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Bug: 117508900
Change-Id: I4889513c0671ff2b689f1beca8084d6f149d473d
Test: Existing tests pass
(cherry picked from commit 29d54b87f121c79d5df87b0b2bcd7a1eb6090c1f)
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ieee802_11_rx_wnmsleep_req() might be called for a short frame that has
no more payload after the Public Action field, i.e., with len == 0. The
bounds checking for the payload length was done only for the information
elements while the one octet Dialog Token field was read
unconditionally. This could result in reading one octet beyond the end
of the received frame data.
Depending on driver interface specific mechanism used for fetching the
frame, this could result in reading one octet beyond the end of a
stack/hash buffer or reading an uninitialized octet from within a
buffer. The actual value that was read as the Dialog Token field is not
used since the function returns immediately after having read this value
when there is no information elements following the field.
This issue was initially added in commit d32d94dbf47a ("WNM: Add
WNM-Sleep Mode implementation for AP") (with CONFIG_IEEE80211V=y build
option) and it remained in place during number of cleanup and fix
changes in this area and renaming of the build parameter to
CONFIG_WNM=y. The impacted function was not included in any default
build without one of the these optional build options being explicitly
enabled. CONFIG_WNM=y is still documented as "experimental and not
complete implementation" in hostapd/defconfig. In addition, commit
114f2830d2c2 ("WNM: Ignore WNM-Sleep Mode Request in wnm_sleep_mode=0
case") made this function exit before the impact read if WNM-Sleep Mode
support was not explicitly enabled in runtime configuration
(wnm_sleep_mode=1 in hostapd.conf).
Fix this by explicitly checking the frame has enough payload before
reading the Dialog Token field.
Bug: 111893132
Change-Id: I4b61e22c39d1a5683923eff34e43bb0c509913d4
Merged-In: I4b61e22c39d1a5683923eff34e43bb0c509913d4
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org>
(cherry picked from commit 7a543744db8ece2376b019040b5668ede68ebd8b)
CVE-2018-9589
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The Setup Response timer is relatively fast (500 ms) and there are
instances where it fires on the responder side after the initiator has
already sent out the TDLS Setup Confirm frame. Prevent the processing of
this stale TDLS Setup Response frame on the initiator side.
Change-Id: I595f41dc803d6707ee8d0ea220f594cce750139a
Signed-off-by: Arik Nemtsov <arikx.nemtsov@intel.com>
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Instead of setting the default PMK length for the cleared PMK, set the
length to 0 and explicitly check for this when deriving PTK to avoid
unexpected key derivation with an all-zeroes key should it be possible
to somehow trigger PTK derivation to happen before PMK derivation.
Change-Id: Ifef3b2ca5ee19e6e89df75fef697e7215f926cb1
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
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This makes it easier to understand the cases where PMK gets configured
based on information from upper layer call (e.g., a PSK).
Change-Id: Ic7cbb18ed37de89d7378503c6b3d0f1da63db4dd
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
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Currently, reinstallations of the PTK are prevented by (1) assuring the
same TPTK is only set once as the PTK, and (2) that one particular PTK
is only installed once. This patch makes it more explicit that point (1)
is required to prevent key reinstallations. At the same time, this patch
hardens wpa_supplicant such that future changes do not accidentally
break this property.
Change-Id: Id03f4790d93deb1bc34b1055fb85ec80c5229bcc
Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
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This was originally added to allow the IEEE 802.11 protocol to be
tested, but there are no known fully functional implementations based on
this nor any known deployments of PeerKey functionality. Furthermore,
PeerKey design in the IEEE Std 802.11-2016 standard has already been
marked as obsolete for DLS and it is being considered for complete
removal in REVmd.
This implementation did not really work, so it could not have been used
in practice. For example, key configuration was using incorrect
algorithm values (WPA_CIPHER_* instead of WPA_ALG_*) which resulted in
mapping to an invalid WPA_ALG_* value for the actual driver operation.
As such, the derived key could not have been successfully set for the
link.
Since there are bugs in this implementation and there does not seem to
be any future for the PeerKey design with DLS (TDLS being the future for
DLS), the best approach is to simply delete all this code to simplify
the EAPOL-Key handling design and to get rid of any potential issues if
these code paths were accidentially reachable.
