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-rw-r--r--docs/interrupt-framework-design.rst37
1 files changed, 21 insertions, 16 deletions
diff --git a/docs/interrupt-framework-design.rst b/docs/interrupt-framework-design.rst
index 940bc24f0..0eb7f54f2 100644
--- a/docs/interrupt-framework-design.rst
+++ b/docs/interrupt-framework-design.rst
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ Non-secure interrupts
former's state is correctly saved by the latter.
#. **CSS=1, TEL3=0**. Interrupt is routed to FEL when execution is in
- non-secure state. This is an valid routing model as a non-secure interrupt
+ non-secure state. This is a valid routing model as a non-secure interrupt
is handled by non-secure software.
#. **CSS=1, TEL3=1**. Interrupt is routed to EL3 when execution is in
@@ -151,6 +151,10 @@ EL3 interrupts
in Secure-EL1/Secure-EL0 is in control of how its execution is preempted
by EL3 interrupt and can handover the interrupt to EL3 for handling.
+ However, when ``EL3_EXCEPTION_HANDLING`` is ``1``, this routing model is
+ invalid as EL3 interrupts are unconditionally routed to EL3, and EL3
+ interrupts will always preempt Secure EL1/EL0 execution.
+
#. **CSS=0, TEL3=1**. Interrupt is routed to EL3 when execution is in
Secure-EL1/Secure-EL0. This is a valid routing model as secure software
in EL3 can handle the interrupt.
@@ -212,17 +216,14 @@ The framework makes the following assumptions to simplify its implementation.
#. Interrupt exceptions (``PSTATE.I`` and ``F`` bits) are masked during execution
in EL3.
-#. .. rubric:: Interrupt management
- :name: interrupt-management
-
- The following sections describe how interrupts are managed by the interrupt
- handling framework. This entails:
+#. Interrupt management: the following sections describe how interrupts are
+ managed by the interrupt handling framework. This entails:
-#. Providing an interface to allow registration of a handler and specification
- of the routing model for a type of interrupt.
+ #. Providing an interface to allow registration of a handler and
+ specification of the routing model for a type of interrupt.
-#. Implementing support to hand control of an interrupt type to its registered
- handler when the interrupt is generated.
+ #. Implementing support to hand control of an interrupt type to its
+ registered handler when the interrupt is generated.
Both aspects of interrupt management involve various components in the secure
software stack spanning from EL3 to Secure-EL1. These components are described
@@ -415,6 +416,9 @@ runtime.
Test secure payload dispatcher behavior
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+**Note:** where this document discusses ``TSP_NS_INTR_ASYNC_PREEMPT`` as being
+``1``, the same results also apply when ``EL3_EXCEPTION_HANDLING`` is ``1``.
+
The TSPD only handles Secure-EL1 interrupts and is provided with the following
routing model at build time.
@@ -678,14 +682,14 @@ the handler function for that type of interrupt. The SPD service is responsible
for the following:
#. Validating the interrupt. This involves ensuring that the interrupt was
- generating according to the interrupt routing model specified by the SPD
+ generated according to the interrupt routing model specified by the SPD
service during registration. It should use the security state of the
exception level (passed in the ``flags`` parameter of the handler) where
the interrupt was taken from to determine this. If the interrupt is not
recognised then the handler should treat it as an irrecoverable error
condition.
- A SPD service can register a handler for Secure-EL1 and/or Non-secure
+ An SPD service can register a handler for Secure-EL1 and/or Non-secure
interrupts. A non-secure interrupt should never be routed to EL3 from
from non-secure state. Also if a routing model is chosen where Secure-EL1
interrupts are routed to S-EL1 when execution is in Secure state, then a
@@ -809,9 +813,10 @@ Test secure payload dispatcher non-secure interrupt handling
The TSP in Secure-EL1 can be preempted by a non-secure interrupt during
``yielding`` SMC processing or by a higher priority EL3 interrupt during
-Secure-EL1 interrupt processing. Currently only non-secure interrupts can
-cause preemption of TSP since there are no EL3 interrupts in the
-system.
+Secure-EL1 interrupt processing. When ``EL3_EXCEPTION_HANDLING`` is ``0``, only
+non-secure interrupts can cause preemption of TSP since there are no EL3
+interrupts in the system. With ``EL3_EXCEPTION_HANDLING=1`` however, any EL3
+interrupt may preempt Secure execution.
It should be noted that while TSP is preempted, the TSPD only allows entry into
the TSP either for Secure-EL1 interrupt handling or for resuming the preempted
@@ -994,7 +999,7 @@ TSP by returning ``SMC_UNK`` error.
--------------
-*Copyright (c) 2014-2015, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.*
+*Copyright (c) 2014-2018, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.*
.. _Porting Guide: ./porting-guide.rst
.. _SMC calling convention: http://infocenter.arm.com/help/topic/com.arm.doc.den0028a/index.html