Add fixes for ext4 security issues relating to corrupted disk images

13 files changed, 731 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/debian/changelog b/debian/changelog
index 9757f9d97726..b8f1305fd12e 100644
--- a/debian/changelog
+++ b/debian/changelog
@@ -89,6 +89,24 @@ linux (4.17.3-1) UNRELEASED; urgency=medium
   * dm: Enable DM_INTEGRITY as module (except on armel) (Closes: #896649)
   * debian/lib/python/debian_linux/debian.py: Accept arbitrary revision
     suffixes (Closes: #898087)
+  * ext4: add corruption check in ext4_xattr_set_entry() (CVE-2018-10879)
+  * ext4: always verify the magic number in xattr blocks (CVE-2018-10879)
+  * ext4: always check block group bounds in ext4_init_block_bitmap()
+    (CVE-2018-10878)
+  * ext4: make sure bitmaps and the inode table don't overlap with bg
+    descriptors (CVE-2018-10878)
+  * ext4: only look at the bg_flags field if it is valid (CVE-2018-10876)
+  * ext4: verify the depth of extent tree in ext4_find_extent()
+    (CVE-2018-10877)
+  * ext4: clear i_data in ext4_inode_info when removing inline data
+    (CVE-2018-10881)
+  * ext4: never move the system.data xattr out of the inode body
+    (CVE-2018-10880)
+  * jbd2: don't mark block as modified if the handle is out of credits
+    (CVE-2018-10883)
+  * ext4: avoid running out of journal credits when appending to an inline file
+    (CVE-2018-10883)
+  * ext4: add more inode number paranoia checks (CVE-2018-10882)
 
   [ Romain Perier ]
   * [x86] amdgpu: Enable DCN 1.0 Raven family (Closes: #901349)
diff --git a/debian/patches/bugfix/all/ext4-add-corruption-check-in-ext4_xattr_set_entry.patch b/debian/patches/bugfix/all/ext4-add-corruption-check-in-ext4_xattr_set_entry.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..8c4c722af76d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/bugfix/all/ext4-add-corruption-check-in-ext4_xattr_set_entry.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
+Date: Wed, 13 Jun 2018 00:23:11 -0400
+Subject: ext4: add corruption check in ext4_xattr_set_entry()
+Origin: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/ext4.git/commit?id=4fda60bbdbb61de76e3d3c48ed77c9e9b96b00d1
+Bug-Debian-Security: https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2018-10879
+
+In theory this should have been caught earlier when the xattr list was
+verified, but in case it got missed, it's simple enough to add check
+to make sure we don't overrun the xattr buffer.
+
+This addresses CVE-2018-10879.
+
+https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200001
+
+Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
+Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca>
+---
+ fs/ext4/xattr.c | 10 ++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/fs/ext4/xattr.c b/fs/ext4/xattr.c
+index fc4ced59c565..230ba79715f6 100644
+--- a/fs/ext4/xattr.c
++++ b/fs/ext4/xattr.c
+@@ -1560,7 +1560,7 @@ static int ext4_xattr_set_entry(struct ext4_xattr_info *i,
+ 				handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode,
+ 				bool is_block)
+ {
+-	struct ext4_xattr_entry *last;
++	struct ext4_xattr_entry *last, *next;
+ 	struct ext4_xattr_entry *here = s->here;
+ 	size_t min_offs = s->end - s->base, name_len = strlen(i->name);
+ 	int in_inode = i->in_inode;
+@@ -1595,7 +1595,13 @@ static int ext4_xattr_set_entry(struct ext4_xattr_info *i,
+ 
+ 	/* Compute min_offs and last. */
+ 	last = s->first;
+-	for (; !IS_LAST_ENTRY(last); last = EXT4_XATTR_NEXT(last)) {
++	for (; !IS_LAST_ENTRY(last); last = next) {
++		next = EXT4_XATTR_NEXT(last);
++		if ((void *)next >= s->end) {
++			EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "corrupted xattr entries");
++			ret = -EFSCORRUPTED;
++			goto out;
++		}
+ 		if (!last->e_value_inum && last->e_value_size) {
+ 			size_t offs = le16_to_cpu(last->e_value_offs);
+ 			if (offs < min_offs)
diff --git a/debian/patches/bugfix/all/ext4-add-more-inode-number-paranoia-checks.patch b/debian/patches/bugfix/all/ext4-add-more-inode-number-paranoia-checks.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..5a509ea4986f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/bugfix/all/ext4-add-more-inode-number-paranoia-checks.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
+Date: Sun, 17 Jun 2018 00:41:14 -0400
+Subject: ext4: add more inode number paranoia checks
+Origin: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/ext4.git/commit?id=a0b4bd6c4418a8d2ba51f27968f5af005e5dbbdd
+Bug-Debian-Security: https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2018-10882
+
+If there is a directory entry pointing to a system inode (such as a
+journal inode), complain and declare the file system to be corrupted.
