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authorBen Cheng <bccheng@google.com>2014-03-25 22:37:19 -0700
committerBen Cheng <bccheng@google.com>2014-03-25 22:37:19 -0700
commit1bc5aee63eb72b341f506ad058502cd0361f0d10 (patch)
treec607e8252f3405424ff15bc2d00aa38dadbb2518 /gcc-4.9/libgo/go/crypto/tls/handshake_client.go
parent283a0bf58fcf333c58a2a92c3ebbc41fb9eb1fdb (diff)
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Initial checkin of GCC 4.9.0 from trunk (r208799).
Change-Id: I48a3c08bb98542aa215912a75f03c0890e497dba
Diffstat (limited to 'gcc-4.9/libgo/go/crypto/tls/handshake_client.go')
-rw-r--r--gcc-4.9/libgo/go/crypto/tls/handshake_client.go411
1 files changed, 411 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/gcc-4.9/libgo/go/crypto/tls/handshake_client.go b/gcc-4.9/libgo/go/crypto/tls/handshake_client.go
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..85e4adefc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gcc-4.9/libgo/go/crypto/tls/handshake_client.go
@@ -0,0 +1,411 @@
+// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+package tls
+
+import (
+ "bytes"
+ "crypto/ecdsa"
+ "crypto/rsa"
+ "crypto/subtle"
+ "crypto/x509"
+ "encoding/asn1"
+ "errors"
+ "io"
+ "strconv"
+)
+
+func (c *Conn) clientHandshake() error {
+ if c.config == nil {
+ c.config = defaultConfig()
+ }
+
+ hello := &clientHelloMsg{
+ vers: c.config.maxVersion(),
+ compressionMethods: []uint8{compressionNone},
+ random: make([]byte, 32),
+ ocspStapling: true,
+ serverName: c.config.ServerName,
+ supportedCurves: []uint16{curveP256, curveP384, curveP521},
+ supportedPoints: []uint8{pointFormatUncompressed},
+ nextProtoNeg: len(c.config.NextProtos) > 0,
+ }
+
+ possibleCipherSuites := c.config.cipherSuites()
+ hello.cipherSuites = make([]uint16, 0, len(possibleCipherSuites))
+
+NextCipherSuite:
+ for _, suiteId := range possibleCipherSuites {
+ for _, suite := range cipherSuites {
+ if suite.id != suiteId {
+ continue
+ }
+ // Don't advertise TLS 1.2-only cipher suites unless
+ // we're attempting TLS 1.2.
+ if hello.vers < VersionTLS12 && suite.flags&suiteTLS12 != 0 {
+ continue
+ }
+ hello.cipherSuites = append(hello.cipherSuites, suiteId)
+ continue NextCipherSuite
+ }
+ }
+
+ t := uint32(c.config.time().Unix())
+ hello.random[0] = byte(t >> 24)
+ hello.random[1] = byte(t >> 16)
+ hello.random[2] = byte(t >> 8)
+ hello.random[3] = byte(t)
+ _, err := io.ReadFull(c.config.rand(), hello.random[4:])
+ if err != nil {
+ c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+ return errors.New("short read from Rand")
+ }
+
+ if hello.vers >= VersionTLS12 {
+ hello.signatureAndHashes = supportedSKXSignatureAlgorithms
+ }
+
+ c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, hello.marshal())
+
+ msg, err := c.readHandshake()
+ if err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+ serverHello, ok := msg.(*serverHelloMsg)
+ if !ok {
+ return c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
+ }
+
+ vers, ok := c.config.mutualVersion(serverHello.vers)
+ if !ok || vers < VersionTLS10 {
+ // TLS 1.0 is the minimum version supported as a client.
