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* Enforce more specific service access.dcashman2015-04-081-7/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Move the following services from tmp_system_server_service to appropriate attributes: network_management network_score notification package permission persistent power print processinfo procstats Bug: 18106000 Change-Id: I9dfb41fa41cde72ef0059668410a2e9eb1af491c
* Add system_api_service and app_api_service attributes.dcashman2015-04-031-1/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | System services differ in designed access level. Add attributes reflecting this distinction and label services appropriately. Begin moving access to the newly labeled services by removing them from tmp_system_server_service into the newly made system_server_service attribute. Reflect the move of system_server_service from a type to an attribute by removing access to system_server_service where appropriate. Change-Id: I7fd06823328daaea6d6f96e4d6bd00332382230b
* Record observed system_server servicemanager service requests.dcashman2015-03-031-0/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | Also formally allow dumpstate access to all services and grant system_server access to address the following non-system_server_service entries: avc: granted { find } for service=drm.drmManager scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:drmserver_service:s0 tclass=service_manager avc: granted { find } for service=nfc scontext=u:r:system_server:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:nfc_service:s0 tclass=service_manager Bug: 18106000 Change-Id: Iad16b36acf44bce52c4824f8b53c0e7731c25602
* Make system_server_service an attribute.dcashman2015-01-141-0/+1
| | | | | | | | Temporarily give every system_server_service its own domain in preparation for splitting it and identifying special services or classes of services. Change-Id: I81ffbdbf5eea05e0146fd7fd245f01639b1ae0ef
* Restrict service_manager find and list access.dcashman2014-12-151-9/+2
| | | | | | | | | All domains are currently granted list and find service_manager permissions, but this is not necessary. Pare the permissions which did not trigger any of the auditallow reporting. Bug: 18106000 Change-Id: Ie0ce8de2af8af2cbe4ce388a2dcf4534694c994a
* am ebfd9f87: allow oemfs:dir searchNick Kralevich2014-10-101-0/+1
|\ | | | | | | | | * commit 'ebfd9f87197f4a39bbc2a5e4f6c6dffc28be36d7': allow oemfs:dir search
| * allow oemfs:dir searchNick Kralevich2014-10-101-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | mediaserver and drmserver both have permission to read oemfs related files. However, there are no search permissions on the directory, so the files would be unreachable. Grant search permissions on the oemfs directory, so that the files within that directory can be read. Bug: 17954291 Change-Id: I9e36dc7b940bd46774753c1fa07b0f47c36ff0db
* | resolved conflicts for merge of 0a20b57f to lmp-dev-plus-aospVineeta Srivastava2014-09-161-0/+3
|\| | | | | | | Change-Id: I6a0d56c23888535964e1559cb8ad63fedd27db47
| * Added sepolicy for oem customization.Vineeta Srivastava2014-09-161-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | Bug: 16635599 Change-Id: I69f9089dde1fe68762a38f4d97ddee2c20aaaa9d
* | Resync lmp-dev-plus-aosp with masterNick Kralevich2014-07-251-0/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | A DO NOT MERGE change merged from lmp-dev to lmp-dev-plus-aosp. This is expected, but it's causing unnecessary merge conflicts when handling AOSP contributions. Resolve those conflicts. This is essentially a revert of bf696327246833c9aba55a645e6c433e9f321e27 for lmp-dev-plus-aosp only. Change-Id: Icc66def7113ab45176ae015f659cb442d53bce5c
* | resolved conflicts for merge of 92b9360c to lmp-dev-plus-aospNick Kralevich2014-07-251-0/+2
|\ \ | |/ |/| | | Change-Id: I16eca0cac13042f9ed2e1484e6aa25f233508aa9
| * Add fine grained access control to DrmManagerService.Riley Spahn2014-07-241-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add policies supporting SELinux MAC in DrmManagerservice. Add drmservice class with verbs for each of the functions exposed by drmservice. Change-Id: Ib758a23302962f41e5103c4853c65adea3a5994e
| * Further refined service_manager auditallow statements.Riley Spahn2014-07-181-1/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Further refined auditallow statements associated with service_manager and added dumpstate to the service_manager_local_audit_domain. Change-Id: I2ecc42c8660de6a91f3b4e56268344fbd069ccc0
| * Add access control for each service_manager action.Riley Spahn2014-07-141-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add SELinux MAC for the service manager actions list and find. Add the list and find verbs to the service_manager class. Add policy requirements for service_manager to enforce policies to binder_use macro. Change-Id: I224b1c6a6e21e3cdeb23badfc35c82a37558f964
* | DO NOT MERGE: Remove service_manager audit_allows.Riley Spahn2014-07-181-8/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Remove the audit_allow rules from lmp-dev because we will not be tightening any further so these logs will not be useful. Change-Id: Ibd0e4bf4e8f4f5438c3dbb9114addaadac9ef8c9
