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authorStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>2014-02-24 15:06:11 -0500
committerStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>2014-02-25 12:41:23 -0500
commit1601132086b054adc70e7f8f38ed24574c90bc37 (patch)
treef56a30d82df78952b6cb537a5535e54baa9d40d2 /racoon.te
parent85708ec4f91fd70b215dc69e00b80e0e7a7d4686 (diff)
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Clean up socket rules.
Replace * or any permission set containing create with create_socket_perms or create_stream_socket_perms. Add net_domain() to all domains using network sockets and delete rules already covered by domain.te or net.te. For netlink_route_socket, only nlmsg_write needs to be separately granted to specific domains that are permitted to modify the routing table. Clarification: read/write permissions are just ability to perform read/recv() or write/send() on the socket, whereas nlmsg_read/ nlmsg_write permissions control ability to observe or modify the underlying kernel state accessed via the socket. See security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c in the kernel for the mapping of netlink message types to nlmsg_read or nlmsg_write. Delete legacy rule for b/12061011. This change does not touch any rules where only read/write were allowed to a socket created by another domain (inherited across exec or received across socket or binder IPC). We may wish to rewrite some or all of those rules with the rw_socket_perms macro but that is a separate change. Change-Id: Ib0637ab86f6d388043eff928e5d96beb02e5450e Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Diffstat (limited to 'racoon.te')
-rw-r--r--racoon.te8
1 files changed, 4 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/racoon.te b/racoon.te
index 596cf7e..1fbdb07 100644
--- a/racoon.te
+++ b/racoon.te
@@ -6,17 +6,17 @@ type racoon_exec, exec_type, file_type;
init_daemon_domain(racoon)
typeattribute racoon mlstrustedsubject;
+net_domain(racoon)
+
binder_call(racoon, servicemanager)
binder_call(racoon, keystore)
allow racoon tun_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
allow racoon cgroup:dir { add_name create };
allow racoon kernel:system module_request;
-allow racoon port:udp_socket name_bind;
-allow racoon node:udp_socket node_bind;
-allow racoon self:{ key_socket udp_socket } create_socket_perms;
-allow racoon self:tun_socket create;
+allow racoon self:key_socket create_socket_perms;
+allow racoon self:tun_socket create_socket_perms;
allow racoon self:capability { net_admin net_bind_service net_raw setuid };
# XXX: should we give ip-up-vpn its own label (currently racoon domain)