diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | domain.te | 3 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | recovery.te | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | unconfined.te | 3 |
3 files changed, 7 insertions, 1 deletions
@@ -147,6 +147,9 @@ neverallow { domain -relabeltodomain } *:dir_file_class_set relabelto; ### neverallow rules ### +neverallow domain self:capability2 mac_override; +neverallow { domain -recovery } self:capability2 mac_admin; + # Only init should be able to load SELinux policies. # The first load technically occurs while still in the kernel domain, # but this does not trigger a denial since there is no policy yet. diff --git a/recovery.te b/recovery.te index eb2a2b0..abcf0cf 100644 --- a/recovery.te +++ b/recovery.te @@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ allow recovery rootfs:file entrypoint; unconfined_domain(recovery) relabelto_domain(recovery) +allow recovery self:capability2 mac_admin; + allow recovery {fs_type dev_type -kmem_device file_type}:dir_file_class_set relabelto; allow recovery unlabeled:filesystem mount; diff --git a/unconfined.te b/unconfined.te index 9facc2e..8d424f3 100644 --- a/unconfined.te +++ b/unconfined.te @@ -16,7 +16,8 @@ # The use of this template is discouraged. ###################################################### -allow unconfineddomain self:capability_class_set *; +allow unconfineddomain self:capability *; +allow unconfineddomain self:capability2 ~{ mac_override mac_admin }; allow unconfineddomain kernel:security ~{ load_policy setenforce setcheckreqprot }; allow unconfineddomain kernel:system *; allow unconfineddomain domain:process ~{ execmem execstack execheap ptrace transition dyntransition }; |