Change-Id: I10294a9ef31c46a27416a6063255939dcedc57d5
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
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This allows ext_mgmt_frame_handling=1 cases with hostapd to process TX
status events based on external processing. This is useful for increased
test coverage of management frame processing.
Change-Id: I056ec2a06334762245dfcb8261b9427e818ef52c
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
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The driver is expected to not report a second association event without
the station having explicitly request a new association. As such, this
case should not be reachable. However, since reconfiguring the same
pairwise or group keys to the driver could result in nonce reuse issues,
be extra careful here and do an additional state check to avoid this
even if the local driver ends up somehow accepting an unexpected
Reassociation Response frame.
Change-Id: Ie76301550e96bfcfe252d874f2e83deb0aeb9533
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
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Commit 03ed0a52393710be6bdae657d1b36efa146520e5 ('WNM: Ignore WNM-Sleep
Mode Response if WNM-Sleep Mode has not been used') started ignoring the
response when no WNM-Sleep Mode Request had been used during the
association. This can be made tighter by clearing the used flag when
successfully processing a response. This adds an additional layer of
protection against unexpected retransmissions of the response frame.
Change-Id: I87ab15f88b604c70512d12426352876ad526ced4
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
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Do not try to reconfigure the same TPK-TK to the driver after it has
been successfully configured. This is an explicit check to avoid issues
related to resetting the TX/RX packet number. There was already a check
for this for TPK M2 (retries of that message are ignored completely), so
that behavior does not get modified.
For TPK M3, the TPK-TK could have been reconfigured, but that was
followed by immediate teardown of the link due to an issue in updating
the STA entry. Furthermore, for TDLS with any real security (i.e.,
ignoring open/WEP), the TPK message exchange is protected on the AP path
and simple replay attacks are not feasible.
As an additional corner case, make sure the local nonce gets updated if
the peer uses a very unlikely "random nonce" of all zeros.
Change-Id: I84131f30c358f27aaf6277e8957d165bca5102aa
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
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The Authenticator state machine path for PTK rekeying ended up bypassing
the AUTHENTICATION2 state where a new ANonce is generated when going
directly to the PTKSTART state since there is no need to try to
determine the PMK again in such a case. This is far from ideal since the
new PTK would depend on a new nonce only from the supplicant.
Fix this by generating a new ANonce when moving to the PTKSTART state
for the purpose of starting new 4-way handshake to rekey PTK.
Change-Id: I7887f36a0f9e7710bc40fbe5014ea8867d7f5f72
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
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Properly track whether a PTK has already been installed to the driver
and the TK part cleared from memory. This prevents an attacker from
trying to trick the client into installing an all-zero TK.
This fixes the earlier fix in commit
ad00d64e7d8827b3cebd665a0ceb08adabf15e1e ('Fix TK configuration to the
driver in EAPOL-Key 3/4 retry case') which did not take into account
possibility of an extra message 1/4 showing up between retries of
message 3/4.
Change-Id: I6b5f6f2a1c0495575eb5a1576462768ddc89f09c
Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
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This extends the protection to track last configured GTK/IGTK value
separately from EAPOL-Key frames and WNM-Sleep Mode frames to cover a
corner case where these two different mechanisms may get used when the
GTK/IGTK has changed and tracking a single value is not sufficient to
detect a possible key reconfiguration.
Change-Id: I6c377809a8590e7a6f2c1c87017d666b82602ad4
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
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Track the current GTK and IGTK that is in use and when receiving a
(possibly retransmitted) Group Message 1 or WNM-Sleep Mode Response, do
not install the given key if it is already in use. This prevents an
attacker from trying to trick the client into resetting or lowering the
sequence counter associated to the group key.
Change-Id: Ib0565e90e62115cc91ac36be3dae3b064e1baa1e
Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
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Do not reinstall TK to the driver during Reassociation Response frame
processing if the first attempt of setting the TK succeeded. This avoids
issues related to clearing the TX/RX PN that could result in reusing
same PN values for transmitted frames (e.g., due to CCM nonce reuse and
also hitting replay protection on the receiver) and accepting replayed
frames on RX side.
