aboutsummaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/docs
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
Diffstat (limited to 'docs')
-rw-r--r--docs/about/maintainers.rst8
-rw-r--r--docs/components/debugfs-design.rst23
-rw-r--r--docs/components/fconf.rst85
-rw-r--r--docs/components/index.rst2
-rw-r--r--docs/design/cpu-specific-build-macros.rst7
-rw-r--r--docs/design/firmware-design.rst4
-rw-r--r--docs/design/trusted-board-boot-build.rst21
-rw-r--r--docs/getting_started/build-options.rst10
-rw-r--r--docs/global_substitutions.txt2
-rw-r--r--docs/glossary.rst6
-rw-r--r--docs/perf/index.rst3
-rw-r--r--docs/perf/performance-monitoring-unit.rst158
-rw-r--r--docs/plat/arm/arm-build-options.rst16
-rw-r--r--docs/plat/arm/fvp/index.rst18
-rw-r--r--docs/plat/meson-axg.rst27
-rw-r--r--docs/process/security-hardening.rst99
-rw-r--r--docs/resources/diagrams/plantuml/fconf_bl1_load_config.puml52
-rw-r--r--docs/resources/diagrams/plantuml/fconf_bl2_populate.puml41
18 files changed, 539 insertions, 43 deletions
diff --git a/docs/about/maintainers.rst b/docs/about/maintainers.rst
index d9d7f84fd..802dafcd8 100644
--- a/docs/about/maintainers.rst
+++ b/docs/about/maintainers.rst
@@ -64,6 +64,14 @@ Amlogic Meson S905X2 (G12A) platform port
:F: drivers/amlogic/g12a
:F: plat/amlogic/g12a/
+Amlogic Meson A113D (AXG) platform port
+-----------------------------------------
+:M: Carlo Caione <ccaione@baylibre.com>
+:G: `carlocaione`_
+:F: docs/plat/meson-axg.rst
+:F: drivers/amlogic/axg
+:F: plat/amlogic/axg/
+
Armv7-A architecture port
-------------------------
:M: Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@linaro.org>
diff --git a/docs/components/debugfs-design.rst b/docs/components/debugfs-design.rst
index 06916f3d9..8ce1ba6a7 100644
--- a/docs/components/debugfs-design.rst
+++ b/docs/components/debugfs-design.rst
@@ -15,8 +15,9 @@ Virtual filesystem
------------------
The core functionality lies in a virtual file system based on a 9p file server
-interface (`Notes on the Plan 9 Kernel Source`_). The implementation permits
-exposing virtual files, firmware drivers, and file blobs.
+interface (`Notes on the Plan 9 Kernel Source`_ and
+`Linux 9p remote filesystem protocol`_).
+The implementation permits exposing virtual files, firmware drivers, and file blobs.
Namespace
~~~~~~~~~
@@ -77,10 +78,10 @@ SMC interface
-------------
The communication with the 9p layer in BL31 is made through an SMC conduit
-(`SMC Calling Convention PDD`_), using a specific SiP Function Id. An NS shared
-buffer is used to pass path string parameters, or e.g. to exchange data on a
-read operation. Refer to `ARM SiP Services`_ for a description of the SMC
-interface.
+(`SMC Calling Convention PDD`_), using a specific SiP Function Id. An NS
+shared buffer is used to pass path string parameters, or e.g. to exchange
+data on a read operation. Refer to `ARM SiP Services`_ for a description
+of the SMC interface.
Security considerations
-----------------------
@@ -114,17 +115,9 @@ The SMC interface is accessible from an NS environment, that is:
- a Linux kernel driver running at NS-EL1
- a Linux userspace application through the kernel driver
-References
-----------
-
-.. [#] `SMC Calling Convention PDD`_
-.. [#] `Notes on the Plan 9 Kernel Source`_
-.. [#] `Linux 9p remote filesystem protocol`_
-.. [#] `ARM SiP Services`_
-
--------------
-*Copyright (c) 2019, Arm Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.*
+*Copyright (c) 2019-2020, Arm Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.*
.. _SMC Calling Convention PDD: http://infocenter.arm.com/help/topic/com.arm.doc.den0028b/
.. _Notes on the Plan 9 Kernel Source: http://lsub.org/who/nemo/9.pdf
diff --git a/docs/components/fconf.rst b/docs/components/fconf.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..cec3cebe4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/components/fconf.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+Firmware Configuration Framework
+================================
+
+This document provides an overview of the |FCONF| framework.
+
+Introduction
+~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+The Firmware CONfiguration Framework (|FCONF|) is an abstraction layer for
+platform specific data, allowing a "property" to be queried and a value
+retrieved without the requesting entity knowing what backing store is being used
+to hold the data.
