| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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Transient volumes like USB drives are only mounted at /mnt/media_rw,
but they still appear in Settings > Storage. To show stats like
free/used space, give Settings the permissions it needs to access
devices mounted there.
avc: denied { search } for name="media_rw" dev="tmpfs" ino=8358 scontext=u:r:system_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mnt_media_rw_file:s0 tclass=dir permissive=0
Bug: 22545248
Change-Id: I273a1729e417873184ad04ba9dd0fec95fd54f97
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SystemPropPoker in settings app lists and communicates with every service on the
system on property change, which is not currently allowed for all services.
This occurs, for instance, when toggling
Developer options -> Monitoring -> Profile GPU Rendering -> On scren as bars.
Addresses the following denials:
SELinux : avc: denied { find } for service=samplingprofiler scontext=u:r:system_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:samplingprofiler_service:s0 tclass=service_manager
SELinux : avc: denied { find } for service=DockObserver scontext=u:r:system_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:DockObserver_service:s0 tclass=service_manager
SELinux : avc: denied { find } for service=devicestoragemonitor scontext=u:r:system_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:devicestoragemonitor_service:s0 tclass=service_manager
SELinux : avc: denied { find } for service=media.camera.proxy scontext=u:r:system_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:cameraproxy_service:s0 tclass=service_manager
SELinux : avc: denied { find } for service=scheduling_policy scontext=u:r:system_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:scheduling_policy_service:s0 tclass=service_manager
SELinux : avc: denied { find } for service=battery scontext=u:r:system_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:battery_service:s0 tclass=service_manager
SELinux : avc: denied { find } for service=processinfo scontext=u:r:system_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:processinfo_service:s0 tclass=service_manager
SELinux : avc: denied { find } for service=batteryproperties scontext=u:r:system_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:healthd_service:s0 tclass=service_manager
SELinux : avc: denied { find } for service=drm.drmManager scontext=u:r:system_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:drmserver_service:s0 tclass=service_manager
SELinux : avc: denied { find } for service=commontime_management scontext=u:r:system_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:commontime_management_service:s0 tclass=service_manager
(cherry-pick of commit: bf0c34d59bd47f9f286c9b5cd97196c1b075b7b1)
Bug: 20762975
Bug: 21446739
Change-Id: I655d39c6d6ff0b8bd333a99d17abc08af8001be8
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Keystore is going through an API cleanup to make names more clear and
remove unclear methods.
(cherry-picked from commit cbc8f796551151c0d9651500d5d9f116177a07dc)
Change-Id: I06354ccd0a9a73fd20168bfce9350c451cfaced3
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user_changed will be used for state change methods around android user
creation/deletion.
(cherry-picked from commit 520bb816b86fe36440767db6e2f05fb4e8a08f3e)
Change-Id: I295ca9adfc4907b5d7bcf0555f6e5a9a3379635b
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A common source of mistakes when authoring sepolicy is properly
setting up property sets. This is a 3 part step of:
1. Allowing the unix domain connection to the init/property service
2. Allowing write on the property_socket file
3. Allowing the set on class property_service
The macro unix_socket_connect() handled 1 and 2, but could be
confusing for first time policy authors. 3 had to be explicitly
added.
To correct this, we introduce a new macros:
set_prop(sourcedomain, targetprop)
This macro handles steps 1, 2 and 3.
No difference in sediff is expected.
(cherrypicked from commit 625a3526f1ebaaa014bb563239cc33829f616232)
Change-Id: I630ba0178439c935d08062892990d43a3cc1239e
Signed-off-by: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@linux.intel.com>
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The Settings app contains a SystemPropPoker class which notifies every service
on the system that a property has changed.
