aboutsummaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/util.c
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorWayne Davison <wayned@samba.org>2006-05-03 00:48:23 +0000
committerWayne Davison <wayned@samba.org>2006-05-03 00:48:23 +0000
commita8167c6611e582ef826e4ee06b590706385470ef (patch)
treed9180c4a93ba576e8fd42c6243b371a9e9eb47b3 /util.c
parent91f4b31fe1031adc3ec3e3066534c9d6be979d21 (diff)
downloadandroid_external_rsync-a8167c6611e582ef826e4ee06b590706385470ef.tar.gz
android_external_rsync-a8167c6611e582ef826e4ee06b590706385470ef.tar.bz2
android_external_rsync-a8167c6611e582ef826e4ee06b590706385470ef.zip
- Added curr_dir_depth, a variable that keeps track of the depth past
the module root when a sanitizing daemon is running. - Use the new calling syntax for sanitize_path(). - Updated count_dir_elements() to not count a . component. - Improved sanitize_path() so that it can take a symlink target string and combine it with the symlink's name when the target is relative. When working with a symlink, the routine also returns NULL if any .. elements try to escape past the module root. - The new routine safe_stat(), is used when sanitizing paths (i.e. when the daemon does not have chroot enabled). This manually follows a chain of symlinks, ensuring they don't try to escape the module.
Diffstat (limited to 'util.c')
-rw-r--r--util.c95
1 files changed, 82 insertions, 13 deletions
diff --git a/util.c b/util.c
index 42e0238b..875af11e 100644
--- a/util.c
+++ b/util.c
@@ -29,12 +29,17 @@ extern int module_id;
extern int modify_window;
extern int relative_paths;
extern int human_readable;
+extern unsigned int module_dirlen;
extern mode_t orig_umask;
extern char *partial_dir;
extern struct filter_list_struct server_filter_list;
int sanitize_paths = 0;
+char curr_dir[MAXPATHLEN];
+unsigned int curr_dir_len;
+int curr_dir_depth; /* This is only set for a sanitizing daemon. */
+
/* Set a fd into nonblocking mode. */
void set_nonblocking(int fd)
{
@@ -539,7 +544,7 @@ static void glob_expand_one(char *s, char ***argv_ptr, int *argc_ptr,
s = ".";
if (sanitize_paths)
- s = sanitize_path(NULL, s, "", 0);
+ s = sanitize_path(NULL, s, "", 0, NULL);
else
s = strdup(s);
@@ -670,7 +675,7 @@ int count_dir_elements(const char *p)
int cnt = 0, new_component = 1;
while (*p) {
if (*p++ == '/')
- new_component = 1;
+ new_component = (*p != '.' || (p[1] != '/' && p[1] != '\0'));
else if (new_component) {
new_component = 0;
cnt++;
@@ -745,8 +750,9 @@ unsigned int clean_fname(char *name, BOOL collapse_dot_dot)
* The rootdir string contains a value to use in place of a leading slash.
* Specify NULL to get the default of lp_path(module_id).
*
- * If depth is >= 0, it is a count of how many '..'s to allow at the start
- * of the path. Use -1 to allow unlimited depth.
+ * The depth var is a count of how many '..'s to allow at the start of the
+ * path. If symlink is set, combine its value with the "p" value to get
+ * the target path, and **return NULL if any '..'s try to escape**.