* | Further refined service_manager auditallow statements.Riley Spahn2014-07-181-1/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Further refined auditallow statements associated with service_manager and added dumpstate to the service_manager_local_audit_domain. (cherry picked from commit 603bc2050959dd353154bf33fa0c2b0612da9c6e) Change-Id: Ib8894aa70aa300c14182a6c934dd56c08c82b05f
* | Add access control for each service_manager action.Riley Spahn2014-07-151-0/+4
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | Add SELinux MAC for the service manager actions list and find. Add the list and find verbs to the service_manager class. Add policy requirements for service_manager to enforce policies to binder_use macro. (cherry picked from commit b8511e0d98880a683c276589ab7d8d7666b7f8c1) Change-Id: I980d4a8acf6a0c6e99a3a7905961eb5564b1be15
* Add SELinux rules for service_manager.Riley Spahn2014-06-121-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | Add a service_mananger class with the verb add. Add a type that groups the services for each of the processes that is allowed to start services in service.te and an attribute for all services controlled by the service manager. Add the service_contexts file which maps service name to target label. Bug: 12909011 Change-Id: I017032a50bc90c57b536e80b972118016d340c7d
* Allow reading of radio data files passed over binder.Stephen Smalley2014-03-271-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Addresses denials such as: avc: denied { read } for pid=5114 comm="le.android.talk" path="/data/data/com.android.providers.telephony/app_parts/PART_1394223232515_recording88476874.amr" dev="mmcblk0p23" ino=64522 scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:radio_data_file:s0 tclass=file avc: denied { getattr } for pid=29199 comm="Binder_4" path="/data/data/com.android.providers.telephony/app_parts/PART_1394223232515_recording88476874.amr" dev="mmcblk0p23" ino=64522 scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:radio_data_file:s0 tclass=file avc: denied { read } for pid=29199 comm="Binder_4" path="/data/data/com.android.providers.telephony/app_parts/PART_1394223232515_recording88476874.amr" dev="mmcblk0p23" ino=64522 scontext=u:r:drmserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:radio_data_file:s0 tclass=file avc: denied { getattr } for pid=9338 comm="MediaLoader" path="/data/data/com.android.providers.telephony/app_parts/PART_1394848620510_image.jpg" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=287374 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:radio_data_file:s0 tclass=file avc: denied { read } for pid=9896 comm="Binder_7" path="/data/data/com.android.providers.telephony/app_parts/PART_1394594346187_image.jpg" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=287522 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:radio_data_file:s0 tclass=file This does not allow write denials such as: avc: denied { write } for pid=1728 comm="Binder_4" path="/data/data/com.android.providers.telephony/app_parts/PART_1394818738798_image.jpg" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=82279 scontext=u:r:untrusted_app:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:radio_data_file:s0 tclass=file Need to understand whether write access is in fact required. Change-Id: I7693d16cb4f9855909d790d3f16f8bf281764468 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
* Allow drmserver and mediaserver to read apk files.Stephen Smalley2014-03-151-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Required to support passing resources via open apk files over Binder. Resolves denials such as: avc: denied { read } for pid=31457 comm="SoundPoolThread" path="/mnt/asec/au.com.shiftyjelly.pocketcasts-1/pkg.apk" dev="dm-10" ino=12 scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:asec_apk_file:s0 tclass=file avc: denied { read } for pid=31439 comm="Binder_2" path="/mnt/asec/au.com.shiftyjelly.pocketcasts-1/pkg.apk" dev="dm-10" ino=12 scontext=u:r:drmserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:asec_apk_file:s0 tclass=file We do not allow open as it is not required (i.e. the files are passed as open files over Binder or local socket and opened by the client). Change-Id: Ib0941df1e9aac8d20621a356d2d212b98471abbc Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
* Get rid of separate platform_app_data_file type.Stephen Smalley2014-03-131-1/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The original concept was to allow separation between /data/data/<pkgdir> files of "platform" apps (signed by one of the four build keys) and untrusted apps. But we had to allow read/write to support passing of open files via Binder or local socket for compatibilty, and it seems that direct open by pathname is in fact used in Android as well, only passing the pathname via Binder or local socket. So there is no real benefit to keeping it as a separate type. Retain a type alias for platform_app_data_file to app_data_file until restorecon /data/data support is in place to provide compatibility. Change-Id: Ic15066f48765322ad40500b2ba2801bb3ced5489 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