Address the following denial:
avc: denied { list } for service=NULL scontext=u:r:system_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:servicemanager:s0 tclass=service_manager
Cherry-pick of Change-Id: I81926e8833c1abcb17a4d49687fc89619b416d6c
Bug: 20762975
Change-Id: I665a460f30a1ef57b513da9166aad60097dd4886
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Move the remaining services from tmp_system_server_service to appropriate
attributes and remove tmp_system_server and associated logging:
registry
restrictions
rttmanager
scheduling_policy
search
sensorservice
serial
servicediscovery
statusbar
task
textservices
telecom_service
trust_service
uimode
updatelock
usagestats
usb
user
vibrator
voiceinteraction
wallpaper
webviewupdate
wifip2p
wifi
window
Bug: 18106000
Change-Id: Ia0a6d47099d82c53ba403af394537db6fbc71ca0
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Move the following services from tmp_system_server_service to appropriate
attributes:
network_management
network_score
notification
package
permission
persistent
power
print
processinfo
procstats
Bug: 18106000
Change-Id: I9dfb41fa41cde72ef0059668410a2e9eb1af491c
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Move the following services from tmp_system_server_service to appropriate
attributes:
jobscheduler
launcherapps
location
lock_settings
media_projection
media_router
media_session
mount
netpolicy
netstats
Bug: 18106000
Change-Id: Ia82d475ec41f658851f945173c968f4abf57e7e1
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Move the following services from tmp_system_server_service to appropriate
attributes:
diskstats
display
dreams
dropbox
ethernet
fingerprint
graphicstats
hardware
hdmi_control
input_method
input_service
Bug: 18106000
Change-Id: Iadd8aab9e78d9d39fb00cf0b5a95fa1927d02095
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Move the following services from tmp_system_server_service to appropriate
attributes:
battery
bluetooth_manager
clipboard
commontime_management
connectivity
content
country_detector
device_policy
deviceidle
Bug: 18106000
Change-Id: I0d0f2a075c0509a783631d88ba453ac13399cdf2
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Assign the alarm, appwidget, assetatlas, audio, backup and batterystats services
the appropriate service access levels and move into enforcing.
Bug: 18106000
Change-Id: If3210bb25f3076edfdb6eec36ef6521ace1bd8d7
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Move accessibility, account, appops and activity services into enforcing with
app_api_service level of access, with additional grants to mediaserver and
isolated app.
Bug: 18106000
Change-Id: I1d5a79b9223026415f1690e8e9325ec4c270e3dd
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System services differ in designed access level. Add attributes reflecting this
distinction and label services appropriately. Begin moving access to the newly
labeled services by removing them from tmp_system_server_service into the newly
made system_server_service attribute. Reflect the move of system_server_service
from a type to an attribute by removing access to system_server_service where
appropriate.
Change-Id: I7fd06823328daaea6d6f96e4d6bd00332382230b
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Get ready to switch system_server service lookups into enforcing.
Bug: 18106000
Change-Id: Iefd4b2eee6cdd680f5ab423d15cc72a2a30e27cf
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Change-Id: I156b139b57f46c695ece35b7b26a3087d87b25df
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Also formally allow dumpstate access to all services and grant system_server
access to address the following non-system_server_service entries:
avc: granted { find } for service=drm.drmManager scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:drmserver_service:s0 tclass=service_manager
avc: granted { find } for service=nfc scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:nfc_service:s0 tclass=service_manager
Bug: 18106000
Change-Id: Iad16b36acf44bce52c4824f8b53c0e7731c25602
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Encountered when certinstaller tries to talk to keystore:
ComponentInfo{com.android.certinstaller/com.android.certinstaller.CertInstaller}: java.lang.NullPointerException: Attempt to invoke interface method 'int android.security.IKeystoreService.test()' on a null object reference
Address the following denial:
avc: denied { find } for service=android.security.keystore scontext=u:r:platform_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:keystore_service:s0 tclass=service_manager
Bug: 19347232
Change-Id: I35b46da3c78b384cf04216be937c6b5bfa86452d
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system_app tries to access files in /data/data (lnk_files).
But due to permission issue it is not able to access the
link files.
Change-Id: I2959d899f5e3ab9caa219d684541d36587a6c059
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Reduce logspam and record further observed service connections.
Bug: 18106000
Change-Id: I9a57e4bb8f1c8e066861719fb208c691498842a8
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Address observed audit logs of the form:
granted { find } for service=XXX scontext=u:r:YYY:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:XXX_service:s0 tclass=service_manager
in order to record existing relationships with services.
Bug: 18106000
Change-Id: I99a68f329c17ba67ebf3b87729b8405bdc925ef4
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Temporarily give every system_server_service its own
domain in preparation for splitting it and identifying
special services or classes of services.
Change-Id: I81ffbdbf5eea05e0146fd7fd245f01639b1ae0ef
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Address the following denial:
SELinux : avc: denied { find } for service=media.audio_flinger scontext=u:r:system_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:mediaserver_service:s0 tclass=service_manager
Change-Id: I6bd5d2490c7d4aa06a645c1ee293f2b3db21968b
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All domains are currently granted list and find service_manager
permissions, but this is not necessary. Pare the permissions
which did not trigger any of the auditallow reporting.