*
* We also clean the path in a manner similar to clean_fname() but with a
* few differences:
@@ -756,11 +762,17 @@ unsigned int clean_fname(char *name, BOOL collapse_dot_dot)
* ALWAYS collapses ".." elements (except for those at the start of the
* string up to "depth" deep). If the resulting name would be empty,
* change it into a ".". */
-char *sanitize_path(char *dest, const char *p, const char *rootdir, int depth)
+char *sanitize_path(char *dest, const char *p, const char *rootdir, int depth,
+ const char *symlink)
{
- char *start, *sanp;
+ char *start, *sanp, *save_dest = dest;
int rlen = 0, leave_one_dotdir = relative_paths;
+ if (symlink && *symlink == '/') {
+ p = symlink;
+ symlink = "";
+ }
+
if (dest != p) {
int plen = strlen(p);
if (*p == '/') {
@@ -783,7 +795,18 @@ char *sanitize_path(char *dest, const char *p, const char *rootdir, int depth)
}
start = sanp = dest + rlen;
- while (*p != '\0') {
+ while (1) {
+ if (*p == '\0') {
+ if (!symlink || !*symlink)
+ break;
+ while (sanp != start && sanp[-1] != '/') {
+ /* strip last element */
+ sanp--;
+ }
+ /* Append a relative symlink */
+ p = symlink;
+ symlink = "";
+ }
/* discard leading or extra slashes */
if (*p == '/') {
p++;
@@ -805,6 +828,11 @@ char *sanitize_path(char *dest, const char *p, const char *rootdir, int depth)
if (*p == '.' && p[1] == '.' && (p[2] == '/' || p[2] == '\0')) {
/* ".." component followed by slash or end */
if (depth <= 0 || sanp != start) {
+ if (symlink && sanp == start) {
+ if (!save_dest)
+ free(dest);
+ return NULL;
+ }
p += 2;
if (sanp != start) {
/* back up sanp one level */
@@ -833,14 +861,48 @@ char *sanitize_path(char *dest, const char *p, const char *rootdir, int depth)
return dest;
}
-char curr_dir[MAXPATHLEN];
-unsigned int curr_dir_len;
+/* If sanitize_paths is not set, this works exactly the same as do_stat().
+ * Otherwise, we verify that no symlink takes us outside the module path.
+ * If we encounter an escape attempt, we return a symlink's stat info! */
+int safe_stat(const char *fname, STRUCT_STAT *stp)
+{
+#ifdef SUPPORT_LINKS
+ char tmpbuf[MAXPATHLEN], linkbuf[MAXPATHLEN], *mod_path;
+ int i, llen, mod_path_len;
-/**
- * Like chdir(), but it keeps track of the current directory (in the
+ if (!sanitize_paths)
+ return do_stat(fname, stp);
+
+ mod_path = lp_path(module_id);
+ mod_path_len = strlen(mod_path);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
+#ifdef DEBUG
+ if (*fname == '/')
+ assert(strncmp(fname, mod_path, mod_path_len) == 0 && fname[mod_path_len] == '/');
+#endif
+ if (do_lstat(fname, stp) < 0)
+ return -1;
+ if (!S_ISLNK(stp->st_mode))
+ return 0;
+ if ((llen = readlink(fname, linkbuf, sizeof linkbuf - 1)) < 0)
+ return -1;
+ linkbuf[llen] = '\0';
+ if (*fname == '/')
+ fname += mod_path_len;
+ if (!(fname = sanitize_path(tmpbuf, fname, mod_path, curr_dir_depth, linkbuf)))
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return 0; /* Leave *stp set to the last symlink. */
+#else
+ return do_stat(fname, stp);
+#endif
+}
+
+/* Like chdir(), but it keeps track of the current directory (in the
* global "curr_dir"), and ensures that the path size doesn't overflow.
- * Also cleans the path using the clean_fname() function.
- **/
+ * Also cleans the path using the clean_fname() function. */
int push_dir(char *dir)
{
static int initialised;
@@ -875,6 +937,11 @@ int push_dir(char *dir)
}
curr_dir_len = clean_fname(curr_dir, 1);
+ if (sanitize_paths) {
+ if (module_dirlen > curr_dir_len)
+ module_dirlen = curr_dir_len;
+ curr_dir_depth = count_dir_elements(curr_dir + module_dirlen);
+ }
return 1;
}
@@ -891,6 +958,8 @@ int pop_dir(char *dir)
curr_dir_len = strlcpy(curr_dir, dir, sizeof curr_dir);
if (curr_dir_len >= sizeof curr_dir)
curr_dir_len = sizeof curr_dir - 1;
+ if (sanitize_paths)
+ curr_dir_depth = count_dir_elements(curr_dir + module_dirlen);
return 1;
}