* Clean up socket rules.Stephen Smalley2014-02-251-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Replace * or any permission set containing create with create_socket_perms or create_stream_socket_perms. Add net_domain() to all domains using network sockets and delete rules already covered by domain.te or net.te. For netlink_route_socket, only nlmsg_write needs to be separately granted to specific domains that are permitted to modify the routing table. Clarification: read/write permissions are just ability to perform read/recv() or write/send() on the socket, whereas nlmsg_read/ nlmsg_write permissions control ability to observe or modify the underlying kernel state accessed via the socket. See security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c in the kernel for the mapping of netlink message types to nlmsg_read or nlmsg_write. Delete legacy rule for b/12061011. This change does not touch any rules where only read/write were allowed to a socket created by another domain (inherited across exec or received across socket or binder IPC). We may wish to rewrite some or all of those rules with the rw_socket_perms macro but that is a separate change. Change-Id: Ib0637ab86f6d388043eff928e5d96beb02e5450e Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
* Introduce asec_public_file type.Robert Craig2014-02-111-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | This new type will allow us to write finer-grained policy concerning asec containers. Some files of these containers need to be world readable. Change-Id: Iefee74214d664acd262edecbb4f981d633ff96ce Signed-off-by: rpcraig <rpcraig@tycho.ncsc.mil>
* Revert "Move tlcd_sock policy over to manta."Nick Kralevich2014-02-041-1/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This doesn't compile on non-manta devices because of a missing drmserver_socket declaration. external/sepolicy/mediaserver.te":68:ERROR 'unknown type drmserver_socket' at token ';' on line 6764: #line 68 allow mediaserver drmserver_socket:sock_file write; checkpolicy: error(s) encountered while parsing configuration make: *** [out/target/product/flo/obj/ETC/sepolicy_intermediates/sepolicy] Error 1 make: *** Waiting for unfinished jobs.... This reverts commit 8cd400d3c4a5a9eb9bd8b0392260200bd23e6548. Change-Id: Ib8f07b57008b9ed1165b945057502779e806f0f8
* Move tlcd_sock policy over to manta.Stephen Smalley2014-02-041-9/+1
| | | | | Change-Id: I7d5a5f964133177e7d466b9759fcf6300fec345d Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
* drmserver: allow looking in efs_file directoriesNick Kralevich2014-01-311-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | We can read any efs_files, but can't look in the directory containing them. Allow it. Without this patch, high resolution movie playback is broken. Addresses the following denial: [ 276.780046] type=1400 audit(1391105234.431:5): avc: denied { search } for pid=125 comm="drmserver" name="/" dev="mmcblk0p1" ino=2 scontext=u:r:drmserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:efs_file:s0 tclass=dir Bug: 12819852 Change-Id: Ie9d13a224cef5e229de1bdb78d605841ed387a21
* Make drmserver enforcing.Nick Kralevich2014-01-251-1/+0
| | | | Change-Id: I7c1d2fc7b4d5a962f872d5f032b6d9e31efe7a24
* Allow drmserver to unlink old socket file.Stephen Smalley2014-01-161-0/+2
| | | | | Change-Id: I35728c4f058fa9aeb51a7960395759590e20b083 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
* Support forcing permissive domains to unconfined.Nick Kralevich2014-01-111-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Permissive domains are only intended for development. When a device launches, we want to ensure that all permissive domains are in, at a minimum, unconfined+enforcing. Add FORCE_PERMISSIVE_TO_UNCONFINED to Android.mk. During development, this flag is false, and permissive domains are allowed. When SELinux new feature development has been frozen immediately before release, this flag will be flipped to true. Any previously permissive domains will move into unconfined+enforcing. This will ensure that all SELinux domains have at least a minimal level of protection. Unconditionally enable this flag for all user builds. Change-Id: I1632f0da0022c80170d8eb57c82499ac13fd7858
* fix mediaserver selinux denials.Nick Kralevich2014-01-061-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | mediaserver needs the ability to read media_rw_data_file files. Allow it. Similarly, this is also needed for drmserver. Addresses the following denials: <5>[ 22.812859] type=1400 audit(1389041093.955:17): avc: denied { read } for pid=1655 comm="MediaScannerSer" path="/data/media/0/DCIM/Camera/VID_20140106_124115.mp4" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=122204 scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:media_rw_data_file:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 22.813103] type=1400 audit(1389041093.955:18): avc: denied { getattr } for pid=849 comm="Binder_2" path="/data/media/0/DCIM/Camera/VID_20140106_124115.mp4" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=122204 scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:media_rw_data_file:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 22.832041] type=1400 audit(1389041093.975:19): avc: denied { read } for pid=849 comm="Binder_2" path="/data/media/0/DCIM/Camera/VID_20140106_124115.mp4" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=122204 