+
+Also, if the superblock's first inode number field is too small,
+refuse to mount the file system.
+
+This addresses CVE-2018-10882.
+
+https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200069
+
+Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
+---
+ fs/ext4/ext4.h  | 5 -----
+ fs/ext4/inode.c | 3 ++-
+ fs/ext4/super.c | 5 +++++
+ 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/fs/ext4/ext4.h
++++ b/fs/ext4/ext4.h
+@@ -1501,11 +1501,6 @@ static inline struct ext4_inode_info *EX
+ static inline int ext4_valid_inum(struct super_block *sb, unsigned long ino)
+ {
+ 	return ino == EXT4_ROOT_INO ||
+-		ino == EXT4_USR_QUOTA_INO ||
+-		ino == EXT4_GRP_QUOTA_INO ||
+-		ino == EXT4_BOOT_LOADER_INO ||
+-		ino == EXT4_JOURNAL_INO ||
+-		ino == EXT4_RESIZE_INO ||
+ 		(ino >= EXT4_FIRST_INO(sb) &&
+ 		 ino <= le32_to_cpu(EXT4_SB(sb)->s_es->s_inodes_count));
+ }
+--- a/fs/ext4/inode.c
++++ b/fs/ext4/inode.c
+@@ -4506,7 +4506,8 @@ static int __ext4_get_inode_loc(struct i
+ 	int			inodes_per_block, inode_offset;
+ 
+ 	iloc->bh = NULL;
+-	if (!ext4_valid_inum(sb, inode->i_ino))
++	if (inode->i_ino < EXT4_ROOT_INO ||
++	    inode->i_ino > le32_to_cpu(EXT4_SB(sb)->s_es->s_inodes_count))
+ 		return -EFSCORRUPTED;
+ 
+ 	iloc->block_group = (inode->i_ino - 1) / EXT4_INODES_PER_GROUP(sb);
+--- a/fs/ext4/super.c
++++ b/fs/ext4/super.c
+@@ -3817,6 +3817,11 @@ static int ext4_fill_super(struct super_
+ 	} else {
+ 		sbi->s_inode_size = le16_to_cpu(es->s_inode_size);
+ 		sbi->s_first_ino = le32_to_cpu(es->s_first_ino);
++		if (sbi->s_first_ino < EXT4_GOOD_OLD_FIRST_INO) {
++			ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "invalid first ino: %u",
++				 sbi->s_first_ino);
++			goto failed_mount;
++		}
+ 		if ((sbi->s_inode_size < EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE) ||
+ 		    (!is_power_of_2(sbi->s_inode_size)) ||
+ 		    (sbi->s_inode_size > blocksize)) {
diff --git a/debian/patches/bugfix/all/ext4-always-check-block-group-bounds-in-ext4_init_bl.patch b/debian/patches/bugfix/all/ext4-always-check-block-group-bounds-in-ext4_init_bl.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..8516b36aef77
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/bugfix/all/ext4-always-check-block-group-bounds-in-ext4_init_bl.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
+Date: Wed, 13 Jun 2018 23:00:48 -0400
+Subject: ext4: always check block group bounds in ext4_init_block_bitmap()
+Origin: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/ext4.git/commit?id=dcf37fefac3f699aa1341f86bcd7808ccc651c33
+Bug-Debian-Security: https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2018-10878
+
+Regardless of whether the flex_bg feature is set, we should always
+check to make sure the bits we are setting in the block bitmap are
+within the block group bounds.