+
+It is used to bridge new and old ways of providing platform-specific data.
+Today, information like the Chain of Trust is held within several, nested
+platform-defined tables. In the future, it may be provided as part of a device
+blob, along with the rest of the information about images to load.
+Introducing this abstraction layer will make migration easier and will preserve
+functionality for platforms that cannot / don't want to use device tree.
+
+Accessing properties
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+Properties defined in the |FCONF| are grouped around namespaces and
+sub-namespaces: a.b.property.
+Examples namespace can be:
+
+- (|TBBR|) Chain of Trust data: tbbr.cot.trusted_boot_fw_cert
+- (|TBBR|) dynamic configuration info: tbbr.dyn_config.disable_auth
+- Arm io policies: arm.io_policies.bl2_image
+
+Properties can be accessed with the ``FCONF_GET_PROPERTY(a,b,property)`` macro.
+
+Defining properties
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+Properties composing the |FCONF| have to be stored in C structures. If another
+backing store is wanted to be used, the platform has to provide a ``populate()``
+function to fill the corresponding C structure.
+
+The ``populate()`` function must be registered to the |FCONF| framework with
+the ``FCONF_REGISTER_POPULATOR()`` macro. This ensures that the function would
+be called inside the generic ``fconf_populate()`` function during
+initialization.
+
+::
+
+ int fconf_populate_tbbr_dyn_config(uintptr_t config)
+ {
+ /* read dtb and fill tbbr_dyn_config struct */
+ }
+
+ FCONF_REGISTER_POPULATOR(fconf_populate_tbbr_dyn_config);
+
+Then, a wrapper has to be provided to match the ``FCONF_GET_PROPERTY()`` macro:
+
+::
+
+ /* generic getter */
+ #define FCONF_GET_PROPERTY(a,b,property) a##__##b##_getter(property)
+
+ /* my specific getter */
+ #define tbbr__dyn_config_getter(id) tbbr_dyn_config.id
+
+This second level wrapper can be used to remap the ``FCONF_GET_PROPERTY()`` to
+anything appropriate: structure, array, function, etc..
+
+Loading the property device tree
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+The ``fconf_load_config()`` must be called to load the device tree containing
+the properties' values. This must be done after the io layer is initialized, as
+the |DTB| is stored on an external device (FIP).
+
+.. uml:: ../resources/diagrams/plantuml/fconf_bl1_load_config.puml
+
+Populating the properties
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+Once a valid device tree is available, the ``fconf_populate(config)`` function
+can be used to fill the C data structure with the data from the config |DTB|.
+This function will call all the ``populate()`` callbacks which have been
+registered with ``FCONF_REGISTER_POPULATOR()``.
+
+.. uml:: ../resources/diagrams/plantuml/fconf_bl2_populate.puml
diff --git a/docs/components/index.rst b/docs/components/index.rst
index f1904c004..ae78b2bd1 100644
--- a/docs/components/index.rst
+++ b/docs/components/index.rst
@@ -8,7 +8,9 @@ Components
spd/index
arm-sip-service
+ debugfs-design
exception-handling
+ fconf
firmware-update
platform-interrupt-controller-API
ras
diff --git a/docs/design/cpu-specific-build-macros.rst b/docs/design/cpu-specific-build-macros.rst
index f3096b418..258f73d0b 100644
--- a/docs/design/cpu-specific-build-macros.rst
+++ b/docs/design/cpu-specific-build-macros.rst
@@ -324,6 +324,13 @@ architecture that can be enabled by the platform as desired.
as recommended in section "4.7 Non-Temporal Loads/Stores" of the
`Cortex-A57 Software Optimization Guide`_.
+- ''A57_ENABLE_NON_CACHEABLE_LOAD_FWD'': This flag enables non-cacheable
+ streaming enhancement feature for Cortex-A57 CPUs. Platforms can set
+ this bit only if their memory system meets the requirement that cache
+ line fill requests from the Cortex-A57 processor are atomic. Each
+ Cortex-A57 based platform must make its own decision on whether to use
+ the optimization. This flag is disabled by default.
+
- ``NEOVERSE_N1_EXTERNAL_LLC``: This flag indicates that an external last
level cache(LLC) is present in the system, and that the DataSource field
on the master CHI interface indicates when data is returned from the LLC.
diff --git a/docs/design/firmware-design.rst b/docs/design/firmware-design.rst
index 5fc1335b3..d0d6ef697 100644
--- a/docs/design/firmware-design.rst
+++ b/docs/design/firmware-design.rst
@@ -2696,13 +2696,13 @@ kernel at boot time. These can be found in the ``fdts`` directory.