Bug: 18106000
Change-Id: Ie0ce8de2af8af2cbe4ce388a2dcf4534694c994a
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Required for Settings to show name/icon of apps on sd card
(permission copied from untrusted_app)
Also removed duplicate permission (from domain) in untrusted_app
Change-Id: Ib2b3bee4dfb54ad5e45b392fd9bfd65add4a00bf
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Change-Id: I8ea400354e33a01d3223b4efced6db76ba00aed6
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Migrators should be allowed to write to /data/misc/keychain in order
to remove it. Similarly /data/misc/user should be writable by system
apps.
TODO: Revoke zygote's rights to read from /data/misc/keychain on
behalf of some preloaded security classes.
Bug: 17811821
Change-Id: I9e9c6883cff1dca3755732225404909c16a0e547
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Bug: 16875245
Change-Id: I2487a80896a4a923fb1fa606f537df9f6ad4220a
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Remove the audit_allow rules from lmp-dev because
we will not be tightening any further so these logs
will not be useful.
Change-Id: Ibd0e4bf4e8f4f5438c3dbb9114addaadac9ef8c9
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Add adbd as a service_manager_local_audit_domain and negate
surfaceflinger_service in its auditallow. Negate keystore_service
and radio_service in the system_app auditallow.
(cherry picked from commit 88157ea34779aa66a7d43a322d10a0eda9fe39a0)
Change-Id: I25354db2add3135335c80be2c2d350e526137572
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Add SELinux MAC for the service manager actions list
and find. Add the list and find verbs to the
service_manager class. Add policy requirements for
service_manager to enforce policies to binder_use
macro.
(cherry picked from commit b8511e0d98880a683c276589ab7d8d7666b7f8c1)
Change-Id: I980d4a8acf6a0c6e99a3a7905961eb5564b1be15
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Bug: 16875245
(cherry picked from commit 372d0df796389e2f6295a394492585ed64f0ceca)
Change-Id: I38fa14226ab94df2029ca60d3c8898f46c1824c7
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Add adbd as a service_manager_local_audit_domain and negate
surfaceflinger_service in its auditallow. Negate keystore_service
and radio_service in the system_app auditallow.
Change-Id: I05ea2a3e853b692f151182202f1b30786b44f1fb
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Add SELinux MAC for the service manager actions list
and find. Add the list and find verbs to the
service_manager class. Add policy requirements for
service_manager to enforce policies to binder_use
macro.
Change-Id: I224b1c6a6e21e3cdeb23badfc35c82a37558f964
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Remove the auditallow statements related to keystore
in system_app and system_server.
Change-Id: I1fc25ff475299ee020ea19f9b6b5811f8fd17c28
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Map imms to system_app_service in service_contexts and add
the system_app_service type and allow system_app to add the
system_app_service.
Bug: 16005467
Change-Id: I06ca75e2602f083297ed44960767df2e78991140
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Add keystore_key class and an action for each action supported
by keystore. Add policies that replicate the access control that
already exists in keystore. Add auditallow rules for actions
not known to be used frequently. Add macro for those domains
wishing to access keystore.
Change-Id: Iddd8672b9e9b72b45ee208e6eda608cc9dc61edc
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Introduce a net_radio_prop type for net. properties that can be
set by radio or system.
Introduce a system_radio_prop type for sys. properties that can be
set by radio or system.
Introduce a dhcp_prop type for properties that can be set by dhcp or system.
Drop the rild_prop vs radio_prop distinction; this was an early
experiment to see if we could separate properties settable by rild
versus other radio UID processes but it did not pan out.
Remove the ability to set properties from unconfineddomain.
Allow init to set any property. Allow recovery to set ctl_default_prop
to restart adbd.
Change-Id: I5ccafcb31ec4004dfefcec8718907f6b6f3e0dfd
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
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- logd Development Settings failed to access persist.logd.size
Change-Id: I0732b44fcbffbf3c187bcb23df2db807fa3e8fde
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Change-Id: I9c3ff0a79d947a14084638772451d06298c43e47
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
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System UID apps want to be able to create/write to system-owned
/data directories outside of their own /data/data package directory,
such as /data/system/cache and /data/misc/keychain. Restore access
(which was removed by Ifa10e3283b07f6bd6ecc16eceeb663edfd756cea when
system_app_data_file was introduced for the /data/data package
directories of system UID apps), but audit writes to system_data_file
so we can look at introducing separate types for these directories in
the future and ultimately remove access to the rest of the system-owned
data.