This issue was introduced by the commit
0e84c25434e6a1f283c7b4e62e483729085b78d2 ('FT: Fix PTK configuration in
authenticator') which allowed wpa_ft_install_ptk() to be called multiple
times with the same PTK. While the second configuration attempt is
needed with some drivers, it must be done only if the first attempt
failed.
Change-Id: I45909184ad3dc8f3f608ce99ee853f3551323458
Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
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P802.11i/D3.0 described the Key Length as having value 16 for the group
key handshake. However, this was changed to 0 in the published IEEE Std
802.11i-2004 amendment (and still remains 0 in the current standard IEEE
Std 802.11-2016). We need to maintain the non-zero value for WPA (v1)
cases, but the RSN case can be changed to 0 to be closer to the current
standard.
Change-Id: I96d654977f7e801a8993d017dad7465cc4aba758
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
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git://codeaurora.org/platform/external/wpa_supplicant_8 into cm-13.0
Change-Id: I110d3aa8efe7861b7a5b0dd570bfe5b0ec88e6be
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CRs Change ID Subject
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1003412 I033aced040c894f4dc4791c4e5081135976ebd0c Add assocresp_elements parameter for hostapd
Change-Id: I5812f488605aead5802f58aa380483e646f557cd
CRs-Fixed: 1003412
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wlan-service.lnx.1.0-dev.1.0
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This new parameter allows hostapd to add Vendor Specific elements into
(Re)Association Response frames similarly to the way vendor_elements
parameter can be used for Beacon and Probe Response frames.
Git-commit: a9112270615dd68d422623ebc26c21a6887a2a11
Git-repo : git://w1.fi/srv/git/hostap.git
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Change-Id: I033aced040c894f4dc4791c4e5081135976ebd0c
CRs-Fixed: 1003412
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CRs Change ID Subject
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
979946 Ib3e11ee78cbe8e4d875d6c43dc2ec5539043fdb1 hostapd: Add Transmit Power Envelope IE when VHT is enab
Change-Id: Idae67eff1883977e326d8f4a8d85993bf93d3d9a
CRs-Fixed: 979946
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Add Transmit Power Envelope element defined in IEEE P802.11-REVmc/D4.3,
8.4.2.161.
Git-commit: 3c417499e71b0c7f2dfae69fb1b67eb31e467ba6
Git-repo : git://w1.fi/srv/git/hostap.git
CRs-Fixed: 979946
Change-Id: Ib3e11ee78cbe8e4d875d6c43dc2ec5539043fdb1
Signed-off-by: Rajkumar Manoharan <rmanohar@qti.qualcomm.com>
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CRs Change ID Subject
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1002261 Ic045516f31520fbe8ba068c88fe247df1746f29a P2P: Continue p2p_find after sending non-success Invitat
Change-Id: Ifebd671c03e9ebbd00a6be7c5fc1f30673743cf7
CRs-Fixed: 1002261
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This was previously handled for the case where the non-success
Invitation Response frame was sent out during the Listen phase. However,
in the case the Action frame TX ended up getting scheduled when the
Search phase scan had already started (e.g., due to the driver reporting
Invitation Request RX late enough for the Listen-to-Search transition
having already started), the postponed Action frame TX status processing
did not cover the specific case of non-success Invitation Response. This
could result in the p2p_find operation getting stopped (stuck in SEARCH
state) unexpectedly
Fix this by calling p2p_check_after_scan_tx_continuation() from
Invitation Response TX callback handler if the invitation was rejected.
