Merge remote-tracking branch 'upstream/marshmallow-release', tag 'android-6.0.0_r1' into HEAD

Android 6.0.0 release 1

Change-Id: Iccee3137d91fb86555abe4596e356cc6c2a2ce47

1 files changed, 29 insertions, 18 deletions

diff --git a/kernel.te b/kernel.te
index a4170ad..baa85b3 100644
--- a/kernel.te
+++ b/kernel.te
@@ -1,41 +1,48 @@
 # Life begins with the kernel.
-type kernel, domain;
+type kernel, domain, mlstrustedsubject;
 
-# Run /init before we have switched domains.
-allow kernel rootfs:file execute_no_trans;
+allow kernel self:capability sys_nice;
 
-# setcon to init domain.
-allow kernel self:process setcurrent;
-allow kernel init:process dyntransition;
-
-# The kernel is unconfined.
-unconfined_domain(kernel)
+# Allow init relabel itself.
+allow kernel rootfs:file relabelfrom;
+allow kernel init_exec:file relabelto;
+# TODO: investigate why we need this.
+allow kernel init:process share;
 
 # cgroup filesystem initialization prior to setting the cgroup root directory label.
 allow kernel unlabeled:dir search;
 
 # Mount usbfs.
 allow kernel usbfs:filesystem mount;
-
-# init direct restorecon calls prior to switching to init domain
-# /dev and /dev/socket
-allow kernel { device socket_device }:dir relabelto;
-# /dev/__properties__
-allow kernel properties_device:file relabelto;
-# /sys
-allow kernel sysfs:{ dir file lnk_file } relabelfrom;
-allow kernel sysfs_type:{ dir file lnk_file } relabelto;
+allow kernel usbfs:dir search;
 
 # Initial setenforce by init prior to switching to init domain.
 # We use dontaudit instead of allow to prevent a kernel spawned userspace
 # process from turning off SELinux once enabled.
 dontaudit kernel self:security setenforce;
 
+# Write to /proc/1/oom_adj prior to switching to init domain.
+allow kernel self:capability sys_resource;
+
+# Init reboot before switching selinux domains under certain error
+# conditions. Allow it.
+# As part of rebooting, init writes "u" to /proc/sysrq-trigger to
+# remount filesystems read-only. /data is not mounted at this point,
+# so we could ignore this. For now, we allow it.
+allow kernel self:capability sys_boot;
+allow kernel proc_sysrq:file w_file_perms;
+
+# Allow writing to /dev/__kmsg__ which was created prior to
+# loading policy
+allow kernel tmpfs:chr_file write;
+
 # Set checkreqprot by init.rc prior to switching to init domain.
+allow kernel selinuxfs:file write;
 allow kernel self:security setcheckreqprot;
 
 # MTP sync (b/15835289)
 # kernel thread "loop0", used by the loop block device, for ASECs (b/17158723)
+allow kernel untrusted_app:fd use;
 allow kernel sdcard_type:file { read write };
 
 # Allow the kernel to read OBB files from app directories. (b/17428116)
@@ -43,7 +50,11 @@ allow kernel sdcard_type:file { read write };
 # Fixes CTS tests:
 #  * android.os.storage.cts.StorageManagerTest#testMountAndUnmountObbNormal
 #  * android.os.storage.cts.StorageManagerTest#testMountAndUnmountTwoObbs
+allow kernel vold:fd use;
 allow kernel app_data_file:file read;
+allow kernel asec_image_file:file read;
+
+domain_auto_trans(kernel, init_exec, init)
 
 ###
 ### neverallow rules