--------------
-*Copyright (c) 2013-2019, Arm Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.*
+*Copyright (c) 2013-2020, Arm Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.*
.. _Power State Coordination Interface PDD: http://infocenter.arm.com/help/topic/com.arm.doc.den0022d/Power_State_Coordination_Interface_PDD_v1_1_DEN0022D.pdf
.. _SMCCC: http://infocenter.arm.com/help/topic/com.arm.doc.den0028b/ARM_DEN0028B_SMC_Calling_Convention.pdf
.. _PSCI: http://infocenter.arm.com/help/topic/com.arm.doc.den0022d/Power_State_Coordination_Interface_PDD_v1_1_DEN0022D.pdf
.. _Power State Coordination Interface PDD: http://infocenter.arm.com/help/topic/com.arm.doc.den0022d/Power_State_Coordination_Interface_PDD_v1_1_DEN0022D.pdf
-.. _Arm ARM: http://infocenter.arm.com/help/index.jsp?topic=/com.arm.doc.ddi0487a.e/index.html
+.. _Arm ARM: https://developer.arm.com/docs/ddi0487/latest
.. _SMC Calling Convention PDD: http://infocenter.arm.com/help/topic/com.arm.doc.den0028b/ARM_DEN0028B_SMC_Calling_Convention.pdf
.. _Trusted Board Boot Requirements CLIENT (TBBR-CLIENT) Armv8-A (ARM DEN0006D): https://developer.arm.com/docs/den0006/latest/trusted-board-boot-requirements-client-tbbr-client-armv8-a
diff --git a/docs/design/trusted-board-boot-build.rst b/docs/design/trusted-board-boot-build.rst
index 202524316..f5c8bc98c 100644
--- a/docs/design/trusted-board-boot-build.rst
+++ b/docs/design/trusted-board-boot-build.rst
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ images with support for these features:
- ``GENERATE_COT=1``
In the case of Arm platforms, the location of the ROTPK hash must also be
- specified at build time. Two locations are currently supported (see
+ specified at build time. The following locations are currently supported (see
``ARM_ROTPK_LOCATION`` build option):
- ``ARM_ROTPK_LOCATION=regs``: the ROTPK hash is obtained from the Trusted
@@ -41,17 +41,16 @@ images with support for these features:
registers are read-only. On FVP Base and Cortex models, the registers
are read-only, but the value can be specified using the command line
option ``bp.trusted_key_storage.public_key`` when launching the model.
- On both Juno and FVP models, the default value corresponds to an
- ECDSA-SECP256R1 public key hash, whose private part is not currently
- available.
+ On Juno board, the default value corresponds to an ECDSA-SECP256R1 public
+ key hash, whose private part is not currently available.
- - ``ARM_ROTPK_LOCATION=devel_rsa``: use the ROTPK hash that is hardcoded
- in the Arm platform port. The private/public RSA key pair may be
- found in ``plat/arm/board/common/rotpk``.
+ - ``ARM_ROTPK_LOCATION=devel_rsa``: use the default hash located in
+ plat/arm/board/common/rotpk/arm_rotpk_rsa_sha256.bin. Enforce generation
+ of the new hash if ROT_KEY is specified.
- - ``ARM_ROTPK_LOCATION=devel_ecdsa``: use the ROTPK hash that is hardcoded
- in the Arm platform port. The private/public ECDSA key pair may be
- found in ``plat/arm/board/common/rotpk``.
+ - ``ARM_ROTPK_LOCATION=devel_ecdsa``: use the default hash located in
+ plat/arm/board/common/rotpk/arm_rotpk_ecdsa_sha256.bin. Enforce generation
+ of the new hash if ROT_KEY is specified.
Example of command line using RSA development keys:
@@ -108,7 +107,7 @@ images with support for these features:
--------------
-*Copyright (c) 2019, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.*
+*Copyright (c) 2019-2020, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.*
.. _mbed TLS Repository: https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls.git
.. _mbed TLS Security Center: https://tls.mbed.org/security
diff --git a/docs/getting_started/build-options.rst b/docs/getting_started/build-options.rst
index e9747afbe..8854a7989 100644
--- a/docs/getting_started/build-options.rst
+++ b/docs/getting_started/build-options.rst
@@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ Common build options
that is only required for the assertion and does not fit in the assertion
itself.
-- ``ENABLE_BACKTRACE``: This option controls whether to enables backtrace
+- ``ENABLE_BACKTRACE``: This option controls whether to enable backtrace
dumps or not. It is supported in both AArch64 and AArch32. However, in
AArch32 the format of the frame records are not defined in the AAPCS and they
are defined by the implementation. This implementation of backtrace only
@@ -468,7 +468,8 @@ Common build options
entrypoint) or 1 (CPU reset to SP_MIN entrypoint). The default value is 0.
