diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'gcc-4.8.1/libgo/go/crypto/x509/verify.go')
-rw-r--r-- | gcc-4.8.1/libgo/go/crypto/x509/verify.go | 404 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 404 deletions
diff --git a/gcc-4.8.1/libgo/go/crypto/x509/verify.go b/gcc-4.8.1/libgo/go/crypto/x509/verify.go deleted file mode 100644 index 51be5feb0..000000000 --- a/gcc-4.8.1/libgo/go/crypto/x509/verify.go +++ /dev/null @@ -1,404 +0,0 @@ -// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. -// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style -// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. - -package x509 - -import ( - "runtime" - "strings" - "time" - "unicode/utf8" -) - -type InvalidReason int - -const ( - // NotAuthorizedToSign results when a certificate is signed by another - // which isn't marked as a CA certificate. - NotAuthorizedToSign InvalidReason = iota - // Expired results when a certificate has expired, based on the time - // given in the VerifyOptions. - Expired - // CANotAuthorizedForThisName results when an intermediate or root - // certificate has a name constraint which doesn't include the name - // being checked. - CANotAuthorizedForThisName - // TooManyIntermediates results when a path length constraint is - // violated. - TooManyIntermediates - // IncompatibleUsage results when the certificate's key usage indicates - // that it may only be used for a different purpose. - IncompatibleUsage -) - -// CertificateInvalidError results when an odd error occurs. Users of this -// library probably want to handle all these errors uniformly. -type CertificateInvalidError struct { - Cert *Certificate - Reason InvalidReason -} - -func (e CertificateInvalidError) Error() string { - switch e.Reason { - case NotAuthorizedToSign: - return "x509: certificate is not authorized to sign other certificates" - case Expired: - return "x509: certificate has expired or is not yet valid" - case CANotAuthorizedForThisName: - return "x509: a root or intermediate certificate is not authorized to sign in this domain" - case TooManyIntermediates: - return "x509: too many intermediates for path length constraint" - case IncompatibleUsage: - return "x509: certificate specifies an incompatible key usage" - } - return "x509: unknown error" -} - -// HostnameError results when the set of authorized names doesn't match the -// requested name. -type HostnameError struct { - Certificate *Certificate - Host string -} - -func (h HostnameError) Error() string { - var valid string - c := h.Certificate - if len(c.DNSNames) > 0 { - valid = strings.Join(c.DNSNames, ", ") - } else { - valid = c.Subject.CommonName - } - return "certificate is valid for " + valid + ", not " + h.Host -} - -// UnknownAuthorityError results when the certificate issuer is unknown -type UnknownAuthorityError struct { - cert *Certificate -} - -func (e UnknownAuthorityError) Error() string { - return "x509: certificate signed by unknown authority" -} - -// SystemRootsError results when we fail to load the system root certificates. -type SystemRootsError struct { -} - -func (e SystemRootsError) Error() string { - return "x509: failed to load system roots and no roots provided" -} - -// VerifyOptions contains parameters for Certificate.Verify. It's a structure -// because other PKIX verification APIs have ended up needing many options. -type VerifyOptions struct { - DNSName string - Intermediates *CertPool - Roots *CertPool // if nil, the system roots are used - CurrentTime time.Time // if zero, the current time is used - // KeyUsage specifies which Extended Key Usage values are acceptable. - // An empty list means ExtKeyUsageServerAuth. Key usage is considered a - // constraint down the chain which mirrors Windows CryptoAPI behaviour, - // but not the spec. To accept any key usage, include ExtKeyUsageAny. - KeyUsages []ExtKeyUsage -} - -const ( - leafCertificate = iota - intermediateCertificate - rootCertificate -) - -// isValid performs validity checks on