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authorGina Dimino <gdimino@google.com>2019-09-02 16:12:07 -0700
committerGina Dimino <gdimino@google.com>2019-09-04 23:11:05 +0000
commitc24d43800a72106879f2e1368fc4b3f44950b068 (patch)
tree12a98c8bd815bca9ed4f6afe68fad911491771a4 /9_security-model
parentc73edfa45cdac5cee6c1c04d3bf220653b1ef788 (diff)
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Docs: Almost final Cleanup CL.
Bug: 140142603 Test: ./cdd_gen.sh --version <version-number> --branch <branch-name> Change-Id: Ib0a8e55035eab94ff6ab28ad3c6aa6c7c1ae19d3
Diffstat (limited to '9_security-model')
-rw-r--r--9_security-model/9_10_device-integrity.md10
-rw-r--r--9_security-model/9_1_permissions.md2
-rw-r--r--9_security-model/9_7_security-features.md2
-rw-r--r--9_security-model/9_8_privacy.md6
-rw-r--r--9_security-model/9_9_full-disk-encryption.md2
5 files changed, 11 insertions, 11 deletions
diff --git a/9_security-model/9_10_device-integrity.md b/9_security-model/9_10_device-integrity.md
index 4a0a2145..cba1739e 100644
--- a/9_security-model/9_10_device-integrity.md
+++ b/9_security-model/9_10_device-integrity.md
@@ -34,16 +34,16 @@ sizes (RSA-2048).
unless the user consents to attempt booting anyway, in which case the data from
any non-verified storage blocks MUST not be used.
* [C-1-7] MUST NOT allow verified partitions on the device to be modified
-unless the user has explicitly unlocked the boot loader.
+unless the user has explicitly unlocked the bootloader.
* [C-SR] If there are multiple discrete chips in the device (e.g. radio,
specialized image processor), the boot process of each of those chips is
STRONGLY RECOMMENDED to verify every stage upon booting.
* [C-1-8] MUST use tamper-evident storage: for storing whether the
-bootloader is unlocked. Tamper-evident storage means that the boot loader can
+bootloader is unlocked. Tamper-evident storage means that the bootloader can
detect if the storage has been tampered with from inside Android.
* [C-1-9] MUST prompt the user, while using the device, and
-require physical confirmation before allowing a transition from boot loader
-locked mode to boot loader unlocked mode.
+require physical confirmation before allowing a transition from bootloader
+locked mode to bootloader unlocked mode.
* [C-1-10] MUST implement rollback protection for partitions used by Android
(e.g. boot, system partitions) and use tamper-evident storage for storing the
metadata used for determining the minimum allowable OS version.
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ requirements.
The upstream Android Open Source Project provides a preferred implementation of
this feature in the [`external/avb/`](
http://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/avb/)
-repository, which can be integrated into the boot loader used for loading
+repository, which can be integrated into the bootloader used for loading
Android.
Device implementations:
diff --git a/9_security-model/9_1_permissions.md b/9_security-model/9_1_permissions.md
index 75ccf99b..ebb1927d 100644
--- a/9_security-model/9_1_permissions.md
+++ b/9_security-model/9_1_permissions.md
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ are not in the `android.\*` namespace.
* [C-0-2] Permissions with a `protectionLevel` of
[`PROTECTION_FLAG_PRIVILEGED`](
https://developer.android.com/reference/android/content/pm/PermissionInfo.html#PROTECTION&lowbar;FLAG&lowbar;PRIVILEGED)
-MUST only be granted to apps preloaded in the privileged path(s) of the system
+MUST only be granted to apps preinstalled in the privileged path(s) of the system
image and within the subset of the explicitly whitelisted permissions for each
app. The AOSP implementation meets this requirement by reading and honoring
the whitelisted permissions for each app from the files in the
diff --git a/9_security-model/9_7_security-features.md b/9_security-model/9_7_security-features.md
index 43221580..83b03ed7 100644
--- a/9_security-model/9_7_security-features.md
+++ b/9_security-model/9_7_security-features.md
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ policy for their own device-specific configuration.
If device implementations use kernel other than Linux, they:
-* [C-2-1] MUST use an mandatory access control system that is
+* [C-2-1] MUST use a mandatory access control system that is
equivalent to SELinux.
Android contains multiple defense-in-depth features that are integral to device
diff --git a/9_security-model/9_8_privacy.md b/9_security-model/9_8_privacy.md
index 814fb4c9..425290fa 100644
--- a/9_security-model/9_8_privacy.md
+++ b/9_security-model/9_8_privacy.md
@@ -166,9 +166,9 @@ If device implementations include a service that implements the System API
as described as above, they:
* [C-1-1] MUST NOT allow users to replace the content capture service with a
- user-installable application or service and MUST only allow the preloaded
- service to capture such data.
-* [C-1-2] MUST NOT allow any apps other than the preloaded content capture
+ user-installable application or service and MUST only allow the
+ preinstalled service to capture such data.
+* [C-1-2] MUST NOT allow any apps other than the preinstalled content capture
service mechanism to be able to capture such data.
* [C-1-3] MUST provide user affordance to disable the content capture
service.
diff --git a/9_security-model/9_9_full-disk-encryption.md b/9_security-model/9_9_full-disk-encryption.md
index ea2837ad..55d6f19d 100644
--- a/9_security-model/9_9_full-disk-encryption.md
+++ b/9_security-model/9_9_full-disk-encryption.md
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ not specified lock screen credentials.
file sizes, ownership, modes, and Extended attributes (xattrs), with a key
cryptographically bound to the device's hardware root of trust.
-* SHOULD make preloaded essential apps (e.g. Alarm, Phone, Messenger)
+* SHOULD make preinstalled essential apps (e.g. Alarm, Phone, Messenger)
Direct Boot aware.
The upstream Android Open Source project provides a preferred implementation of