+
+https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199865
+
+Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
+[bwh: Backported to 4.17: adjust context]
+---
+ fs/ext4/balloc.c | 10 +++-------
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/fs/ext4/balloc.c
++++ b/fs/ext4/balloc.c
+@@ -184,7 +184,6 @@ static int ext4_init_block_bitmap(struct
+ 	unsigned int bit, bit_max;
+ 	struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb);
+ 	ext4_fsblk_t start, tmp;
+-	int flex_bg = 0;
+ 	struct ext4_group_info *grp;
+ 
+ 	J_ASSERT_BH(bh, buffer_locked(bh));
+@@ -217,22 +216,19 @@ static int ext4_init_block_bitmap(struct
+ 
+ 	start = ext4_group_first_block_no(sb, block_group);
+ 
+-	if (ext4_has_feature_flex_bg(sb))
+-		flex_bg = 1;
+-
+ 	/* Set bits for block and inode bitmaps, and inode table */
+ 	tmp = ext4_block_bitmap(sb, gdp);
+-	if (!flex_bg || ext4_block_in_group(sb, tmp, block_group))
++	if (ext4_block_in_group(sb, tmp, block_group))
+ 		ext4_set_bit(EXT4_B2C(sbi, tmp - start), bh->b_data);
+ 
+ 	tmp = ext4_inode_bitmap(sb, gdp);
+-	if (!flex_bg || ext4_block_in_group(sb, tmp, block_group))
++	if (ext4_block_in_group(sb, tmp, block_group))
+ 		ext4_set_bit(EXT4_B2C(sbi, tmp - start), bh->b_data);
+ 
+ 	tmp = ext4_inode_table(sb, gdp);
+ 	for (; tmp < ext4_inode_table(sb, gdp) +
+ 		     sbi->s_itb_per_group; tmp++) {
+-		if (!flex_bg || ext4_block_in_group(sb, tmp, block_group))
++		if (ext4_block_in_group(sb, tmp, block_group))
+ 			ext4_set_bit(EXT4_B2C(sbi, tmp - start), bh->b_data);
+ 	}
+ 
diff --git a/debian/patches/bugfix/all/ext4-always-verify-the-magic-number-in-xattr-blocks.patch b/debian/patches/bugfix/all/ext4-always-verify-the-magic-number-in-xattr-blocks.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..2522bcb4c422
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/bugfix/all/ext4-always-verify-the-magic-number-in-xattr-blocks.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
+Date: Wed, 13 Jun 2018 00:51:28 -0400
+Subject: ext4: always verify the magic number in xattr blocks
+Origin: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/ext4.git/commit?id=3345c50533c6a17ebc0284362ca7b69aaef37ac4
+Bug-Debian-Security: https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2018-10879
+
+If there an inode points to a block which is also some other type of
+metadata block (such as a block allocation bitmap), the
+buffer_verified flag can be set when it was validated as that other
+metadata block type; however, it would make a really terrible external
+attribute block.  The reason why we use the verified flag is to avoid
+constantly reverifying the block.  However, it doesn't take much
+overhead to make sure the magic number of the xattr block is correct,
+and this will avoid potential crashes.
+
+This addresses CVE-2018-10879.
+
+https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200001
+
+Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
+Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca>
+---
+ fs/ext4/xattr.c | 6 +++---
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/fs/ext4/xattr.c b/fs/ext4/xattr.c
+index 230ba79715f6..0263692979ec 100644
+--- a/fs/ext4/xattr.c
++++ b/fs/ext4/xattr.c
+@@ -230,12 +230,12 @@ __ext4_xattr_check_block(struct inode *inode, struct buffer_head *bh,
+ {
+ 	int error = -EFSCORRUPTED;
+ 
+-	if (buffer_verified(bh))
+-		return 0;
+-
+ 	if (BHDR(bh)->h_magic != cpu_to_le32(EXT4_XATTR_MAGIC) ||
+ 	    BHDR(bh)->h_blocks != cpu_to_le32(1))
+ 		goto errout;
++	if (buffer_verified(bh))
++		return 0;
++
+ 	error = -EFSBADCRC;
+ 	if (!ext4_xattr_block_csum_verify(inode, bh))
+ 		goto errout;
diff --git a/debian/patches/bugfix/all/ext4-avoid-running-out-of-journal-credits-when-appen.patch b/debian/patches/bugfix/all/ext4-avoid-running-out-of-journal-credits-when-appen.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..911fcac747a9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/bugfix/all/ext4-avoid-running-out-of-journal-credits-when-appen.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
+Date: Sat, 16 Jun 2018 23:41:59 -0400
+Subject: ext4: avoid running out of journal credits when appending to an
+ inline file
+Origin: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/ext4.git/commit?id=3886651521995071fab29401094e675b6ebfdc8c
+Bug-Debian-Security: https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2018-10883
+
+Use a separate journal transaction if it turns out that we need to
+convert an inline file to use an data block.  Otherwise we could end
+up failing due to not having journal credits.
+
+This addresses CVE-2018-10883.
+
+https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200071
+
+Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
+---
+ fs/ext4/ext4.h   |  3 ---
+ fs/ext4/inline.c | 38 +-------------------------------------
+ fs/ext4/xattr.c  | 19 ++-----------------
+ 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 57 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/fs/ext4/ext4.h
++++ b/fs/ext4/ext4.h
+@@ -3005,9 +3005,6 @@ extern int ext4_inline_data_fiemap(struc
+ struct iomap;
+ extern int ext4_inline_data_iomap(struct inode *inode, struct iomap *iomap);
+ 
+-extern int ext4_try_to_evict_inline_data(handle_t *handle,
+-					 struct inode *inode,
+-					 int needed);
+ extern int ext4_inline_data_truncate(struct inode *inode, int *has_inline);
+ 
+ extern int ext4_convert_inline_data(struct inode *inode);
+--- a/fs/ext4/inline.c
++++ b/fs/ext4/inline.c
+@@ -887,11 +887,11 @@ retry_journal:
+ 	flags |= AOP_FLAG_NOFS;
+ 
+ 	if (ret == -ENOSPC) {
++		ext4_journal_stop(handle);
+ 		ret = ext4_da_convert_inline_data_to_extent(mapping,
+ 							    inode,
+ 							    flags,
+ 							    fsdata);
+-		ext4_journal_stop(handle);
+ 		if (ret == -ENOSPC &&
+ 		    ext4_should_retry_alloc(inode->i_sb, &retries))
+ 			goto retry_journal;
+@@ -1891,42 +1891,6 @@ out:
+ 	return (error < 0 ? error : 0);
+ }
+ 
+-/*
+- * Called during xattr set, and if we can sparse space 'needed',
+- * just create the extent tree evict the data to the outer block.