the c. -func (c *Certificate) isValid(certType int, currentChain []*Certificate, opts *VerifyOptions) error { - now := opts.CurrentTime - if now.IsZero() { - now = time.Now() - } - if now.Before(c.NotBefore) || now.After(c.NotAfter) { - return CertificateInvalidError{c, Expired} - } - - if len(c.PermittedDNSDomains) > 0 { - for _, domain := range c.PermittedDNSDomains { - if opts.DNSName == domain || - (strings.HasSuffix(opts.DNSName, domain) && - len(opts.DNSName) >= 1+len(domain) && - opts.DNSName[len(opts.DNSName)-len(domain)-1] == '.') { - continue - } - - return CertificateInvalidError{c, CANotAuthorizedForThisName} - } - } - - // KeyUsage status flags are ignored. From Engineering Security, Peter - // Gutmann: A European government CA marked its signing certificates as - // being valid for encryption only, but no-one noticed. Another - // European CA marked its signature keys as not being valid for - // signatures. A different CA marked its own trusted root certificate - // as being invalid for certificate signing. Another national CA - // distributed a certificate to be used to encrypt data for the - // country’s tax authority that was marked as only being usable for - // digital signatures but not for encryption. Yet another CA reversed - // the order of the bit flags in the keyUsage due to confusion over - // encoding endianness, essentially setting a random keyUsage in - // certificates that it issued. Another CA created a self-invalidating - // certificate by adding a certificate policy statement stipulating - // that the certificate had to be used strictly as specified in the - // keyUsage, and a keyUsage containing a flag indicating that the RSA - // encryption key could only be used for Diffie-Hellman key agreement. - - if certType == intermediateCertificate && (!c.BasicConstraintsValid || !c.IsCA) { - return CertificateInvalidError{c, NotAuthorizedToSign} - } - - if c.BasicConstraintsValid && c.MaxPathLen >= 0 { - numIntermediates := len(currentChain) - 1 - if numIntermediates > c.MaxPathLen { - return CertificateInvalidError{c, TooManyIntermediates} - } - } - - return nil -} - -// Verify attempts to verify c by building one or more chains from c to a -// certificate in opts.Roots, using certificates in opts.Intermediates if -// needed. If successful, it returns one or more chains where the first -// element of the chain is c and the last element is from opts.Roots. -// -// WARNING: this doesn't do any revocation checking. -func (c *Certificate) Verify(opts VerifyOptions) (chains [][]*Certificate, err error) { - // Use Windows's own verification and chain building. - if opts.Roots == nil && runtime.GOOS == "windows" { - return c.systemVerify(&opts) - } - - if opts.Roots == nil { - opts.Roots = systemRootsPool() - if opts.Roots == nil { - return nil, SystemRootsError{} - } - } - - err = c.isValid(leafCertificate, nil, &opts) - if err != nil { - return - } - - if len(opts.DNSName) > 0 { - err = c.VerifyHostname(opts.DNSName) - if err != nil { - return - } - } - - candidateChains, err := c.buildChains(make(map[int][][]*Certificate), []*Certificate{c}, &opts) - if err != nil { - return - } - - keyUsages := opts.KeyUsages - if len(keyUsages) == 0 { - keyUsages = []ExtKeyUsage{ExtKeyUsageServerAuth} - } - - // If any key usage is acceptable then we're done. - for _, usage := range keyUsages { - if usage == ExtKeyUsageAny { - chains = candidateChains - return - } - } - - for _, candidate := range candidateChains { - if checkChainForKeyUsage(candidate, keyUsages) { - chains = append(chains, candidate) - } - } - - if len(chains) == 0 { - err = CertificateInvalidError{c, IncompatibleUsage} - } - - return -} - -func appendToFreshChain(chain []*Certificate, cert *Certificate) []*Certificate { - n := make([]*Certificate, len(chain)+1) - copy(n, chain) - n[len(chain)] = cert - return n -} - -func (c *Certificate) buildChains(cache map[int][][]*Certificate, currentChain []*Certificate, opts *VerifyOptions) (chains [][]*Certificate, err