+ return c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion)
+ }
+ c.vers = vers
+ c.haveVers = true
+
+ finishedHash := newFinishedHash(c.vers)
+ finishedHash.Write(hello.marshal())
+ finishedHash.Write(serverHello.marshal())
+
+ if serverHello.compressionMethod != compressionNone {
+ return c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
+ }
+
+ if !hello.nextProtoNeg && serverHello.nextProtoNeg {
+ c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
+ return errors.New("server advertised unrequested NPN")
+ }
+
+ suite := mutualCipherSuite(c.config.cipherSuites(), serverHello.cipherSuite)
+ if suite == nil {
+ return c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
+ }
+
+ msg, err = c.readHandshake()
+ if err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+ certMsg, ok := msg.(*certificateMsg)
+ if !ok || len(certMsg.certificates) == 0 {
+ return c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
+ }
+ finishedHash.Write(certMsg.marshal())
+
+ certs := make([]*x509.Certificate, len(certMsg.certificates))
+ for i, asn1Data := range certMsg.certificates {
+ cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(asn1Data)
+ if err != nil {
+ c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
+ return errors.New("failed to parse certificate from server: " + err.Error())
+ }
+ certs[i] = cert
+ }
+
+ if !c.config.InsecureSkipVerify {
+ opts := x509.VerifyOptions{
+ Roots: c.config.RootCAs,
+ CurrentTime: c.config.time(),
+ DNSName: c.config.ServerName,
+ Intermediates: x509.NewCertPool(),
+ }
+
+ for i, cert := range certs {
+ if i == 0 {
+ continue
+ }
+ opts.Intermediates.AddCert(cert)
+ }
+ c.verifiedChains, err = certs[0].Verify(opts)
+ if err != nil {
+ c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
+ return err
+ }
+ }
+
+ switch certs[0].PublicKey.(type) {
+ case *rsa.PublicKey, *ecdsa.PublicKey:
+ break
+ default:
+ return c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedCertificate)
+ }
+
+ c.peerCertificates = certs
+
+ if serverHello.ocspStapling {
+ msg, err = c.readHandshake()
+ if err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+ cs, ok := msg.(*certificateStatusMsg)
+ if !ok {
+ return c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
+ }
+ finishedHash.Write(cs.marshal())
+
+ if cs.statusType == statusTypeOCSP {
+ c.ocspResponse = cs.response
+ }
+ }
+
+ msg, err = c.readHandshake()
+ if err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+
+ keyAgreement := suite.ka(c.vers)
+
+ skx, ok := msg.(*serverKeyExchangeMsg)
+ if ok {
+ finishedHash.Write(skx.marshal())
+ err = keyAgreement.processServerKeyExchange(c.config, hello, serverHello, certs[0], skx)
+ if err != nil {
+ c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
+ return err
+ }
+
+ msg, err = c.readHandshake()
+ if err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+ }
+
+ var chainToSend *Certificate
+ var certRequested bool
+ certReq, ok := msg.(*certificateRequestMsg)
+ if ok {
+ certRequested = true
+
+ // RFC 4346 on the certificateAuthorities field:
+ // A list of the distinguished names of acceptable certificate
+ // authorities. These distinguished names may specify a desired
+ // distinguished name for a root CA or for a subordinate CA;
+ // thus, this message can be used to describe both known roots
+ // and a desired authorization space. If the
+ // certificate_authorities list is empty then the client MAY
+ // send any certificate of the appropriate
+ // ClientCertificateType, unless there is some external
+ // arrangement to the contrary.
+
+ finishedHash.Write(certReq.marshal())
+
+ var rsaAvail, ecdsaAvail bool
+ for _, certType := range certReq.certificateTypes {
+ switch certType {
+ case certTypeRSASign:
+ rsaAvail = true
+ case certTypeECDSASign:
+ ecdsaAvail = true
+ }
+ }
+
+ // We need to search our list of client certs for one
+ // where SignatureAlgorithm is RSA and the Issuer is in
+ // certReq.certificateAuthorities
+ findCert:
+ for i, chain := range c.config.Certificates {
+ if !rsaAvail && !ecdsaAvail {
+ continue
+ }
+
+ for j, cert := range chain.Certificate {
+ x509Cert := chain.Leaf
+ // parse the certificate if this isn't the leaf
+ // node, or if chain.Leaf was nil
+ if j != 0 || x509Cert == nil {
+ if x509Cert, err = x509.ParseCertificate(cert); err != nil {
+ c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+ return errors.New("tls: failed to parse client certificate #" + strconv.Itoa(i) + ": " + err.Error())
+ }
+ }
+
+ switch {
+ case rsaAvail && x509Cert.PublicKeyAlgorithm == x509.RSA:
+ case ecdsaAvail && x509Cert.PublicKeyAlgorithm == x509.ECDSA:
+ default:
+ continue findCert
+ }
+
+ if len(certReq.certificateAuthorities) == 0 {
+ // they gave us an empty list, so just take the
+ // first RSA cert from c.config.Certificates
+ chainToSend = &chain
+ break findCert
+ }
+
+ for _, ca := range certReq.certificateAuthorities {
+ if bytes.Equal(x509Cert.RawIssuer, ca) {
+ chainToSend = &chain
+ break findCert
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ msg, err = c.readHandshake()
+ if err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+ }
+
+ shd, ok := msg.(*serverHelloDoneMsg)
+ if !ok {
+ return c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
+ }
+ finishedHash.Write(shd.marshal())
+
+ // If the server requested a certificate then we have to send a
+ // Certificate message, even if it's empty because we don't have a
+ // certificate to send.