- ``ROT_KEY``: This option is used when ``GENERATE_COT=1``. It specifies the
- file that contains the ROT private key in PEM format. If ``SAVE_KEYS=1``, this
+ file that contains the ROT private key in PEM format and enforces public key
+ hash generation. If ``SAVE_KEYS=1``, this
file name will be used to save the key.
- ``SAVE_KEYS``: This option is used when ``GENERATE_COT=1``. It tells the
@@ -577,6 +578,11 @@ Common build options
exposing a virtual filesystem interface through BL31 as a SiP SMC function.
Default is 0.
+- ``USE_FCONF_BASED_IO``: This flag determines whether to use IO based on the
+ firmware configuration framework. This allows moving the io_policies into a
+ configuration device tree, instead of static structure in the code base.
+
+
- ``USE_ROMLIB``: This flag determines whether library at ROM will be used.
This feature creates a library of functions to be placed in ROM and thus
reduces SRAM usage. Refer to :ref:`Library at ROM` for further details. Default
diff --git a/docs/global_substitutions.txt b/docs/global_substitutions.txt
index 491b160e6..4dda1dcd4 100644
--- a/docs/global_substitutions.txt
+++ b/docs/global_substitutions.txt
@@ -6,11 +6,13 @@
.. |COT| replace:: :term:`COT`
.. |CSS| replace:: :term:`CSS`
.. |CVE| replace:: :term:`CVE`
+.. |DTB| replace:: :term:`DTB`
.. |DS-5| replace:: :term:`DS-5`
.. |DSU| replace:: :term:`DSU`
.. |DT| replace:: :term:`DT`
.. |EL| replace:: :term:`EL`
.. |EHF| replace:: :term:`EHF`
+.. |FCONF| replace:: :term:`FCONF`
.. |FDT| replace:: :term:`FDT`
.. |FIP| replace:: :term:`FIP`
.. |FVP| replace:: :term:`FVP`
diff --git a/docs/glossary.rst b/docs/glossary.rst
index 2f19df59c..3da30b02a 100644
--- a/docs/glossary.rst
+++ b/docs/glossary.rst
@@ -42,12 +42,18 @@ You can find additional definitions in the `Arm Glossary`_.
DT
Device Tree
+ DTB
+ Device Tree Blob
+
EL
Exception Level
EHF
Exception Handling Framework
+ FCONF
+ Firmware Configuration Framework
+
FDT
Flattened Device Tree
diff --git a/docs/perf/index.rst b/docs/perf/index.rst
index 0f49b4810..1482b80f6 100644
--- a/docs/perf/index.rst
+++ b/docs/perf/index.rst
@@ -8,7 +8,8 @@ Performance & Testing
psci-performance-juno
tsp
+ performance-monitoring-unit
--------------
-*Copyright (c) 2019, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.*
+*Copyright (c) 2019-2020, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.*
diff --git a/docs/perf/performance-monitoring-unit.rst b/docs/perf/performance-monitoring-unit.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5dd1af5fc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/perf/performance-monitoring-unit.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
+Performance Monitoring Unit
+===========================
+
+The Performance Monitoring Unit (PMU) allows recording of architectural and
+microarchitectural events for profiling purposes.
+
+This document gives an overview of the PMU counter configuration to assist with
+implementation and to complement the PMU security guidelines given in the
+:ref:`Secure Development Guidelines` document.
+
+.. note::
+ This section applies to Armv8-A implementations which have version 3
+ of the Performance Monitors Extension (PMUv3).
+
+PMU Counters
+------------
+
+The PMU makes 32 counters available at all privilege levels:
+
+- 31 programmable event counters: ``PMEVCNTR<n>``, where ``n`` is ``0`` to
+ ``30``.
+- A dedicated cycle counter: ``PMCCNTR``.
+
+Architectural mappings
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
++--------------+---------+----------------------------+
+| Counters | State | System Register Name |
++==============+=========+============================+
+| | AArch64 | ``PMEVCNTR<n>_EL0[63*:0]`` |
+| Programmable +---------+----------------------------+
+| | AArch32 | ``PMEVCNTR<n>[31:0]`` |
++--------------+---------+----------------------------+
+| | AArch64 | ``PMCCNTR_EL0[63:0]`` |
+| Cycle +---------+----------------------------+
+| | AArch32 | ``PMCCNTR[63:0]`` |
++--------------+---------+----------------------------+
+
+.. note::
+ Bits [63:32] are only available if ARMv8.5-PMU is implemented. Refer to the
+ `Arm ARM`_ for a detailed description of ARMv8.5-PMU features.