+- *
+- * We use jbd2 instead of page cache to move data to the 1st block
+- * so that the whole transaction can be committed as a whole and
+- * the data isn't lost because of the delayed page cache write.
+- */
+-int ext4_try_to_evict_inline_data(handle_t *handle,
+-				  struct inode *inode,
+-				  int needed)
+-{
+-	int error;
+-	struct ext4_xattr_entry *entry;
+-	struct ext4_inode *raw_inode;
+-	struct ext4_iloc iloc;
+-
+-	error = ext4_get_inode_loc(inode, &iloc);
+-	if (error)
+-		return error;
+-
+-	raw_inode = ext4_raw_inode(&iloc);
+-	entry = (struct ext4_xattr_entry *)((void *)raw_inode +
+-					    EXT4_I(inode)->i_inline_off);
+-	if (EXT4_XATTR_LEN(entry->e_name_len) +
+-	    EXT4_XATTR_SIZE(le32_to_cpu(entry->e_value_size)) < needed) {
+-		error = -ENOSPC;
+-		goto out;
+-	}
+-
+-	error = ext4_convert_inline_data_nolock(handle, inode, &iloc);
+-out:
+-	brelse(iloc.bh);
+-	return error;
+-}
+-
+ int ext4_inline_data_truncate(struct inode *inode, int *has_inline)
+ {
+ 	handle_t *handle;
+--- a/fs/ext4/xattr.c
++++ b/fs/ext4/xattr.c
+@@ -2212,23 +2212,8 @@ int ext4_xattr_ibody_inline_set(handle_t
+ 	if (EXT4_I(inode)->i_extra_isize == 0)
+ 		return -ENOSPC;
+ 	error = ext4_xattr_set_entry(i, s, handle, inode, false /* is_block */);
+-	if (error) {
+-		if (error == -ENOSPC &&
+-		    ext4_has_inline_data(inode)) {
+-			error = ext4_try_to_evict_inline_data(handle, inode,
+-					EXT4_XATTR_LEN(strlen(i->name) +
+-					EXT4_XATTR_SIZE(i->value_len)));
+-			if (error)
+-				return error;
+-			error = ext4_xattr_ibody_find(inode, i, is);
+-			if (error)
+-				return error;
+-			error = ext4_xattr_set_entry(i, s, handle, inode,
+-						     false /* is_block */);
+-		}
+-		if (error)
+-			return error;
+-	}
++	if (error)
++		return error;
+ 	header = IHDR(inode, ext4_raw_inode(&is->iloc));
+ 	if (!IS_LAST_ENTRY(s->first)) {
+ 		header->h_magic = cpu_to_le32(EXT4_XATTR_MAGIC);
diff --git a/debian/patches/bugfix/all/ext4-clear-i_data-in-ext4_inode_info-when-removing-i.patch b/debian/patches/bugfix/all/ext4-clear-i_data-in-ext4_inode_info-when-removing-i.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..f4344dd1f190
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/bugfix/all/ext4-clear-i_data-in-ext4_inode_info-when-removing-i.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
+Date: Fri, 15 Jun 2018 12:28:16 -0400
+Subject: ext4: clear i_data in ext4_inode_info when removing inline data
+Origin: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/ext4.git/commit?id=cd75e020ee28aa21985c6d8ebafc7457b4c51531
+Bug-Debian-Security: https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2018-10881
+
+When converting from an inode from storing the data in-line to a data
+block, ext4_destroy_inline_data_nolock() was only clearing the on-disk
+copy of the i_blocks[] array.  It was not clearing copy of the
+i_blocks[] in ext4_inode_info, in i_data[], which is the copy actually
+used by ext4_map_blocks().
+
+This didn't matter much if we are using extents, since the extents
+header would be invalid and thus the extents could would re-initialize
+the extents tree.  But if we are using indirect blocks, the previous
+contents of the i_blocks array will be treated as block numbers, with
+potentially catastrophic results to the file system integrity and/or
+user data.
+
+This gets worse if the file system is using a 1k block size and
+s_first_data is zero, but even without this, the file system can get
+quite badly corrupted.
+
+This addresses CVE-2018-10881.