+ if certRequested {
+ certMsg = new(certificateMsg)
+ if chainToSend != nil {
+ certMsg.certificates = chainToSend.Certificate
+ }
+ finishedHash.Write(certMsg.marshal())
+ c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certMsg.marshal())
+ }
+
+ preMasterSecret, ckx, err := keyAgreement.generateClientKeyExchange(c.config, hello, certs[0])
+ if err != nil {
+ c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+ return err
+ }
+ if ckx != nil {
+ finishedHash.Write(ckx.marshal())
+ c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, ckx.marshal())
+ }
+
+ if chainToSend != nil {
+ var signed []byte
+ certVerify := &certificateVerifyMsg{
+ hasSignatureAndHash: c.vers >= VersionTLS12,
+ }
+
+ switch key := c.config.Certificates[0].PrivateKey.(type) {
+ case *ecdsa.PrivateKey:
+ digest, _, hashId := finishedHash.hashForClientCertificate(signatureECDSA)
+ r, s, err := ecdsa.Sign(c.config.rand(), key, digest)
+ if err == nil {
+ signed, err = asn1.Marshal(ecdsaSignature{r, s})
+ }
+ certVerify.signatureAndHash.signature = signatureECDSA
+ certVerify.signatureAndHash.hash = hashId
+ case *rsa.PrivateKey:
+ digest, hashFunc, hashId := finishedHash.hashForClientCertificate(signatureRSA)
+ signed, err = rsa.SignPKCS1v15(c.config.rand(), key, hashFunc, digest)
+ certVerify.signatureAndHash.signature = signatureRSA
+ certVerify.signatureAndHash.hash = hashId
+ default:
+ err = errors.New("unknown private key type")
+ }
+ if err != nil {
+ return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+ }
+ certVerify.signature = signed
+
+ finishedHash.Write(certVerify.marshal())
+ c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certVerify.marshal())
+ }
+
+ masterSecret := masterFromPreMasterSecret(c.vers, preMasterSecret, hello.random, serverHello.random)
+ clientMAC, serverMAC, clientKey, serverKey, clientIV, serverIV :=
+ keysFromMasterSecret(c.vers, masterSecret, hello.random, serverHello.random, suite.macLen, suite.keyLen, suite.ivLen)
+
+ var clientCipher interface{}
+ var clientHash macFunction
+ if suite.cipher != nil {
+ clientCipher = suite.cipher(clientKey, clientIV, false /* not for reading */)
+ clientHash = suite.mac(c.vers, clientMAC)
+ } else {
+ clientCipher = suite.aead(clientKey, clientIV)
+ }
+ c.out.prepareCipherSpec(c.vers, clientCipher, clientHash)
+ c.writeRecord(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec, []byte{1})
+
+ if serverHello.nextProtoNeg {
+ nextProto := new(nextProtoMsg)
+ proto, fallback := mutualProtocol(c.config.NextProtos, serverHello.nextProtos)
+ nextProto.proto = proto
+ c.clientProtocol = proto
+ c.clientProtocolFallback = fallback
+
+ finishedHash.Write(nextProto.marshal())
+ c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, nextProto.marshal())
+ }
+
+ finished := new(finishedMsg)
+ finished.verifyData = finishedHash.clientSum(masterSecret)
+ finishedHash.Write(finished.marshal())
+ c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, finished.marshal())
+
+ var serverCipher interface{}
+ var serverHash macFunction
+ if suite.cipher != nil {
+ serverCipher = suite.cipher(serverKey, serverIV, true /* for reading */)
+ serverHash = suite.mac(c.vers, serverMAC)
+ } else {
+ serverCipher = suite.aead(serverKey, serverIV)
+ }
+ c.in.prepareCipherSpec(c.vers, serverCipher, serverHash)
+ c.readRecord(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec)
+ if err := c.error(); err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+
+ msg, err = c.readHandshake()
+ if err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+ serverFinished, ok := msg.(*finishedMsg)
+ if !ok {
+ return c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
+ }
+
+ verify := finishedHash.serverSum(masterSecret)
+ if len(verify) != len(serverFinished.verifyData) ||
+ subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(verify, serverFinished.verifyData) != 1 {
+ return c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
+ }
+
+ c.handshakeComplete = true
+ c.cipherSuite = suite.id
+ return nil
+}
+
+// mutualProtocol finds the mutual Next Protocol Negotiation protocol given the
+// set of client and server supported protocols. The set of client supported
+// protocols must not be empty. It returns the resulting protocol and flag
+// indicating if the fallback case was reached.
+func mutualProtocol(clientProtos, serverProtos []string) (string, bool) {
+ for _, s := range serverProtos {
+ for _, c := range clientProtos {
+ if s == c {
+ return s, false
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ return clientProtos[0], true
+}