error) { - for _, rootNum := range opts.Roots.findVerifiedParents(c) { - root := opts.Roots.certs[rootNum] - err = root.isValid(rootCertificate, currentChain, opts) - if err != nil { - continue - } - chains = append(chains, appendToFreshChain(currentChain, root)) - } - -nextIntermediate: - for _, intermediateNum := range opts.Intermediates.findVerifiedParents(c) { - intermediate := opts.Intermediates.certs[intermediateNum] - for _, cert := range currentChain { - if cert == intermediate { - continue nextIntermediate - } - } - err = intermediate.isValid(intermediateCertificate, currentChain, opts) - if err != nil { - continue - } - var childChains [][]*Certificate - childChains, ok := cache[intermediateNum] - if !ok { - childChains, err = intermediate.buildChains(cache, appendToFreshChain(currentChain, intermediate), opts) - cache[intermediateNum] = childChains - } - chains = append(chains, childChains...) - } - - if len(chains) > 0 { - err = nil - } - - if len(chains) == 0 && err == nil { - err = UnknownAuthorityError{c} - } - - return -} - -func matchHostnames(pattern, host string) bool { - if len(pattern) == 0 || len(host) == 0 { - return false - } - - patternParts := strings.Split(pattern, ".") - hostParts := strings.Split(host, ".") - - if len(patternParts) != len(hostParts) { - return false - } - - for i, patternPart := range patternParts { - if patternPart == "*" { - continue - } - if patternPart != hostParts[i] { - return false - } - } - - return true -} - -// toLowerCaseASCII returns a lower-case version of in. See RFC 6125 6.4.1. We use -// an explicitly ASCII function to avoid any sharp corners resulting from -// performing Unicode operations on DNS labels. -func toLowerCaseASCII(in string) string { - // If the string is already lower-case then there's nothing to do. - isAlreadyLowerCase := true - for _, c := range in { - if c == utf8.RuneError { - // If we get a UTF-8 error then there might be - // upper-case ASCII bytes in the invalid sequence. - isAlreadyLowerCase = false - break - } - if 'A' <= c && c <= 'Z' { - isAlreadyLowerCase = false - break - } - } - - if isAlreadyLowerCase { - return in - } - - out := []byte(in) - for i, c := range out { - if 'A' <= c && c <= 'Z' { - out[i] += 'a' - 'A' - } - } - return string(out) -} - -// VerifyHostname returns nil if c is a valid certificate for the named host. -// Otherwise it returns an error describing the mismatch. -func (c *Certificate) VerifyHostname(h string) error { - lowered := toLowerCaseASCII(h) - - if len(c.DNSNames) > 0 { - for _, match := range c.DNSNames { - if matchHostnames(toLowerCaseASCII(match), lowered) { - return nil - } - } - // If Subject Alt Name is given, we ignore the common name. - } else if matchHostnames(toLowerCaseASCII(c.Subject.CommonName), lowered) { - return nil - } - - return HostnameError{c, h} -} - -func checkChainForKeyUsage(chain []*Certificate, keyUsages []ExtKeyUsage) bool { - usages := make([]ExtKeyUsage, len(keyUsages)) - copy(usages, keyUsages) - - if len(chain) == 0 { - return false - } - - usagesRemaining := len(usages) - - // We walk down the list and cross out any usages that aren't supported - // by each certificate. If we cross out all the usages, then the chain - // is unacceptable. - - for i := len(chain) - 1; i >= 0; i-- { - cert := chain[i] - if len(cert.ExtKeyUsage) == 0 && len(cert.UnknownExtKeyUsage) == 0 { - // The certificate doesn't have any extended key usage specified. - continue - } - - for _, usage := range cert.ExtKeyUsage { - if usage == ExtKeyUsageAny { - // The certificate is explicitly good for any usage. - continue - } - } - - const invalidUsage ExtKeyUsage = -1 - - NextRequestedUsage: - for i, requestedUsage := range usages { - if requestedUsage == invalidUsage { - continue - } - - for _, usage := range cert.ExtKeyUsage { - if requestedUsage == usage { - continue NextRequestedUsage - } - } - - usages[i] = invalidUsage - usagesRemaining-- - if usagesRemaining == 0 { - return false - } - } - } - - return true -} |