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authorRob Barnes <robbarnes@google.com>2018-09-24 10:35:29 -0600
committerRob Barnes <robbarnes@google.com>2018-09-26 06:10:20 +0000
commit2c46b2e3b8bb07b3f261eea514a3ada1e2457b50 (patch)
tree73acf4f5e188123feaab34cf54a8971ece9faf8f /keymaster
parentf5fda3976a1e0ea1ff479c480bdc926eb9ba2e6a (diff)
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Fixed minor comment typos in IKeymasterDevice.hal
Test: 'make checkbuild' finished successfully. Change-Id: I4ceb39475fff176bfcd57e10335aa1af64849739
Diffstat (limited to 'keymaster')
-rw-r--r--keymaster/4.0/IKeymasterDevice.hal18
1 files changed, 9 insertions, 9 deletions
diff --git a/keymaster/4.0/IKeymasterDevice.hal b/keymaster/4.0/IKeymasterDevice.hal
index 85a25c6d3..c867ab0c9 100644
--- a/keymaster/4.0/IKeymasterDevice.hal
+++ b/keymaster/4.0/IKeymasterDevice.hal
@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ import android.hardware.keymaster@3.0::KeyFormat;
* startup, preferably by the bootloader. This bitstring must be cryptographically bound to every
* key managed by the IKeymasterDevice. As above, the recommended mechanism for this cryptographic
* binding is to include the Root of Trust data in the input to the key derivation function used to
- * derive a key that is used to encryp the private/secret key material.
+ * derive a key that is used to encrypt the private/secret key material.
*
* The root of trust consists of a bitstring that must be derived from the public key used by
* Verified Boot to verify the signature on the boot image and from the the lock state of the
@@ -386,7 +386,7 @@ interface IKeymasterDevice {
* Generates a new cryptographic key, specifying associated parameters, which must be
* cryptographically bound to the key. IKeymasterDevice implementations must disallow any use
* of a key in any way inconsistent with the authorizations specified at generation time. With
- * respect to parameters that the secure environment cannot enforce, the secure envionment's
+ * respect to parameters that the secure environment cannot enforce, the secure environment's
* obligation is limited to ensuring that the unenforceable parameters associated with the key
* cannot be modified, so that every call to getKeyCharacteristics returns the original
* values. In addition, the characteristics returned by generateKey places parameters correctly
@@ -433,7 +433,7 @@ interface IKeymasterDevice {
* supported for RSA keys.
*
* o Tag::DIGEST specifies digest algorithms that may be used with the new key. TEE
- * IKeymasterDevice implementatiosn must support all Digest values (see types.hal) for RSA
+ * IKeymasterDevice implementations must support all Digest values (see types.hal) for RSA
* keys. StrongBox IKeymasterDevice implementations must support SHA_2_256.
*
* o Tag::PADDING specifies the padding modes that may be used with the new
@@ -495,13 +495,13 @@ interface IKeymasterDevice {
*
* @param keyFormat The format of the key material to import. See KeyFormat in types.hal.
*
- * @pram keyData The key material to import, in the format specifed in keyFormat.
+ * @pram keyData The key material to import, in the format specified in keyFormat.
*
* @return keyBlob Opaque descriptor of the imported key. The recommended implementation
* strategy is to include an encrypted copy of the key material, wrapped in a key
* unavailable outside secure hardware.
*
- * @return keyCharacteristics Decription of the generated key. See the getKeyCharacteristics
+ * @return keyCharacteristics Description of the generated key. See the getKeyCharacteristics
* method below.
*/
importKey(vec<KeyParameter> keyParams, KeyFormat keyFormat, vec<uint8_t> keyData)
@@ -615,7 +615,7 @@ interface IKeymasterDevice {
* value, it must be computationally infeasible for the secure hardware to obtain the key
* material.
*
- * @return keyCharacteristics Decription of the generated key. See KeyCharacteristics in
+ * @return keyCharacteristics Description of the generated key. See KeyCharacteristics in
* types.hal.
*/
getKeyCharacteristics(vec<uint8_t> keyBlob, vec<uint8_t> clientId, vec<uint8_t> appData)
@@ -815,7 +815,7 @@ interface IKeymasterDevice {
* any one of them is higher than the corresponding current device value upgradeKey() must
* return ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT. There is one exception: it is always permissible to
* "downgrade" from any OS_VERSION number to OS_VERSION 0. For example, if the key has
- * OS_VERSION 080001, it is permisible to upgrade the key if the current system version is
+ * OS_VERSION 080001, it is permissible to upgrade the key if the current system version is
* 080100, because the new version is larger, or if the current system version is 0, because
* upgrades to 0 are always allowed. If the system version were 080000, however, keymaster must
* return ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT because that value is smaller than 080001. Values other
@@ -1040,7 +1040,7 @@ interface IKeymasterDevice {
* authorizations contain Tag::CALLER_NONCE, then the caller may provide an IV/nonce with
* Tag::NONCE in inParams. If a nonce is provided when Tag::CALLER_NONCE is not authorized,
* begin() must return ErrorCode::CALLER_NONCE_PROHIBITED. If a nonce is not provided when
- * Tag::CALLER_NONCE is authorized, IKeymasterDevice msut generate a random IV/nonce.
+ * Tag::CALLER_NONCE is authorized, IKeymasterDevice must generate a random IV/nonce.
*
* -- HMAC keys --
*
@@ -1082,7 +1082,7 @@ interface IKeymasterDevice {
/**
* Provides data to, and possibly receives output from, an ongoing cryptographic operation begun
- * with begin(). The operation is specified by the operationHandle paramater.
+ * with begin(). The operation is specified by the operationHandle parameter.
*
* If operationHandle is invalid, update() must return ErrorCode::INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE.
*