+
+https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200015
+
+Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
+---
+ fs/ext4/inline.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+--- a/fs/ext4/inline.c
++++ b/fs/ext4/inline.c
+@@ -437,6 +437,7 @@ static int ext4_destroy_inline_data_nolo
+ 
+ 	memset((void *)ext4_raw_inode(&is.iloc)->i_block,
+ 		0, EXT4_MIN_INLINE_DATA_SIZE);
++	memset(ei->i_data, 0, EXT4_MIN_INLINE_DATA_SIZE);
+ 
+ 	if (ext4_has_feature_extents(inode->i_sb)) {
+ 		if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode) ||
diff --git a/debian/patches/bugfix/all/ext4-make-sure-bitmaps-and-the-inode-table-don-t-ove.patch b/debian/patches/bugfix/all/ext4-make-sure-bitmaps-and-the-inode-table-don-t-ove.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..a1b2cfefdb78
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/bugfix/all/ext4-make-sure-bitmaps-and-the-inode-table-don-t-ove.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
+Date: Wed, 13 Jun 2018 23:08:26 -0400
+Subject: ext4: make sure bitmaps and the inode table don't overlap with bg
+ descriptors
+Origin: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/ext4.git/commit?id=6b506a7d09854128b1da9571d879ee9dea3ffb02
+Bug-Debian-Security: https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2018-10878
+
+It's really bad when the allocation bitmaps and the inode table
+overlap with the block group descriptors, since it causes random
+corruption of the bg descriptors.  So we really want to head those off
+at the pass.
+
+https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199865
+
+Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
+---
+ fs/ext4/super.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/fs/ext4/super.c
++++ b/fs/ext4/super.c
+@@ -2307,6 +2307,7 @@ static int ext4_check_descriptors(struct
+ 	struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb);
+ 	ext4_fsblk_t first_block = le32_to_cpu(sbi->s_es->s_first_data_block);
+ 	ext4_fsblk_t last_block;
++	ext4_fsblk_t last_bg_block = sb_block + ext4_bg_num_gdb(sb, 0) + 1;
+ 	ext4_fsblk_t block_bitmap;
+ 	ext4_fsblk_t inode_bitmap;
+ 	ext4_fsblk_t inode_table;
+@@ -2339,6 +2340,14 @@ static int ext4_check_descriptors(struct
+ 			if (!sb_rdonly(sb))
+ 				return 0;
+ 		}
++		if (block_bitmap >= sb_block + 1 &&
++		    block_bitmap <= last_bg_block) {
++			ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "ext4_check_descriptors: "
++				 "Block bitmap for group %u overlaps "
++				 "block group descriptors", i);
++			if (!sb_rdonly(sb))
++				return 0;
++		}
+ 		if (block_bitmap < first_block || block_bitmap > last_block) {
+ 			ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "ext4_check_descriptors: "
+ 			       "Block bitmap for group %u not in group "
+@@ -2353,6 +2362,14 @@ static int ext4_check_descriptors(struct
+ 			if (!sb_rdonly(sb))
+ 				return 0;
+ 		}
++		if (inode_bitmap >= sb_block + 1 &&
++		    inode_bitmap <= last_bg_block) {
++			ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "ext4_check_descriptors: "
++				 "Inode bitmap for group %u overlaps "
++				 "block group descriptors", i);
++			if (!sb_rdonly(sb))
++				return 0;
++		}
+ 		if (inode_bitmap < first_block || inode_bitmap > last_block) {
+ 			ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "ext4_check_descriptors: "
+ 			       "Inode bitmap for group %u not in group "
+@@ -2367,6 +2384,14 @@ static int ext4_check_descriptors(struct
+ 			if (!sb_rdonly(sb))
+ 				return 0;
+ 		}
++		if (inode_table >= sb_block + 1 &&
++		    inode_table <= last_bg_block) {
++			ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "ext4_check_descriptors: "
++				 "Inode table for group %u overlaps "
++				 "block group descriptors", i);
++			if (!sb_rdonly(sb))
++				return 0;
++		}
+ 		if (inode_table < first_block ||
+ 		    inode_table + sbi->s_itb_per_group - 1 > last_block) {
+ 			ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "ext4_check_descriptors: "
diff --git a/debian/patches/bugfix/all/ext4-never-move-the-system.data-xattr-out-of-the-ino.patch b/debian/patches/bugfix/all/ext4-never-move-the-system.data-xattr-out-of-the-ino.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..ea530a7a2665
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/bugfix/all/ext4-never-move-the-system.data-xattr-out-of-the-ino.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
+Date: Sat, 16 Jun 2018 15:40:48 -0400
+Subject: ext4: never move the system.data xattr out of the inode body
+Origin: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/ext4.git/commit?id=896003d9fd652666080a06411d4238ee6eb4fb76
+Bug-Debian-Security: https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2018-10880
+
+When expanding the extra isize space, we must never move the
+system.data xattr out of the inode body.  For performance reasons, it
+doesn't make any sense, and the inline data implementation assumes
+that system.data xattr is never in the external xattr block.