+
+Configuring the PMU for counting events
+---------------------------------------
+
+Each programmable counter has an associated register, ``PMEVTYPER<n>`` which
+configures it. The cycle counter has the ``PMCCFILTR_EL0`` register, which has
+an identical function and bit field layout as ``PMEVTYPER<n>``. In addition,
+the counters are enabled (permitted to increment) via the ``PMCNTENSET`` and
+``PMCR`` registers. These can be accessed at all privilege levels.
+
+Architectural mappings
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
++-----------------------------+------------------------+
+| AArch64 | AArch32 |
++=============================+========================+
+| ``PMEVTYPER<n>_EL0[63*:0]`` | ``PMEVTYPER<n>[31:0]`` |
++-----------------------------+------------------------+
+| ``PMCCFILTR_EL0[63*:0]`` | ``PMCCFILTR[31:0]`` |
++-----------------------------+------------------------+
+| ``PMCNTENSET_EL0[63*:0]`` | ``PMCNTENSET[31:0]`` |
++-----------------------------+------------------------+
+| ``PMCR_EL0[63*:0]`` | ``PMCR[31:0]`` |
++-----------------------------+------------------------+
+
+.. note::
+ Bits [63:32] are reserved.
+
+Relevant register fields
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+For ``PMEVTYPER<n>_EL0``/``PMEVTYPER<n>`` and ``PMCCFILTR_EL0/PMCCFILTR``, the
+most important fields are:
+
+- ``P``:
+
+ - Bit 31.
+ - If set to ``0``, will increment the associated ``PMEVCNTR<n>`` at EL1.
+
+- ``NSK``:
+
+ - Bit 29.
+ - If equal to the ``P`` bit it enables the associated ``PMEVCNTR<n>`` at
+ Non-secure EL1.
+ - Reserved if EL3 not implemented.
+
+- ``NSH``:
+
+ - Bit 27.
+ - If set to ``1``, will increment the associated ``PMEVCNTR<n>`` at EL2.
+ - Reserved if EL2 not implemented.
+
+- ``SH``:
+
+ - Bit 24.
+ - If different to the ``NSH`` bit it enables the associated ``PMEVCNTR<n>``
+ at Secure EL2.
+ - Reserved if Secure EL2 not implemented.
+
+- ``M``:
+
+ - Bit 26.
+ - If equal to the ``P`` bit it enables the associated ``PMEVCNTR<n>`` at
+ EL3.
+
+- ``evtCount[15:10]``:
+
+ - Extension to ``evtCount[9:0]``. Reserved unless ARMv8.1-PMU implemented.
+
+- ``evtCount[9:0]``:
+
+ - The event number that the associated ``PMEVCNTR<n>`` will count.
+
+For ``PMCNTENSET_EL0``/``PMCNTENSET``, the most important fields are:
+
+- ``P[30:0]``:
+
+ - Setting bit ``P[n]`` to ``1`` enables counter ``PMEVCNTR<n>``.
+ - The effects of ``PMEVTYPER<n>`` are applied on top of this.
+ In other words, the counter will not increment at any privilege level or
+ security state unless it is enabled here.
+
+- ``C``:
+
+ - Bit 31.
+ - If set to ``1`` enables the cycle counter ``PMCCNTR``.
+
+For ``PMCR``/``PMCR_EL0``, the most important fields are:
+
+- ``DP``:
+
+ - Bit 5.
+ - If set to ``1`` it disables the cycle counter ``PMCCNTR`` where event
+ counting (by ``PMEVCNTR<n>``) is prohibited (e.g. EL2 and the Secure
+ world).
+ - If set to ``0``, ``PMCCNTR`` will not be affected by this bit and
+ therefore will be able to count where the programmable counters are
+ prohibited.
+
+- ``E``:
+
+ - Bit 0.
+ - Enables/disables counting altogether.
+ - The effects of ``PMCNTENSET`` and ``PMCR.DP`` are applied on top of this.
+ In other words, if this bit is ``0`` then no counters will increment
+ regardless of how the other PMU system registers or bit fields are
+ configured.
+
+.. rubric:: References
+
+- `Arm ARM`_
+
+--------------
+
+*Copyright (c) 2019-2020, Arm Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.*
+
+.. _Arm ARM: https://developer.arm.com/docs/ddi0487/latest
diff --git a/docs/plat/arm/arm-build-options.rst b/docs/plat/arm/arm-build-options.rst
index d24ad231d..9622de65d 100644
--- a/docs/plat/arm/arm-build-options.rst
+++ b/docs/plat/arm/arm-build-options.rst
@@ -57,8 +57,7 @@ Arm Platform Build Options
``ARM_ROTPK_LOCATION`` are:
- ``regs`` : return the ROTPK hash stored in the Trusted root-key storage
- registers. The private key corresponding to this ROTPK hash is not
- currently available.