Change-Id: I573f120f23f2dd2d228aa738b31ad2cb3044ec6e
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
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- permit logd control from system_app
Bug: 14563261
Change-Id: Id5992cca70647a0e4b913a793c6ba8334dc57963
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We were using system_data_file for the /data/data directories of
system UID apps to match the DAC ownership of system UID shared with
other system files. However, we are seeing cases where files created
in these directories must be writable by other apps, and we would like
to avoid allowing write to system data files outside of these directories.
So introduce a separate system_app_data_file type and assign it.
This should also help protect against arbitrary writes by system UID
apps to other system data directories.
This resolves the following denial when cropping or taking a user photo
for secondary users:
avc: denied { write } for path="/data/data/com.android.settings/cache/TakeEditUserPhoto2.jpg" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=82120 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_data_file:s0 tclass=file
avc: denied { write } for path="/data/data/com.android.settings/cache/CropEditUserPhoto.jpg" dev="mmcblk0p30" ino=602905 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:system_data_file:s0 tclass=file
Bug: 14604553
Change-Id: Ifa10e3283b07f6bd6ecc16eceeb663edfd756cea
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
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Resolves denials such as:
avc: denied { set } for property =ctl.bugreport scontext=u:r:system_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:ctl_default_prop:s0 tclass=property_service
avc: denied { write } for pid=4415 comm=5369676E616C2043617463686572 name="anr" dev="dm-0" ino=358337 scontext=u:r:system_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:anr_data_file:s0 tclass=dir
avc: denied { add_name } for pid=4415 comm=5369676E616C2043617463686572 name="traces.txt" scontext=u:r:system_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:anr_data_file:s0 tclass=dir
avc: denied { create } for pid=4415 comm=5369676E616C2043617463686572 name="traces.txt" scontext=u:r:system_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:anr_data_file:s0 tclass=file
Change-Id: I71d0ede049136d72f28bdc85d52fcefa2f7d128f
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
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Coalesce a number of allow rules replicated among multiple
app domains.
Get rid of duplicated rules already covered by domain, appdomain,
or platformappdomain rules.
Split the platformappdomain rules to their own platformappdomain.te
file, document them more fully, and note the inheritance in each
of the relevant *_app.te files.
Generalize isolated app unix_stream_socket rules to all app domains
to resolve denials such as:
avc: denied { read write } for pid=11897 comm="Binder_2" path="socket:[203881]" dev="sockfs" ino=203881 scontext=u:r:release_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tclass=unix_stream_socket
avc: denied { getattr } for pid=11990 comm=4173796E635461736B202334 path="socket:[203881]" dev="sockfs" ino=203881 scontext=u:r:release_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tclass=unix_stream_socket
avc: denied { getopt } for pid=11990 comm=4173796E635461736B202334 scontext=u:r:release_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tclass=unix_stream_socket
avc: denied { read write } for pid=6890 comm="Binder_10" path="socket:[205010]" dev="sockfs" ino=205010 scontext=u:r:release_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:media_app:s0 tclass=unix_stream_socket
avc: denied { getattr } for pid=11990 comm=4173796E635461736B202334 path="socket:[205010]" dev="sockfs" ino=205010 scontext=u:r:release_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:media_app:s0 tclass=unix_stream_socket
avc: denied { getopt } for pid=11990 comm=4173796E635461736B202334 scontext=u:r:release_app:s0 tcontext=u:r:media_app:s0 tclass=unix_stream_socket
Change-Id: I770d7d51d498b15447219083739153265d951fe5
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
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A number of binder_call rules are duplicated by other rules
written in terms of attributes/sets (e.g. appdomain, binderservicedomain).
Get rid of the duplicates.
Also use binder_use() in racoon.te rather than manually writing the
base rule for communicating with the servicemanager.
Change-Id: I5a459cc2154b1466bcde6eccef253dfcdcb44e0a
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
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Change I6dacdc43bcc1a56e47655e37e825ee6a205eb56b switched
the keystore to using binder instead of a socket, so this
socket type and rules have been unused for a while. The type
was only ever assigned to a /dev/socket socket file (tmpfs) so
there is no issue with removing the type (no persistent files
will have this xattr value).