+
+This addresses CVE-2018-10880
+
+https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200005
+
+Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
+---
+ fs/ext4/xattr.c | 5 +++++
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/fs/ext4/xattr.c
++++ b/fs/ext4/xattr.c
+@@ -2657,6 +2657,11 @@ static int ext4_xattr_make_inode_space(h
+ 		last = IFIRST(header);
+ 		/* Find the entry best suited to be pushed into EA block */
+ 		for (; !IS_LAST_ENTRY(last); last = EXT4_XATTR_NEXT(last)) {
++			/* never move system.data out of the inode */
++			if ((last->e_name_len == 4) &&
++			    (last->e_name_index == EXT4_XATTR_INDEX_SYSTEM) &&
++			    !memcmp(last->e_name, "data", 4))
++				continue;
+ 			total_size = EXT4_XATTR_LEN(last->e_name_len);
+ 			if (!last->e_value_inum)
+ 				total_size += EXT4_XATTR_SIZE(
diff --git a/debian/patches/bugfix/all/ext4-only-look-at-the-bg_flags-field-if-it-is-valid.patch b/debian/patches/bugfix/all/ext4-only-look-at-the-bg_flags-field-if-it-is-valid.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..1eba51ee725f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/bugfix/all/ext4-only-look-at-the-bg_flags-field-if-it-is-valid.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
+Date: Thu, 14 Jun 2018 00:58:00 -0400
+Subject: ext4: only look at the bg_flags field if it is valid
+Origin: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/ext4.git/commit?id=32a82d31527ae9cb568f5d7fa5ad27b2860324ed
+Bug-Debian-Security: https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2018-10876
+
+The bg_flags field in the block group descripts is only valid if the
+uninit_bg or metadata_csum feature is enabled.  We were not
+consistently looking at this field; fix this.
+
+Also block group #0 must never have uninitialized allocation bitmaps,
+or need to be zeroed, since that's where the root inode, and other
+special inodes are set up.  Check for these conditions and mark the
+file system as corrupted if they are detected.
+
+This addresses CVE-2018-10876.
+
+https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199403
+
+Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
+---
+ fs/ext4/balloc.c  | 11 ++++++++++-
+ fs/ext4/ialloc.c  | 14 ++++++++++++--
+ fs/ext4/mballoc.c |  6 ++++--
+ fs/ext4/super.c   | 11 ++++++++++-
+ 4 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/fs/ext4/balloc.c
++++ b/fs/ext4/balloc.c
+@@ -451,7 +451,16 @@ ext4_read_block_bitmap_nowait(struct sup
+ 		goto verify;
+ 	}
+ 	ext4_lock_group(sb, block_group);
+-	if (desc->bg_flags & cpu_to_le16(EXT4_BG_BLOCK_UNINIT)) {
++	if (ext4_has_group_desc_csum(sb) &&
++	    (desc->bg_flags & cpu_to_le16(EXT4_BG_BLOCK_UNINIT))) {
++		if (block_group == 0) {
++			ext4_unlock_group(sb, block_group);
++			unlock_buffer(bh);
++			ext4_error(sb, "Block bitmap for bg 0 marked "
++				   "uninitialized");
++			err = -EFSCORRUPTED;
++			goto out;
++		}
+ 		err = ext4_init_block_bitmap(sb, bh, block_group, desc);
+ 		set_bitmap_uptodate(bh);
+ 		set_buffer_uptodate(bh);
+--- a/fs/ext4/ialloc.c
++++ b/fs/ext4/ialloc.c
+@@ -155,7 +155,16 @@ ext4_read_inode_bitmap(struct super_bloc
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	ext4_lock_group(sb, block_group);
+-	if (desc->bg_flags & cpu_to_le16(EXT4_BG_INODE_UNINIT)) {
++	if (ext4_has_group_desc_csum(sb) &&
++	    (desc->bg_flags & cpu_to_le16(EXT4_BG_INODE_UNINIT))) {
++		if (block_group == 0) {