CRs-Fixed: 1002261
Git-commit: 3433721c5f9073c0d45c1109b825f1dcbabbf517
Git-repo : git://w1.fi/srv/git/hostap.git
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Change-Id: Ic045516f31520fbe8ba068c88fe247df1746f29a
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CRs Change ID Subject
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1007548 I35e8483bdda5c391b95da42c2f577d5e9217f2e2 Remove newlines from wpa_supplicant config network outpu
1007548 Ibb1eeb6b727c27ecc4a2efce57f5394e98051061 Reject SET commands with newline characters in the strin
1007548 Ifa826eb7de2cba5458e8bb31dca3259cb37b4005 Reject psk parameter set with invalid passphrase charact
1007548 I2b439a72af08a744ce5bf74a05b2cac817fe5b05 WPS: Reject a Credential with invalid passphrase
1031991 I2934fbf676c803059e62ba2436c1181efb05a294 hostapd: Skip hostapd ACL check for drivers supporting A
1032710 Ibd9e3dc79cb1a7650b3adc55afdc95818a2e011b eap_proxy: postpone qmi init until demonize
1007548 Ib8222446297317f4e57bdb49597fdf6d19554886 Reject SET_CRED commands with newline characters in the
Change-Id: I7955e55240d97be6022ffad8c2229b5896d9a33a
CRs-Fixed: 1031991, 1007548, 1032710
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wlan-service.lnx.1.0-dev.1.0
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Parent thread exits when daemonize. This will cause child threads
to die and eap_proxy_post_init is not executed
To fix this, child thread should be created after demonize
Change-Id: Ibd9e3dc79cb1a7650b3adc55afdc95818a2e011b
CRs-Fixed: 1032710
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into wlan-service.lnx.1.0-dev.1.0
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Many of the global configuration parameters are written as strings
without filtering and if there is an embedded newline character in the
value, unexpected configuration file data might be written.
This fixes an issue where wpa_supplicant could have updated the
configuration file global parameter with arbitrary data from the control
interface or D-Bus interface. While those interfaces are supposed to be
accessible only for trusted users/applications, it may be possible that
an untrusted user has access to a management software component that
does not validate the value of a parameter before passing it to
wpa_supplicant.
This could allow such an untrusted user to inject almost arbitrary data
into the configuration file. Such configuration file could result in
wpa_supplicant trying to load a library (e.g., opensc_engine_path,
pkcs11_engine_path, pkcs11_module_path, load_dynamic_eap) from user
controlled location when starting again. This would allow code from that
library to be executed under the wpa_supplicant process privileges
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Git-commit: 2a3f56502b52375c3bf113cf92adfa99bad6b488
Git-repo: git://w1.fi/srv/git/hostap.git
Change-Id: Ibb1eeb6b727c27ecc4a2efce57f5394e98051061
CRs-fixed: 1007548
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values" into wlan-service.lnx.1.0-dev.1.0
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Most of the cred block parameters are written as strings without
filtering and if there is an embedded newline character in the value,
unexpected configuration file data might be written.
This fixes an issue where wpa_supplicant could have updated the
configuration file cred parameter with arbitrary data from the control
interface or D-Bus interface. While those interfaces are supposed to be
accessible only for trusted users/applications, it may be possible that
an untrusted user has access to a management software component that
does not validate the credential value before passing it to
wpa_supplicant.
This could allow such an untrusted user to inject almost arbitrary data
into the configuration file. Such configuration file could result in
wpa_supplicant trying to load a library (e.g., opensc_engine_path,
pkcs11_engine_path, pkcs11_module_path, load_dynamic_eap) from user
controlled location when starting again. This would allow code from that
library to be executed under the wpa_supplicant process privileges
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Git-commit: b166cd84a77a6717be9600bf95378a0055d6f5a5
Git-repo: git://w1.fi/srv/git/hostap.git
Change-Id: Ib8222446297317f4e57bdb49597fdf6d19554886
CRs-fixed: 1007548
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wlan-service.lnx.1.0-dev.1.0
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Spurious newlines output while writing the config file can corrupt the
wpa_supplicant configuration. Avoid writing these for the network block
parameters. This is a generic filter that cover cases that may not have
been explicitly addressed with a more specific commit to avoid control
characters in the psk parameter.
Signed-off-by: Paul Stewart <pstew@google.com>
Git-commit: 0fe5a234240a108b294a87174ad197f6b5cb38e9
Git-repo: git://w1.fi/srv/git/hostap.git
Change-Id: I35e8483bdda5c391b95da42c2f577d5e9217f2e2
CRs-fixed: 1007548
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wlan-service.lnx.1.0-dev.1.0
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WPA/WPA2-Personal passphrase is not allowed to include control
characters. Reject a passphrase configuration attempt if that passphrase
includes an invalid passphrase.
This fixes an issue where wpa_supplicant could have updated the
configuration file psk parameter with arbitrary data from the control
interface or D-Bus interface. While those interfaces are supposed to be
accessible only for trusted users/applications, it may be possible that
an untrusted user has access to a management software component that
does not validate the passphrase value before passing it to
wpa_supplicant.