+ registers.
- ``devel_rsa`` : return a development public key hash embedded in the BL1
and BL2 binaries. This hash has been obtained from the RSA public key
``arm_rotpk_rsa.der``, located in ``plat/arm/board/common/rotpk``. To use
@@ -70,6 +69,12 @@ Arm Platform Build Options
use this option, ``arm_rotprivk_ecdsa.pem`` must be specified as
``ROT_KEY`` when creating the certificates.
+- ``ARM_ROTPK_HASH``: used when ``ARM_ROTPK_LOCATION=devel_*``. Specifies the
+ location of the ROTPK hash. Not expected to be a build option. This defaults to
+ ``plat/arm/board/common/rotpk/*_sha256.bin`` depending on the specified algorithm.
+ Providing ``ROT_KEY`` enforces generation of the hash from the ``ROT_KEY`` and
+ overwrites the default hash file.
+
- ``ARM_TSP_RAM_LOCATION``: location of the TSP binary. Options:
- ``tsram`` : Trusted SRAM (default option when TBB is not enabled)
@@ -109,6 +114,11 @@ Arm CSS Platform-Specific Build Options
management operations and for SCP RAM Firmware transfer. If this option
is set to 1, then SCMI/SDS drivers will be used. Default is 0.
+ - ``CSS_SGI_CHIP_COUNT``: Configures the number of chips on a SGI/RD platform
+ which supports multi-chip operation. If ``CSS_SGI_CHIP_COUNT`` is set to any
+ valid value greater than 1, the platform code performs required configuration
+ to support multi-chip operation.
+
--------------
-*Copyright (c) 2019, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.*
+*Copyright (c) 2019-2020, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.*
diff --git a/docs/plat/arm/fvp/index.rst b/docs/plat/arm/fvp/index.rst
index 37010e1a5..40e966117 100644
--- a/docs/plat/arm/fvp/index.rst
+++ b/docs/plat/arm/fvp/index.rst
@@ -277,15 +277,15 @@ And the FVP binary can be run with the following command:
-C cluster0.NUM_CORES=4 \
-C cluster1.NUM_CORES=4 \
-C cache_state_modelled=1 \
- -C cluster0.cpu0.RVBAR=0x04020000 \
- -C cluster0.cpu1.RVBAR=0x04020000 \
- -C cluster0.cpu2.RVBAR=0x04020000 \
- -C cluster0.cpu3.RVBAR=0x04020000 \
- -C cluster1.cpu0.RVBAR=0x04020000 \
- -C cluster1.cpu1.RVBAR=0x04020000 \
- -C cluster1.cpu2.RVBAR=0x04020000 \
- -C cluster1.cpu3.RVBAR=0x04020000 \
- --data cluster0.cpu0="<path-to>/bl31.bin"@0x04020000 \
+ -C cluster0.cpu0.RVBAR=0x04001000 \
+ -C cluster0.cpu1.RVBAR=0x04001000 \
+ -C cluster0.cpu2.RVBAR=0x04001000 \
+ -C cluster0.cpu3.RVBAR=0x04001000 \
+ -C cluster1.cpu0.RVBAR=0x04001000 \
+ -C cluster1.cpu1.RVBAR=0x04001000 \
+ -C cluster1.cpu2.RVBAR=0x04001000 \
+ -C cluster1.cpu3.RVBAR=0x04001000 \
+ --data cluster0.cpu0="<path-to>/bl31.bin"@0x04001000 \
--data cluster0.cpu0="<path-to>/<patched-fdt>"@0x82000000 \
--data cluster0.cpu0="<path-to>/<kernel-binary>"@0x80080000 \
--data cluster0.cpu0="<path-to>/<ramdisk.img>"@0x84000000
diff --git a/docs/plat/meson-axg.rst b/docs/plat/meson-axg.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1e4b2c207
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/plat/meson-axg.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+Amlogic Meson A113D (AXG)
+===========================
+
+The Amlogic Meson A113D is a SoC with a quad core Arm Cortex-A53 running at
+~1.2GHz. It also contains a Cortex-M3 used as SCP.
+
+This port is a minimal implementation of BL31 capable of booting mainline U-Boot
+and Linux:
+
+- SCPI support.
+- Basic PSCI support (CPU_ON, CPU_OFF, SYSTEM_RESET, SYSTEM_OFF). Note that CPU0
+ can't be turned off, so there is a workaround to hide this from the caller.
+- GICv2 driver set up.
+- Basic SIP services (read efuse data, enable/disable JTAG).
