrm_replay_notify_bmp,
.overflow = xfrm_replay_overflow_esn,
};