This could allow such an untrusted user to inject up to 63 characters of
almost arbitrary data into the configuration file. Such configuration
file could result in wpa_supplicant trying to load a library (e.g.,
opensc_engine_path, pkcs11_engine_path, pkcs11_module_path,
load_dynamic_eap) from user controlled location when starting again.
This would allow code from that library to be executed under the
wpa_supplicant process privileges.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Git-commit: 73e4abb24a936014727924d8b0b2965edfc117dd
Git-repo: git://w1.fi/srv/git/hostap.git
Change-Id: Ifa826eb7de2cba5458e8bb31dca3259cb37b4005
CRs-fixed: 1007548
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wlan-service.lnx.1.0-dev.1.0
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WPA/WPA2-Personal passphrase is not allowed to include control
characters. Reject a Credential received from a WPS Registrar both as
STA (Credential) and AP (AP Settings) if the credential is for WPAPSK or
WPA2PSK authentication type and includes an invalid passphrase.
This fixes an issue where hostapd or wpa_supplicant could have updated
the configuration file PSK/passphrase parameter with arbitrary data from
an external device (Registrar) that may not be fully trusted. Should
such data include a newline character, the resulting configuration file
could become invalid and fail to be parsed.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Git-commit: ecbb0b3dc122b0d290987cf9c84010bbe53e1022
Git-repo: git://w1.fi/srv/git/hostap.git
Change-Id: I2b439a72af08a744ce5bf74a05b2cac817fe5b05
CRs-fixed: 1007548
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Commit 0603bcb7fe8babf183362518238c142afe8e2036 ('hostapd: Process MAC
ACLs on a station association event (SME in driver)') processes MAC ACL
on a station association event for drivers which use AP SME offload but
does not consider the scenario where the drivers offload ACL. This can
result in station disconnection, though the driver accepts the
connection. Address this by avoiding the hostapd ACL check for the
drivers offloading MAC ACL.
CRs-Fixed: 1031991
Git-commit: bb4e19e3f4c9d1973279b3b768bc0539ee7cb962
Git-repo : git://w1.fi/srv/git/hostap.git
Change-Id: I2934fbf676c803059e62ba2436c1181efb05a294
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
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* The QMI libraries are linked with the intermediate lib, we don't
need to link them directly to the executable.
Change-Id: Ifedf5c480af6b5f0309cd36da719e98ae3a69750
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Ticket: CYNGNOS-3020
Change-Id: Id6463c0079b8456594f7661c39b41810291fb40b
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If there is no retrieved parameter, we should not de-reference null
Bug: 27748546
Change-Id: I8e6ceba26ab7d73ab365b72c0bfdcdb0a36a59a7
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Spurious newlines output while writing the config file can
corrupt the wpa_supplicant configuration. Avoid writing these.
Bug: 27371366
Change-Id: I3bb99b8c46dba1c81cbccc76ed0cd01abc3ccef9
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WNM Sleep Mode Response frame is used to update GTK/IGTK only if PMF is
enabled. Verify that PMF is in use before using this field on station
side to avoid accepting unauthenticated key updates.
Bug: 25266660
Change-Id: Ib4b80f9c9e4aa5ea0b827c5202809c9660ad9b39
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Shmidt <dimitrysh@google.com>
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* Not all branches support the new QMI invocations, so add
self-detection to deal with this.
Change-Id: Iff2c060505727cefab62715baaf82394257122ce
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Change-Id: I3a7806e0b4f407b8de646ed172cde37152d2f158
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Change-Id: I86c5e41e4d6987e432cb2f129ad585149228b04a
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Change-Id: I1e0259aad8516c8eacf50de6313a558f01032ae4
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In the mediatek platform the performance of p2p connections will
degrade significantly if different frequences are used for STA and
P2P.
Change-Id: I8bd7e4a3f10177c99d273eccb88c8590fcbe3d34
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in progress
This creates a race-condition between credentials management and association,
often kicking the connection state into a loop.
This does not apply if the EAP connection is proxied.
Change-Id: Ie43612c6112438dbdacad2a0f585c11674f5b53d
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