+
+In order to build it:
+
+.. code:: shell
+
+ CROSS_COMPILE=aarch64-none-elf- make DEBUG=1 PLAT=axg [SPD=opteed]
+ [AML_USE_ATOS=1 when using ATOS as BL32]
+
+This port has been tested on a A113D board. After building it, follow the
+instructions in the `U-Boot repository`_, replacing the mentioned **bl31.img**
+by the one built from this port.
+
+.. _U-Boot repository: https://github.com/u-boot/u-boot/blob/master/board/amlogic/s400/README
diff --git a/docs/process/security-hardening.rst b/docs/process/security-hardening.rst
index 43a572125..507046f2e 100644
--- a/docs/process/security-hardening.rst
+++ b/docs/process/security-hardening.rst
@@ -25,6 +25,99 @@ The secure world **should never** crash or become unusable due to receiving too
many normal world requests (a *Denial of Service* or *DoS* attack). It should
have a mechanism for throttling or ignoring normal world requests.
+Preventing Secure-world timing information leakage via PMU counters
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+The Secure world needs to implement some defenses to prevent the Non-secure
+world from making it leak timing information. In general, higher privilege
+levels must defend from those below when the PMU is treated as an attack
+vector.
+
+Refer to the :ref:`Performance Monitoring Unit` guide for detailed information
+on the PMU registers.
+
+Timing leakage attacks from the Non-secure world
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+Since the Non-secure world has access to the ``PMCR`` register, it can
+configure the PMU to increment counters at any exception level and in both
+Secure and Non-secure state. Thus, it attempts to leak timing information from
+the Secure world.
+
+Shown below is an example of such a configuration:
+
+- ``PMEVTYPER0_EL0`` and ``PMCCFILTR_EL0``:
+
+ - Set ``P`` to ``0``.
+ - Set ``NSK`` to ``1``.
+ - Set ``M`` to ``0``.
+ - Set ``NSH`` to ``0``.
+ - Set ``SH`` to ``1``.
+
+- ``PMCNTENSET_EL0``:
+
+ - Set ``P[0]`` to ``1``.
+ - Set ``C`` to ``1``.
+
+- ``PMCR_EL0``:
+
+ - Set ``DP`` to ``0``.
+ - Set ``E`` to ``1``.
+
+This configuration instructs ``PMEVCNTR0_EL0`` and ``PMCCNTR_EL0`` to increment
+at Secure EL1, Secure EL2 (if implemented) and EL3.
+
+Since the Non-secure world has fine-grained control over where (at which
+exception levels) it instructs counters to increment, obtaining event counts
+would allow it to carry out side-channel timing attacks against the Secure
+world. Examples include Spectre, Meltdown, as well as extracting secrets from
+cryptographic algorithms with data-dependent variations in their execution
+time.
+
+Secure world mitigation strategies
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+The ``MDCR_EL3`` register allows EL3 to configure the PMU (among other things).
+The `Arm ARM`_ details all of the bit fields in this register, but for the PMU
+there are two bits which determine the permissions of the counters:
+
+- ``SPME`` for the programmable counters.
+- ``SCCD`` for the cycle counter.
+
+Depending on the implemented features, the Secure world can prohibit counting
+in AArch64 state via the following:
+
+- ARMv8.2-Debug not implemented:
+
+ - Prohibit general event counters and the cycle counter:
+ ``MDCR_EL3.SPME == 0 && PMCR_EL0.DP == 1 && !ExternalSecureNoninvasiveDebugEnabled()``.
+
+ - ``MDCR_EL3.SPME`` resets to ``0``, so by default general events should
+ not be counted in the Secure world.
+ - The ``PMCR_EL0.DP`` bit therefore needs to be set to ``1`` when EL3 is
+ entered and ``PMCR_EL0`` needs to be saved and restored in EL3.
+ - ``ExternalSecureNoninvasiveDebugEnabled()`` is an authentication
+ interface which is implementation-defined unless ARMv8.4-Debug is
+ implemented. The `Arm ARM`_ has detailed information on this topic.
+
+ - The only other way is to disable the ``PMCR_EL0.E`` bit upon entering
+ EL3, which disables counting altogether.
+
+- ARMv8.2-Debug implemented:
+
+ - Prohibit general event counters: ``MDCR_EL3.SPME == 0``.
+ - Prohibit cycle counter: ``MDCR_EL3.SPME == 0 && PMCR_EL0.DP == 1``.
+ ``PMCR_EL0`` therefore needs to be saved and restored in EL3.
+
+- ARMv8.5-PMU implemented:
+
+ - Prohibit general event counters: as in ARMv8.2-Debug.