++			ext4_unlock_group(sb, block_group);
++			unlock_buffer(bh);
++			ext4_error(sb, "Inode bitmap for bg 0 marked "
++				   "uninitialized");
++			err = -EFSCORRUPTED;
++			goto out;
++		}
+ 		memset(bh->b_data, 0, (EXT4_INODES_PER_GROUP(sb) + 7) / 8);
+ 		ext4_mark_bitmap_end(EXT4_INODES_PER_GROUP(sb),
+ 				     sb->s_blocksize * 8, bh->b_data);
+@@ -1000,7 +1009,8 @@ got:
+ 
+ 		/* recheck and clear flag under lock if we still need to */
+ 		ext4_lock_group(sb, group);
+-		if (gdp->bg_flags & cpu_to_le16(EXT4_BG_BLOCK_UNINIT)) {
++		if (ext4_has_group_desc_csum(sb) &&
++		    (gdp->bg_flags & cpu_to_le16(EXT4_BG_BLOCK_UNINIT))) {
+ 			gdp->bg_flags &= cpu_to_le16(~EXT4_BG_BLOCK_UNINIT);
+ 			ext4_free_group_clusters_set(sb, gdp,
+ 				ext4_free_clusters_after_init(sb, group, gdp));
+--- a/fs/ext4/mballoc.c
++++ b/fs/ext4/mballoc.c
+@@ -2444,7 +2444,8 @@ int ext4_mb_add_groupinfo(struct super_b
+ 	 * initialize bb_free to be able to skip
+ 	 * empty groups without initialization
+ 	 */
+-	if (desc->bg_flags & cpu_to_le16(EXT4_BG_BLOCK_UNINIT)) {
++	if (ext4_has_group_desc_csum(sb) &&
++	    (desc->bg_flags & cpu_to_le16(EXT4_BG_BLOCK_UNINIT))) {
+ 		meta_group_info[i]->bb_free =
+ 			ext4_free_clusters_after_init(sb, group, desc);
+ 	} else {
+@@ -3011,7 +3012,8 @@ ext4_mb_mark_diskspace_used(struct ext4_
+ #endif
+ 	ext4_set_bits(bitmap_bh->b_data, ac->ac_b_ex.fe_start,
+ 		      ac->ac_b_ex.fe_len);
+-	if (gdp->bg_flags & cpu_to_le16(EXT4_BG_BLOCK_UNINIT)) {
++	if (ext4_has_group_desc_csum(sb) &&
++	    (gdp->bg_flags & cpu_to_le16(EXT4_BG_BLOCK_UNINIT))) {
+ 		gdp->bg_flags &= cpu_to_le16(~EXT4_BG_BLOCK_UNINIT);
+ 		ext4_free_group_clusters_set(sb, gdp,
+ 					     ext4_free_clusters_after_init(sb,
+--- a/fs/ext4/super.c
++++ b/fs/ext4/super.c
+@@ -3098,13 +3098,22 @@ static ext4_group_t ext4_has_uninit_itab
+ 	ext4_group_t group, ngroups = EXT4_SB(sb)->s_groups_count;
+ 	struct ext4_group_desc *gdp = NULL;
+ 
++	if (!ext4_has_group_desc_csum(sb))
++		return ngroups;
++
+ 	for (group = 0; group < ngroups; group++) {
+ 		gdp = ext4_get_group_desc(sb, group, NULL);
+ 		if (!gdp)
+ 			continue;
+ 
+-		if (!(gdp->bg_flags & cpu_to_le16(EXT4_BG_INODE_ZEROED)))
++		if (gdp->bg_flags & cpu_to_le16(EXT4_BG_INODE_ZEROED))
++			continue;
++		if (group != 0)
+ 			break;
++		ext4_error(sb, "Inode table for bg 0 marked as "
++			   "needing zeroing");
++		if (sb_rdonly(sb))
++			return ngroups;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	return group;
diff --git a/debian/patches/bugfix/all/ext4-verify-the-depth-of-extent-tree-in-ext4_find_ex.patch b/debian/patches/bugfix/all/ext4-verify-the-depth-of-extent-tree-in-ext4_find_ex.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..06220d2f2f8e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/bugfix/all/ext4-verify-the-depth-of-extent-tree-in-ext4_find_ex.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
+Date: Thu, 14 Jun 2018 12:55:10 -0400
+Subject: ext4: verify the depth of extent tree in ext4_find_extent()
+Origin: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/ext4.git/commit?id=0a8173832987f52ab6926dbdf1cd3991ca615000
+Bug-Debian-Security: https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2018-10877
+
+If there is a corupted file system where the claimed depth of the
+extent tree is -1, this can cause a massive buffer overrun leading to
+sadness.
+
+This addresses CVE-2018-10877.
