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-rw-r--r--debian/patches/bugfix/all/USB-usbip-fix-potential-out-of-bounds-write.patch45
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 45 deletions
diff --git a/debian/patches/bugfix/all/USB-usbip-fix-potential-out-of-bounds-write.patch b/debian/patches/bugfix/all/USB-usbip-fix-potential-out-of-bounds-write.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 2a2c4bdb4303..000000000000
--- a/debian/patches/bugfix/all/USB-usbip-fix-potential-out-of-bounds-write.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
-From: Ignat Korchagin <ignat.korchagin@gmail.com>
-Date: Thu, 17 Mar 2016 18:00:29 +0000
-Subject: USB: usbip: fix potential out-of-bounds write
-Origin: https://git.kernel.org/linus/b348d7dddb6c4fbfc810b7a0626e8ec9e29f7cbb
-
-Fix potential out-of-bounds write to urb->transfer_buffer
-usbip handles network communication directly in the kernel. When receiving a
-packet from its peer, usbip code parses headers according to protocol. As
-part of this parsing urb->actual_length is filled. Since the input for
-urb->actual_length comes from the network, it should be treated as untrusted.
-Any entity controlling the network may put any value in the input and the
-preallocated urb->transfer_buffer may not be large enough to hold the data.
-Thus, the malicious entity is able to write arbitrary data to kernel memory.
-
-Signed-off-by: Ignat Korchagin <ignat.korchagin@gmail.com>
-Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
----
- drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c | 11 +++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c b/drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c
-index facaaf0..e40da77 100644
---- a/drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c
-+++ b/drivers/usb/usbip/usbip_common.c
-@@ -741,6 +741,17 @@ int usbip_recv_xbuff(struct usbip_device *ud, struct urb *urb)
- if (!(size > 0))
- return 0;
-
-+ if (size > urb->transfer_buffer_length) {
-+ /* should not happen, probably malicious packet */
-+ if (ud->side == USBIP_STUB) {
-+ usbip_event_add(ud, SDEV_EVENT_ERROR_TCP);
-+ return 0;
-+ } else {
-+ usbip_event_add(ud, VDEV_EVENT_ERROR_TCP);
-+ return -EPIPE;
-+ }
-+ }
-+
- ret = usbip_recv(ud->tcp_socket, urb->transfer_buffer, size);
- if (ret != size) {
- dev_err(&urb->dev->dev, "recv xbuf, %d\n", ret);
---
-2.1.4
-