Change-Id: Id584233c58f6276774c3432ea76878aca28d6280
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
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There is some overlap between socket rules in app.te and the net.te rules,
but they aren't quite identical since not all app domains presently include
the net_domain() macro and because the rules in app.te allow more permissions
for netlink_route_socket and allow rawip_socket permissions for ping.
The current app.te rules prevent one from ever creating a non-networked app
domain. Resolve this overlap by:
1) Adding the missing permissions allowed by app.te to net.te for
netlink_route_socket and rawip_socket.
2) Adding net_domain() calls to all existing app domains that do not already
have it.
3) Deleting the redundant socket rules from app.te.
Then we'll have no effective change in what is allowed for apps but
allow one to define app domains in the future that are not allowed
network access.
Also cleanup net.te to use the create_socket_perms macro rather than *
and add macros for stream socket permissions.
Change-Id: I6e80d65b0ccbd48bd2b7272c083a4473e2b588a9
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
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This new type will allow us to write finer-grained
policy concerning asec containers. Some files of
these containers need to be world readable.
Change-Id: Iefee74214d664acd262edecbb4f981d633ff96ce
Signed-off-by: rpcraig <rpcraig@tycho.ncsc.mil>
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Triggering a bug report via
Settings > Developer Options > Take bug report
generates a number of denials.
Two bugs here:
1) According to the "allowed" list in
frameworks/native/cmds/servicemanager/service_manager.c ,
media apps, nfc, radio, and apps with system/root UIDs can register
as a binder service. However, they were not placed into the
binder_service domain. Fix them.
2) The bugreport mechanism queries all the services and java
programs and asks them to write to a shell owned file. Grant the
corresponding SELinux capability.
Addresses the following denials:
<5>[ 149.342181] type=1400 audit(1389419775.872:17): avc: denied { write } for pid=4023 comm="dumpsys" path="/data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport-2014-01-10-21-55-46.txt.tmp" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=82094 scontext=u:r:keystore:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=file
<5>[ 149.371844] type=1400 audit(1389419775.902:18): avc: denied { write } for pid=4023 comm="dumpsys" path="/data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport-2014-01-10-21-55-46.txt.tmp" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=82094 scontext=u:r:healthd:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=file
<5>[ 149.980161] type=1400 audit(1389419776.512:22): avc: denied { write } for pid=4023 comm="dumpsys" path="/data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport-2014-01-10-21-55-46.txt.tmp" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=82094 scontext=u:r:drmserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=file
<5>[ 150.095066] type=1400 audit(1389419776.622:23): avc: denied { write } for pid=1514 comm="Binder_C" path="/data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport-2014-01-10-21-55-46.txt.tmp" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=82094 scontext=u:r:system_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=file
<5>[ 150.096748] type=1400 audit(1389419776.632:24): avc: denied { getattr } for pid=3178 comm="Binder_3" path="/data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport-2014-01-10-21-55-46.txt.tmp" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=82094 scontext=u:r:system_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=file
<5>[ 150.097090] type=1400 audit(1389419776.632:25): avc: denied { write } for pid=1514 comm="Binder_C" path="/data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport-2014-01-10-21-55-46.txt.tmp" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=82094 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=file
<5>[ 154.545583] type=1400 audit(1389419781.072:43): avc: denied { write } for pid=1423 comm="Binder_A" path="/data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport-2014-01-10-21-55-46.txt.tmp" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=82094 scontext=u:r:media_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=file
<5>[ 156.000877] type=1400 audit(1389419782.532:44): avc: denied { write } for pid=1423 comm="Binder_A" path="/data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport-2014-01-10-21-55-46.txt.tmp" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=82094 scontext=u:r:radio:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=file
<5>[ 156.022567] type=1400 audit(1389419782.552:45): avc: denied { write } for pid=1423 comm="Binder_A" path="/data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport-2014-01-10-21-55-46.txt.tmp" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=82094 scontext=u:r:radio:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=file
<5>[ 156.043463] type=1400 audit(1389419782.572:46): avc: denied { write } for pid=1423 comm="Binder_A" path="/data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport-2014-01-10-21-55-46.txt.tmp" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=82094 scontext=u:r:nfc:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=file
<5>[ 156.062550] type=1400 audit(1389419782.592:47): avc: denied { write } for pid=1423 comm="Binder_A" path="/data/data/com.android.shell/files/bugreports/bugreport-2014-01-10-21-55-46.txt.tmp" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=82094 scontext=u:r:radio:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0 tclass=file
Change-Id: I365d530c38ce176617e48b620c05c4aae01324d3
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