+
+https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199417
+
+Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
+---
+ fs/ext4/ext4_extents.h | 1 +
+ fs/ext4/extents.c      | 6 ++++++
+ 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/fs/ext4/ext4_extents.h
++++ b/fs/ext4/ext4_extents.h
+@@ -91,6 +91,7 @@ struct ext4_extent_header {
+ };
+ 
+ #define EXT4_EXT_MAGIC		cpu_to_le16(0xf30a)
++#define EXT4_MAX_EXTENT_DEPTH 5
+ 
+ #define EXT4_EXTENT_TAIL_OFFSET(hdr) \
+ 	(sizeof(struct ext4_extent_header) + \
+--- a/fs/ext4/extents.c
++++ b/fs/ext4/extents.c
+@@ -869,6 +869,12 @@ ext4_find_extent(struct inode *inode, ex
+ 
+ 	eh = ext_inode_hdr(inode);
+ 	depth = ext_depth(inode);
++	if (depth < 0 || depth > EXT4_MAX_EXTENT_DEPTH) {
++		EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "inode has invalid extent depth: %d",
++				 depth);
++		ret = -EFSCORRUPTED;
++		goto err;
++	}
+ 
+ 	if (path) {
+ 		ext4_ext_drop_refs(path);
diff --git a/debian/patches/bugfix/all/jbd2-don-t-mark-block-as-modified-if-the-handle-is-o.patch b/debian/patches/bugfix/all/jbd2-don-t-mark-block-as-modified-if-the-handle-is-o.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..2db45203909b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/bugfix/all/jbd2-don-t-mark-block-as-modified-if-the-handle-is-o.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
+Date: Sat, 16 Jun 2018 20:21:45 -0400
+Subject: jbd2: don't mark block as modified if the handle is out of credits
+Origin: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/ext4.git/commit?id=aa18d2cefac6c34885659d12c3fdcffcd6c54e9a
+Bug-Debian-Security: https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2018-10883
+
+Do not set the b_modified flag in block's journal head should not
+until after we're sure that jbd2_journal_dirty_metadat() will not
+abort with an error due to there not being enough space reserved in
+the jbd2 handle.
+
+Otherwise, future attempts to modify the buffer may lead a large
+number of spurious errors and warnings.
+
+This addresses CVE-2018-10883.
+
+https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200071
+
+Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
+---
+ fs/jbd2/transaction.c | 9 ++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/fs/jbd2/transaction.c
++++ b/fs/jbd2/transaction.c
+@@ -1363,6 +1363,13 @@ int jbd2_journal_dirty_metadata(handle_t
+ 		if (jh->b_transaction == transaction &&
+ 		    jh->b_jlist != BJ_Metadata) {
+ 			jbd_lock_bh_state(bh);
++			if (jh->b_transaction == transaction &&
++			    jh->b_jlist != BJ_Metadata)
++				pr_err("JBD2: assertion failure: h_type=%u "
++				       "h_line_no=%u block_no=%llu jlist=%u\n",
++				       handle->h_type, handle->h_line_no,
++				       (unsigned long long) bh->b_blocknr,
++				       jh->b_jlist);
+ 			J_ASSERT_JH(jh, jh->b_transaction != transaction ||
+ 					jh->b_jlist == BJ_Metadata);
+ 			jbd_unlock_bh_state(bh);
+@@ -1382,11 +1389,11 @@ int jbd2_journal_dirty_metadata(handle_t
+ 		 * of the transaction. This needs to be done
+ 		 * once a transaction -bzzz
+ 		 */
+-		jh->b_modified = 1;
+ 		if (handle->h_buffer_credits <= 0) {
+ 			ret = -ENOSPC;
+ 			goto out_unlock_bh;
+ 		}
++		jh->b_modified = 1;
+ 		handle->h_buffer_credits--;
+ 	}
+ 
diff --git a/debian/patches/series b/debian/patches/series
index def1bb5210e6..c2c2db5959e1 100644
--- a/debian/patches/series
+++ b/debian/patches/series
@@ -133,6 +133,17 @@ features/all/lockdown/arm64-add-kernel-config-option-to-lock-down-when.patch
 debian/i386-686-pae-pci-set-pci-nobios-by-default.patch
 bugfix/x86/virt-vbox-Only-copy_from_user-the-request-header-onc.patch
 bugfix/all/tracing-check-for-no-filter-when-processing-event-fi.patch
+bugfix/all/ext4-add-corruption-check-in-ext4_xattr_set_entry.patch
+bugfix/all/ext4-always-verify-the-magic-number-in-xattr-blocks.patch
+bugfix/all/ext4-always-check-block-group-bounds-in-ext4_init_bl.patch
+bugfix/all/ext4-make-sure-bitmaps-and-the-inode-table-don-t-ove.patch
+bugfix/all/ext4-only-look-at-the-bg_flags-field-if-it-is-valid.patch
+bugfix/all/ext4-verify-the-depth-of-extent-tree-in-ext4_find_ex.patch
+bugfix/all/ext4-clear-i_data-in-ext4_inode_info-when-removing-i.patch
+bugfix/all/ext4-never-move-the-system.data-xattr-out-of-the-ino.patch
+bugfix/all/jbd2-don-t-mark-block-as-modified-if-the-handle-is-o.patch
+bugfix/all/ext4-avoid-running-out-of-journal-credits-when-appen.patch
+bugfix/all/ext4-add-more-inode-number-paranoia-checks.patch
 
 # Fix exported symbol versions
 bugfix/all/module-disable-matching-missing-version-crc.patch