+ - Prohibit cycle counter: ``MDCR_EL3.SCCD == 1``
+
+In Aarch32 execution state the ``MDCR_EL3`` alias is the ``SDCR`` register,
+which has some of the bit fields of ``MDCR_EL3``, most importantly the ``SPME``
+and ``SCCD`` bits.
+
Build options
-------------
@@ -71,6 +164,12 @@ Several build options can be used to check for security issues. Refer to the
NB: The ``Werror`` flag is enabled by default in TF-A and can be disabled by
setting the ``E`` build flag to 0.
+.. rubric:: References
+
+- `Arm ARM`_
+
--------------
*Copyright (c) 2019-2020, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.*
+
+.. _Arm ARM: https://developer.arm.com/docs/ddi0487/latest
diff --git a/docs/resources/diagrams/plantuml/fconf_bl1_load_config.puml b/docs/resources/diagrams/plantuml/fconf_bl1_load_config.puml
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c36e54423
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/resources/diagrams/plantuml/fconf_bl1_load_config.puml
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+@startuml
+
+box "BL1 common code"
+ participant bl1_main
+ participant bl_common
+end box
+
+box "arm platform code" #LightBlue
+ participant fvp_bl1_setup
+ participant arm_bl1_setup
+ participant arm_io_storage
+end box
+
+box "platform common code"
+ participant plat_bl1_common
+ participant fconf
+end box
+
+bl1_main -> fvp_bl1_setup : bl1_platform_setup()
+fvp_bl1_setup -> arm_bl1_setup : arm_bl1_platform_setup()
+arm_bl1_setup -> arm_io_storage : plat_arm_io_setup()
+note over arm_io_storage : register and setup fip
+arm_bl1_setup -> fconf : fconf_load_config()
+activate fconf
+ note over fconf
+ create and populate an
+ image_desc_t for TB_FW_CONFIG
+ end note
+ fconf -> bl_common : load_auth_image(TB_FW_CONFIG_ID, &image_info)
+ activate bl_common
+ note over bl_common
+ load and auth image from fip
+ with info from plat_io_policy
+ end note
+ bl_common -> arm_io_storage
+ arm_io_storage -> fconf: FCONF_GET_PROPERTY(arm, arm_io_policies, tb_fw_cfg)
+ note over fconf: use staticaly defined policies in bl1
+ fconf <- bl_common : image_info
+ deactivate bl_common
+ note over fconf : get tb_fw_config_dtb from image_info
+ fconf -> plat_bl1_common : bl1_plat_get_image_desc(BL2_IMAGE_ID)
+ fconf <- plat_bl1_common : BL2_IMAGE_DESC
+ note over fconf
+ set ep_info.args.arg0 of BL2_IMAGE_DESC
+ to TB_FW_CONFIG base address
+ end note
+arm_bl1_setup <- fconf
+deactivate fconf
+
+== load & auth, prepare and jump to BL2 ==
+
+@enduml
diff --git a/docs/resources/diagrams/plantuml/fconf_bl2_populate.puml b/docs/resources/diagrams/plantuml/fconf_bl2_populate.puml
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..98a3ff19b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/resources/diagrams/plantuml/fconf_bl2_populate.puml
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+@startuml
+
+box "BL2 common code"
+ participant bl2_entrypoint
+ participant bl2_main
+end box
+
+box "platform common code"
+ participant fconf
+ participant fconf_tbbr_getter
+end box
+
+box "arm platform code" #LightBlue
+ participant arm_bl2_setup
+ participant arm_io_storage
+ participant arm_fconf_io
+end box
+
+== bl2 setup ==
+bl2_entrypoint -> bl2_main : bl2_setup()
+bl2_main -> arm_bl2_setup : bl2_early_platform_setup2(\n\t arg0, arg1, arg2, arg3)
+note over arm_bl2_setup
+ arg0 = tb_fw_config
+ arg1 = mem_layout
+end note
+arm_bl2_setup -> arm_bl2_setup : arm_bl2_early_platform_setup(\n\t tb_fw_config, mem_layout)
+activate arm_bl2_setup
+ arm_bl2_setup -> fconf: fconf_polulate(tb_fw_config)
+ activate fconf
+ fconf -> fconf_tbbr_getter: fconf_populate_tbbr_dyn_config(uintptr_t dtb)
+ note over fconf_tbbr_getter: read tbbr propeties from dtb
+ fconf -> arm_fconf_io: fconf_populate_arm_io_policies(uintptr_t dtb)
+ note over arm_fconf_io: read arm io propeties from dtb
+ deactivate fconf
+ arm_bl2_setup -> arm_io_storage : plat_arm_io_setup()
+ note over arm_io_storage: use populated properties
+deactivate arm_bl2_setup
+
+== bl2 main ==
+
+@enduml