scontext=u:r:drmserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:media_rw_data_file:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 52.357470] type=1400 audit(1389041123.494:29): avc: denied { read } for pid=2757 comm="ImageLoader" path="/data/media/0/DCIM/Camera/VID_20140106_124520.mp4" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=122211 scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:media_rw_data_file:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 52.357717] type=1400 audit(1389041123.494:30): avc: denied { getattr } for pid=849 comm="Binder_2" path="/data/media/0/DCIM/Camera/VID_20140106_124520.mp4" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=122211 scontext=u:r:mediaserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:media_rw_data_file:s0 tclass=file <5>[ 52.382276] type=1400 audit(1389041123.524:31): avc: denied { read } for pid=849 comm="Binder_2" path="/data/media/0/DCIM/Camera/VID_20140106_124520.mp4" dev="mmcblk0p28" ino=122211 scontext=u:r:drmserver:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:media_rw_data_file:s0 tclass=file Allow anyone who has access to video_device:chr_file to also have read access to video_device:dir. Otherwise, the chracter devices may not be reachable. Bug: 12416198 Change-Id: I649cd52ec7f1a25afb3aea479482e3f270bfe074
* Confine drmserver, but leave it permissive for now.Stephen Smalley2013-10-291-1/+31
| | | | | Change-Id: I8f344dda3ab9766b4a72c404061f242e054129cd Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
* Move unconfined domains out of permissive mode.Nick Kralevich2013-10-211-1/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This change removes the permissive line from unconfined domains. Unconfined domains can do (mostly) anything, so moving these domains into enforcing should be a no-op. The following domains were deliberately NOT changed: 1) kernel 2) init In the future, this gives us the ability to tighten up the rules in unconfined, and have those tightened rules actually work. When we're ready to tighten up the rules for these domains, we can: 1) Remove unconfined_domain and re-add the permissive line. 2) Submit the domain in permissive but NOT unconfined. 3) Remove the permissive line 4) Wait a few days and submit the no-permissive change. For instance, if we were ready to do this for adb, we'd identify a list of possible rules which allow adbd to work, re-add the permissive line, and then upload those changes to AOSP. After sufficient testing, we'd then move adb to enforcing. We'd repeat this for each domain until everything is enforcing and out of unconfined. Change-Id: If674190de3262969322fb2e93d9a0e734f8b9245
* Make all domains unconfined.repo sync2013-05-201-26/+1
| | | | | | | | This prevents denials from being generated by the base policy. Over time, these rules will be incrementally tightened to improve security. Change-Id: I4be1c987a5d69ac784a56d42fc2c9063c402de11
* Move domains into per-domain permissive mode.repo sync2013-05-141-0/+1
| | | | | Bug: 4070557 Change-Id: I027f76cff6df90e9909711cb81fbd17db95233c1
* Give the drmserver the ability to connect to the tee.Geremy Condra2013-04-051-0/+3
| | | | | Bug: 8539042 Change-Id: I6a9c3247688f49bed4a1637c728e77c2e865afd2
* Allow drmserver to interact with apk_data_file sock_files.Geremy Condra2013-04-051-0/+1
| | | | | Bug: 8539042 Change-Id: I255930759ce0612f6ec9b931bfe545342ef808fc
* Give drmserver the ability to interact with apk_data_file dirs.Geremy Condra2013-04-051-0/+1
| | | | | Bug: 8539042 Change-Id: I87165fd83b1abef9eb7bf4c403714150aaefed6e
* Allow drmserver to read the wv keys.Geremy Condra2013-04-051-0/+1
| | | | | Bug: 8539042 Change-Id: I31e7a3ae6ba783b78c3b38756966950a20f2f2aa
* Revert "Revert "Various minor policy fixes based on CTS.""Geremy Condra2013-03-271-0/+4
| | | | | | | | This reverts commit ba84bf1dec64d745b6efc516799b2c722a672cd9 Hidden dependency resolved. Change-Id: I9f0844f643abfda8405db2c722a36c847882c392
* Revert "Various minor policy fixes based on CTS."Geremy Condra2013-03-221-4/+0
| | | | | | This reverts commit 8a814a7604afd20f12c9ff3dcdae7d10e9b75f84 Change-Id: Id1497cc42d07ee7ff2ca44ae4042fc9f2efc9aad
* Various minor policy fixes based on CTS.Stephen Smalley2013-03-221-0/+4
| | | | | Change-Id: I5a3584b6cc5eda2b7d82e85452f9fe457877f1d1 Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
* Split internal and external sdcardsWilliam Roberts2013-03-221-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Two new types are introduced: sdcard_internal sdcard_external The existing type of sdcard, is dropped and a new attribute sdcard_type is introduced. The boolean app_sdcard_rw has also been changed to allow for controlling untrusted_app domain to use the internal and external sdcards. Change-Id: Ic7252a8e1703a43cb496413809d01cc6cacba8f5
* Trusted Execution Environment policy.rpcraig2012-08-131-0/+1
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* Additions for grouper/JBrpcraig2012-08-101-0/+4
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* Policy changes to support running the latest CTS.Stephen Smalley2012-03-071-0/+6
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* SE Android policy.Stephen Smalley2012-01-041-0/+10
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