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Change-Id: If6b85fbb2332f7a03b603f2d46bd2f73c778ecf9
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
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Resolves denials such as:
avc: denied { read write } for path="socket:[33571]" dev="sockfs" ino=33571 scontext=u:r:ppp:s0 tcontext=u:r:mtp:s0 tclass=unix_dgram_socket
Change-Id: Icb1ee00d8513179039bfb738647f49480e836f25
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
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Replace * or any permission set containing create with
create_socket_perms or create_stream_socket_perms.
Add net_domain() to all domains using network sockets and
delete rules already covered by domain.te or net.te.
For netlink_route_socket, only nlmsg_write needs to be separately
granted to specific domains that are permitted to modify the routing
table. Clarification: read/write permissions are just ability to
perform read/recv() or write/send() on the socket, whereas nlmsg_read/
nlmsg_write permissions control ability to observe or modify the
underlying kernel state accessed via the socket.
See security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c in the kernel for the mapping of
netlink message types to nlmsg_read or nlmsg_write.
Delete legacy rule for b/12061011.
This change does not touch any rules where only read/write were allowed
to a socket created by another domain (inherited across exec or
received across socket or binder IPC). We may wish to rewrite some or all
of those rules with the rw_socket_perms macro but that is a separate
change.
Change-Id: Ib0637ab86f6d388043eff928e5d96beb02e5450e
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
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Also add rules from our policy.
Change-Id: I6f552538cc4f6b28b2883aa74832230944cbdb7a
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
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They serve no purpose; these directories/files are normally accessible
in the same way as the rest of /system. Also one of them has the wrong
attributes (data_file_type), thereby making it writable by some domains,
and under current policy, shell and apps cannot do ls -l /etc/ppp /etc/dhcpcd.
Change-Id: I0c1baa434fe78373684f4eaab40a41fddf2bdd79
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
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This change removes the permissive line from unconfined
domains. Unconfined domains can do (mostly) anything, so moving
these domains into enforcing should be a no-op.
The following domains were deliberately NOT changed:
1) kernel
2) init
In the future, this gives us the ability to tighten up the
rules in unconfined, and have those tightened rules actually
work.
When we're ready to tighten up the rules for these domains,
we can:
1) Remove unconfined_domain and re-add the permissive line.
2) Submit the domain in permissive but NOT unconfined.
3) Remove the permissive line
4) Wait a few days and submit the no-permissive change.
For instance, if we were ready to do this for adb, we'd identify
a list of possible rules which allow adbd to work, re-add
the permissive line, and then upload those changes to AOSP.
After sufficient testing, we'd then move adb to enforcing.
We'd repeat this for each domain until everything is enforcing
and out of unconfined.
Change-Id: If674190de3262969322fb2e93d9a0e734f8b9245
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This prevents denials from being generated by the base policy.
Over time, these rules will be incrementally tightened to improve
security.
Change-Id: I4be1c987a5d69ac784a56d42fc2c9063c402de11
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Bug: 4070557
Change-Id: I027f76cff6df90e9909711cb81fbd17db95233c1
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Initial policy for Point-to-Point tunneling and
tunneling manager services.
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