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authorAndre Furtado <afurtado@google.com>2016-08-22 21:00:26 +0000
committerandroid-build-merger <android-build-merger@google.com>2016-08-22 21:00:26 +0000
commita8ae137579cf2fe0efdc670ed0fae7fa6a425e7d (patch)
treeca3c15b1f795e1b5684677344156e6df8e37e86f
parentdeb745d6ce5e2315acbd0b1028041ca08cc6fc5d (diff)
parentfd9be3377ffeb967601985a195ab9fe9cfd94872 (diff)
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30481342: Security Vulnerability - TOCTOU in MmsProvider allows access to files as phone (radio) uid - DO NOT MERGE
am: fd9be3377f Change-Id: I6d000dae9b27336a466dfe49b30fe27084ca6943
-rw-r--r--src/com/android/providers/telephony/MmsProvider.java37
1 files changed, 31 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/src/com/android/providers/telephony/MmsProvider.java b/src/com/android/providers/telephony/MmsProvider.java
index ac7c1f9..e6008bc 100644
--- a/src/com/android/providers/telephony/MmsProvider.java
+++ b/src/com/android/providers/telephony/MmsProvider.java
@@ -268,7 +268,11 @@ public class MmsProvider extends ContentProvider {
@Override
public Uri insert(Uri uri, ContentValues values) {
- // Don't let anyone insert anything with the _data column
+ // The _data column is filled internally in MmsProvider, so this check is just to avoid
+ // it from being inadvertently set. This is not supposed to be a protection against
+ // malicious attack, since sql injection could still be attempted to bypass the check. On
+ // the other hand, the MmsProvider does verify that the _data column has an allowed value
+ // before opening any uri/files.
if (values != null && values.containsKey(Part._DATA)) {
return null;
}
@@ -686,7 +690,11 @@ public class MmsProvider extends ContentProvider {
@Override
public int update(Uri uri, ContentValues values,
String selection, String[] selectionArgs) {
- // Don't let anyone update the _data column
+ // The _data column is filled internally in MmsProvider, so this check is just to avoid
+ // it from being inadvertently set. This is not supposed to be a protection against
+ // malicious attack, since sql injection could still be attempted to bypass the check. On
+ // the other hand, the MmsProvider does verify that the _data column has an allowed value
+ // before opening any uri/files.
if (values != null && values.containsKey(Part._DATA)) {
return 0;
}
@@ -785,7 +793,11 @@ public class MmsProvider extends ContentProvider {
return null;
}
- // Verify that the _data path points to mms data
+ return safeOpenFileHelper(uri, mode);
+ }
+
+ private ParcelFileDescriptor safeOpenFileHelper(
+ Uri uri, String mode) throws FileNotFoundException {
Cursor c = query(uri, new String[]{"_data"}, null, null, null);
int count = (c != null) ? c.getCount() : 0;
if (count != 1) {
@@ -806,19 +818,32 @@ public class MmsProvider extends ContentProvider {
c.close();
if (path == null) {
- return null;
+ throw new FileNotFoundException("Column _data not found.");
}
+
+ File filePath = new File(path);
try {
- File filePath = new File(path);
+ // The MmsProvider shouldn't open a file that isn't MMS data, so we verify that the
+ // _data path actually points to MMS data. That safeguards ourselves from callers who
+ // inserted or updated a URI (more specifically the _data column) with disallowed paths.
+ // TODO(afurtado): provide a more robust mechanism to avoid disallowed _data paths to
+ // be inserted/updated in the first place, including via SQL injection.
if (!filePath.getCanonicalPath()
.startsWith(getContext().getApplicationInfo().dataDir + "/app_parts/")) {
+ Log.e(TAG, "openFile: path "
+ + filePath.getCanonicalPath()
+ + " does not start with "
+ + getContext().getApplicationInfo().dataDir + "/app_parts/");
+ // Don't care return value
return null;
}
} catch (IOException e) {
+ Log.e(TAG, "openFile: create path failed " + e, e);
return null;
}
- return openFileHelper(uri, mode);
+ int modeBits = ParcelFileDescriptor.parseMode(mode);
+ return ParcelFileDescriptor.open(filePath, modeBits);
}
private void filterUnsupportedKeys(ContentValues values) {