cryptfs_hw: Remove android reboot during password check

After reaching the maximum number of retires with wrong password,
userdata is erased based on the info written on /cache partition.
As per the latest changes of A/B, cache partition is not present
which leads to failure of userdata wipe before reboot. This patch
removes reboot from cryptfs_hw layer if max entries reached, as
frameworks take care of userdata wipe.

Change-Id: If97f2f7452beb004f44d7d41d1d76def23fe2720

1 files changed, 1 insertions, 14 deletions

diff --git a/cryptfs_hw.c b/cryptfs_hw.c
index c7b1b30..0006966 100755
--- a/cryptfs_hw.c
+++ b/cryptfs_hw.c
@@ -117,19 +117,6 @@ static unsigned char* get_tmp_passwd(const char* passwd)
     return tmp_passwd;
 }
 
-static void wipe_userdata()
-{
-    mkdir("/cache/recovery", 0700);
-    int fd = open("/cache/recovery/command", O_RDWR|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC|O_NOFOLLOW, 0600);
-    if (fd >= 0) {
-        write(fd, "--wipe_data", strlen("--wipe_data") + 1);
-        close(fd);
-    } else {
-        SLOGE("could not open /cache/recovery/command\n");
-    }
-    android_reboot(ANDROID_RB_RESTART2, 0, "recovery");
-}
-
 static int is_qseecom_up()
 {
     int i = 0;
@@ -208,7 +195,7 @@ static int set_key(const char* currentpasswd, const char* passwd, const char* en
             }
             if(err < 0) {
                 if(ERR_MAX_PASSWORD_ATTEMPTS == err)
-                    wipe_userdata();
+                    SLOGI("Maximum wrong password attempts reached, will erase userdata\n");
             }
             secure_memset(tmp_passwd, 0, MAX_PASSWORD_LEN);
             free(tmp_passwd);